Opinion
CA 9:22-cv-00940-JD-MHC
07-12-2023
Sterling L. Singleton, Plaintiff, v. South Carolina Department of Corrections, Brian P. Stirling, Dennis Patterson, Willie Davis, Terry Wallace, Whittington, Willie Ocean, Travis Pressly, Edward Gaston, Robert Brannon, Ms. Labradore, William Gill, Shanon Dean, Anthony Berry, Tishiro Inabnit, Sophia Paquette, Terry Marshall, Dr. Kennard Dubose, Shawn Stover, and Myers, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Molly H. Cherry, United States Magistrate Judge
Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Bryan P. Stirling, Dennis Patterson, Willie Davis, Terry Wallace, Whittington, Willie Ocean, Ms. Labrador, William Gill, Shanon Dean, Anthony Berry, Tishiro Inabnit, Sophia Paquette, Terry Marshall, Dr. Kennard Debose, and Shawn Stover (“Individual Defendants”), and the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”) (collectively, “Defendants”). ECF No. 41. After the Court issued an order pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising pro se Plaintiff Sterling L. Singleton (“Plaintiff”) of the dismissal procedures and the possible consequences if he failed to adequately respond to Defendants' Motion, Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition. ECF No. 58. Defendants filed a Reply. ECF No. 73. The Motion is ripe for review.
Defendant's last name is spelled “Labradore” in the caption; however, based on affidavits filed in this action, it appears the correct spelling of her last name is “Labrador.” See ECF No. 41-3.
All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) and (e) (D.S.C.). Because the Motion is dispositive as to these Defendants, this Report and Recommendation is entered for review by the District Judge.
Discovery is ongoing as to Defendants Robert Brannon, Edward Gaston, and Travis Pressly. See ECF Nos. 48, 60, 68. Defendant Myers has not been served.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when Defendants failed to protect him while he was housed at the Kirkland Correctional Institution (“KCI”) of the SCDC. Plaintiff also appears to assert claims under South Carolina law including negligence, gross negligence, and a violation of his rights under Article I, § 15 of the South Carolina Constitution. See ECF No. 1 at 5-7.
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when he was allegedly assaulted by another inmate on April 6, 2019, while both were inmates in the High Level Behavioral Management Unit (“HLBMU”) Program located at KCI. He asserts that this inmate (whom Plaintiff never identifies by name) had a history of stabbing other inmates and was a known affiliate of an inmate that previously attacked Plaintiff. See ECF No. 1 at 8, 10. He alleges that Defendant Myers left his post, after which the inmate attacked Plaintiff by stabbing Plaintiff with a shank eight times, resulting in wounds to Plaintiff's head, center back, upper left arm/shoulder, and left shoulder/back. ECF No. 1 at 10.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Gill, Dean, Stover, Berry, Inabnit, Paquette, Pressly, Gadsden, Myers, and Brennan failed to protect Plaintiff from this attack despite previous threats of harm to him. See ECF No. 1 at 8, 10. He contends that Defendants SCDC, Stirling, Patterson, Davis, Wallace, Whittington, Ocean, Debose, Marshall, and Labrador were deliberately indifferent to his health, safety, and security, and were aware of, or should have been aware of, a substantial risk of serious harm to him and failed to take corrective and/or preventative actions. See ECF No. 1 at 8-11. Plaintiff claims that these Defendants failed to properly provide protection and security for him, failed to properly train their subordinates, failed to properly supervise their subordinates, and failed to implement and enforce policies and practices to prevent inmates from obtaining and possessing dangerous weapons.
Plaintiff states that he received stitches to four areas and claims he thereafter has suffered from mental and emotional trauma, PTSD, mood swings, lack of sleep, hypervigilance, impulsive responses, flashbacks, nightmares, and distrust. ECF No. 1 at 16. Plaintiff requests injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as monetary damages. ECF No. 1 at 12-13.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Defendants move for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ECF No 41. Summary judgment is appropriate if a party “shows there is no genuine dispute as to any issue of material fact” and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Under the framework established in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), the party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the Court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, must demonstrate that specific, material facts exist which give rise to a genuine issue. Id. at 324.
