Sirisena v. City Univ. of N.Y.

9 Citing cases

  1. Mackenzie v. N.Y.C. Dept. of Educ.

    No. 21-CV-5711-LTS (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2023)

    . . constitutes a separate actionable unlawful employment practice” that starts the clock on the limitations period. Id.; see also Sirisena v. City Univ. of New York, No. 17-CV-7135-DLI-RML, 2019 WL 1493220, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2019) (“[D]enial of preferred job assignments is a prototypical example of a discrete act that is not subject to the continuing violation doctrine.”

  2. Garcia v. Regan

    19-cv-8482 (LJL) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2022)

    Thus, “[f]ailure to promote, refusal to rehire, termination, job reassignments, and unsatisfactory performance reviews are discrete acts that constitute separate actionable employment practices.” Hausdorf, 2018 WL 1871945, at *5 (citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114); see, e.g., Roache v. Long Island R.R., 487 F.Supp.3d 154, 169 (E.D.N.Y. 2020); Sirisena v. City Univ. of New York, 2019 WL 1493220, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31 2019); Gutierrez v. City of New York, 756 F.Supp.2d 491, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). Out-of-time claims may still “provide ‘relevant background evidence'” to any timely claims.

  3. Francois v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ.

    19 Civ. 11119 (ER) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2021)

    After all, the focus of this analysis is on the employer's alleged actions, rather than whether the employee continues to feel the effects of those actions over time. Sirisena v. City Univ. of N.Y., No. 17 Civ. 7135 (DLI) (RML), 2019 WL 1493220, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2019); see also Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258 (1980). Here, the Department's alleged constructive discharge of Francois is the type of isolated incident that defines a discrete act, rather than a continuing violation.

  4. Herz v. City of New York

    20-CV-2846 (JPO) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2021)

    Herz's continuing violation theory does not save his claim. "When evaluating discrimination claims under the continuing violation theory, the focus of the analysis is on the acts of the employer rather than the effect felt by the employee." Sirisena v. City Univ. of New York, No. 17 Civ. 7135, 2019 WL 1493220, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2019) (citing Elmenayer v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 318 F.3d 130, 135 (2d Cir. 2003)); see also Harris v. City of New York, 186 F.3d 243, 250 (2d Cir. 1999) ("[A] continuing violation cannot be established merely because the claimant continues to feel the effects of a time-barred discriminatory act."). The actions of BOE were discrete and occurred, at the latest, in 2017.

  5. Bernstein v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ.

    19-cv-11816 (LJL) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2020)   Cited 14 times
    Affirming Morgan ’s continuing relevance for the proposition that termination and refusal to rehire are discrete acts and that if one such discrete act is time barred, it is not actionable, even if it relates to acts alleged in the timely filed charge

    Thus, "[f]ailure to promote, refusal to rehire, termination, job reassignments, and unsatisfactory performance reviews are discrete acts that constitute separate actionable employment practices." Hausdorf, 2018 WL 1871945, at *5 (citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114); see, e.g., Roache v. Long Island R.R., 2020 WL 5594640, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Sept 17, 2020); Sirisena v. City Univ. of New York, 2019 WL 1493220, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31 2019); Gutierrez v. City of New York, 756 F. Supp. 2d 491, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); see also Mohamed v. New York Univ., 2015 WL 3387218, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2015) (noting that since Morgan, the continuing violation doctrine has been limited to "claims amounting to assertions of hostile-work environment or similar claims that 'cannot be said to occur on any particular day' but rather are the product of events that take place 'over a series of days and perhaps years'") (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115).

  6. Lahens v. AT&T Mobility P.R., Inc.

    CIVIL NO.: 18-1776 (MEL) (D.P.R. Sep. 8, 2020)   Cited 1 times

    Therefore, Plaintiff's claims related to the Sales Excellence Program are time-barred because the denial of a promotion and denial of preferred job assignments constitute discrete acts. See Sirisena v. City Univ. of New York, Civ. No. 17-7135, 2019 WL 1493220, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2019) ("denial of preferred job assignments is a prototypical example of a discrete act that is not subject to the continuing violation doctrine"); Shah v. Tunxis Cmty. College, Civ. No. 3:14-712, 2015 WL 4254909, at *7 (D. Conn. July 14, 2015); Anderson v. Nassau Cty. Dept. of Corr., 558 F. Supp. 2d 283, 297 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). Similarly, Plaintiff's claim related to the Compass program is also time-barred.

  7. Lahens v. AT&T Mobility P.R., Inc.

    CIVIL NO.: 18-1776 (MEL) (D.P.R. Sep. 4, 2020)

    Therefore, Plaintiff's claims related to the Sales Excellence Program are time-barred because the denial of a promotion and denial of preferred job assignments constitute discrete acts. See Sirisena v. City Univ. of New York, Civ. No. 17-7135, 2019 WL 1493220, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2019) ("denial of preferred job assignments is a prototypical example of a discrete act that is not subject to the continuing violation doctrine"); Shah v. Tunxis Cmty. College, Civ. No. 3:14-712, 2015 WL 4254909, at *7 (D. Conn. July 14, 2015); Anderson v. Nassau Cty. Dept. of Corr., 558 F. Supp. 2d 283, 297 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). Similarly, Plaintiff's claim related to the Compass program is also time-barred.

  8. Zoulas v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ.

    400 F. Supp. 3d 25 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)   Cited 101 times
    Holding the "inability to pursue per session work as a result of poor performance reviews rises to the level of an adverse employment action"

    Examples of discrete acts, for the purposes of the continuing violation doctrine, include disparate disciplining, negative performance reviews, termination, failure to promote, and denial of a preferred job position. See, e.g.,Sirisena v. City Univ. of New York , No. 17-CV-7135 (DLI) (RML), 2019 WL 1493220, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2019) ; Edner v. NYCTA-MTA , 134 F. Supp. 3d 657, 663 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) ; see also, e.g.,Glaser v. Fulton-Montgomery Cmty. Coll. , 50 F. App'x 17, 20 (2d Cir. 2002). "[M]ultiple incidents of discrimination, even similar ones, that are not the result of a discriminatory policy or mechanism do not amount to a continuing violation."

  9. Troise v. SUNY Cortland NY

    5:18-cv-00734 (BKS/ATB) (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2019)   Cited 2 times
    Taking judicial notice of the plaintiff's NYSDHR complaint, NYSDHR determination, and EEOC's right-to-sue letter

    Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Sciences Center of Brooklyn, 280 F.3d 98, 108 (2d Cir. 2001). While it is well established that "Title VII abrogates the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity," Sirisena v. City Univ. of N.Y., No. 17-cv-7135, 2019 WL 1493220, at *3, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58384, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2019) (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 447-456 (1976)), "no waiver or congressional abrogation exists with respect to ADEA claims," Id. (citing Kimmel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 89 (2000)). "Whether a federal court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question that 'may be raised at any time . . . by the court sua sponte.'" McGinty v. New York, 251 F.3d 84, 90 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Lyndonville Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Lussier, 211 F.3d 697, 700 (2d Cir. 2000)).