Under this standard, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, although the Court views all the underlying facts and inferences in the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the non-moving “party nonetheless must offer some ‘concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in his [or her] favor.'” Williams v. Genex Servs., LLC, 809 F.3d 103, 109 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256). That is to say, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory or speculative allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude the granting of the summary judgment motion. Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. To survive summary judgment, the non-movant must provide evidence of every element essential to his action on which he will bear the burden of proving at a trial on the merits. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322.
Additionally, pro se filings are to be “liberally construed” and a pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This “[l]iberal construction of the pleadings is particularly appropriate where, as here, there is a pro se complaint raising civil rights issues.” Smith v. Smith, 589 F.3d 736, 738 (4th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 173 (4th Cir. 2018) (noting “we are obliged to construe [a complaint's] allegations liberally and with the intent of doing justice”). However, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact when none exists. See United States v. Wilson, 699 F.3d 789, 797 (4th Cir. 2012); Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990) (“The ‘special judicial solicitude' with which a district court should view such pro se complaints does not transform the court into an advocate.”).
III. DISCUSSION
Defendants argue summary judgment is proper for six reasons. Specifically, they argue (1) Eleventh Amendment immunity protects them in their official capacities; (2) Plaintiff has failed to show personal involvement; (3) Plaintiff has not shown an Eighth Amendment violation; (4) they are entitled to qualified immunity; (5) they are not the proper parties for any state law tort claims; and (6) the statute of limitations has run for any state law claims. The Court agrees.
1. Eleventh Amendment
Defendants are being sued in their official and individual capacities. See ECF No. 41-1 at 13-14. Defendants, in their official capacities, are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment and, thus, entitled to summary judgment.
Under the Eleventh Amendment, federal courts are barred from hearing claims against a state or its agents, instrumentalities, and employees, unless the state has consented to the suit. Fauconier v. Clarke, 966 F.3d 265, 279 (4th Cir. 2020); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997) (“It has long been settled that [the Eleventh Amendment's] reference to ‘actions against one of the United States' encompasses not only actions in which a State is actually named as the defendant, but also certain actions against state agents and state instrumentalities.”). Unless a state has consented to suit or Congress has waived a state's immunity pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, a state (and its agencies) may not be sued in federal or state court. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989). Congress has not abrogated the states' sovereign immunity under § 1983, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 343 (1979), and South Carolina has not consented to suit in federal district court. S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-20(e).
Here, Defendant SCDC is an agency and an alter ego of the state of South Carolina. See S.C. Code § 24-1-30. As a result, the Eleventh Amendment bars the action against Defendant SCDC. See Will, 491 U.S. at 66.
Plaintiff has also sued the Individual Defendants in their official capacities. At all times relevant to Plaintiff's Complaint, it is undisputed that the Individual Defendants were employed by SCDC. Thus, the above-named Individual Defendants are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity in their official capacities. See Simpson v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., No. 2:19-CV-2245-RMG, 2020 WL 582321, at *2 n.1 (D.S.C. Feb. 6, 2020) (noting SCDC employees are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity in suits brought against them in their official capacities). Additionally, for purposes of § 1983, Defendants are not considered “persons” amenable to suit. See Will, 491 U.S. at 71 (“Neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons' under § 1983.”); see also Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 26-27 (1991). Accordingly, the undersigned recommends granting summary judgment to these Defendants in their official capacities.
2. Personal Involvement
Defendants argue Plaintiff has failed to show any personal involvement by the Individual Defendants. ECF No. 41-1 at 4-6. The Court agrees.
To state a § 1983 claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate Defendants, acting under color of state law, deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 310 (4th Cir. 2001). At the summary judgment stage, Plaintiff must show the Individual Defendants' personal involvement for liability to attach under § 1983. Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 171-72 (4th Cir. 2018) (noting a plaintiff must affirmatively show that the official acted personally in violating the plaintiff's constitutional rights and finding certain defendants were entitled to summary judgment because “they lacked sufficient personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivations”).
Plaintiff's Complaint sets forth general conclusory allegations against the Individual Defendants, simply repeating that they were “deliberate[ly] indifferent;” failed to “implement and enforce appropriate policies, customs, and practices;” failed “to properly train;” allowed “uncontrolled violence, inhumane treatment, and conditions;” and generally asserting they are ultimately responsible for all of the various constitutional violations Plaintiff alleges. See ECF No. 1 at 8-11. There are minimal factual allegations in the Complaint, as Plaintiff provides few factual details about the alleged assault itself, including the name of his purported assailant, how or where the assault occurred, what precipitated the assault, any witnesses to the assault, and Plaintiff's own involvement in the incident.
In short, Plaintiff levels bald assertions of wrongdoing without any factual elaboration.Such conclusory assertions are insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment. See Thompson, 312 F.3d at 649 (noting conclusory or speculative allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude the granting of the summary judgment motion). Even construing the Complaint liberally, as this Court must, Plaintiff does not allege-or cite to any evidence in the record that could lead a reasonable jury to believe-that the Individual Defendants had any personal involvement in any alleged deprivation of his constitutional rights, which is fatal to Plaintiff's § 1983 claim.
Indeed, Plaintiff's claims, as pled, do not even meet the pleading requirements of Rule 8. See ECF No. 1; Fed.R.Civ.P. 8. The Supreme Court has made clear that a plaintiff “must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference that Defendants are liable for any misconduct. See id. at 678. The Complaint contains conclusory allegations that do not provide factual detail beyond averring generally that Defendants violated his constitutional rights. See id. (noting that a court is not bound to accept as true a complaint's threadbare, conclusory legal statements that are couched as factual allegations). There are no facts from which to infer that any Defendant engaged in conduct that ran afoul of the Constitution. See id. at 679 (noting “[w]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-‘that the pleader is entitled to relief'” (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2))). Furthermore, the Complaint provides no specific examples of occurrences in which any Defendant violated his rights, nor does it include allegations, with any specificity, of any personal involvement on the part of the Individual Defendants.
The only apparent factual allegation against any of the Individual Defendants appears to be against Defendant Myers, where Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Myers left his post at some point during the day on April 6, 2019. See ECF No. 1 at 10. There is nothing in the Complaint beyond this single instance of factual detail, other than averring generally that Defendants violated his constitutional rights.
Thus, Plaintiff fails to show these Defendants had any personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violations. See Williamson, 912 F.3d at 171 (noting a plaintiff must show that the official acted personally in violating the plaintiff's constitutional rights); Wilcox v. Brown, 877 F.3d 161, 170 (4th Cir. 2017) (noting liability will only lie in § 1983 actions where it is “affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiffs' rights” (citation omitted)).
Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff alleges any Defendants are vicariously liable by virtue of the actions of their subordinates, that claim also fails. Pure supervisory liability will not lie in § 1983 actions. Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985) (“The doctrine of respondeat superior has no application under this section.” (quoting Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977))). Rather, to hold a supervisor liable for a constitutional injury inflicted by a subordinate under § 1983, Plaintiff must show facts establishing the following elements: (1) the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that a subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed “a pervasive and unreasonable risk” of constitutional injury to people like the plaintiff; (2) the supervisor's response was so inadequate as to constitute deliberate indifference or tacit authorization of the subordinate's conduct; and (3) there is an “affirmative causal link” between the supervisor's inaction and the plaintiff's constitutional injury. Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff has failed to produce evidence showing any of these required elements.
Accordingly, because Plaintiff fails to point to evidence in the record that supports a threshold essential element of a § 1983 claim, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment solely on this basis. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322 (noting the non-movant must provide evidence of every element essential to his action to survive summary judgment).
3. Eighth Amendment
Plaintiff generally maintains that Defendants failed to protect him from an assault by an inmate that allegedly occurred on April 6, 2019. Plaintiff has not identified his assailant, but Defendants maintain “it is understood that [Plaintiff] is claiming he was assaulted by an inmate named Rayshawn Pearson.” ECF No. 41-1 at 6.
Although unclear, Plaintiff may also be alleging that Defendants violated the Constitution by violating SCDC's policies. See ECF No. 1 at 9-10. However, this Court has found that violations of policies and procedures alone, even if they occurred, do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Johnson v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., No. 3:06-2062-CMC-JRM, 2007 WL 904826, at *12 (D.S.C. Mar. 21, 2007) (“[T]the failure of prison officials to follow their own policies or procedures, standing alone, does not amount to a constitutional violation.”); Keeler v. Pea, 782 F.Supp. 42, 44 (D.S.C. 1992) (noting § 1983 “does not provide any relief against prison rules violations assuming, arguendo, that such a violation occurred”). Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff may be asserting a claim on this basis, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.
Plaintiff's claims are an allegation that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1994) (explaining that the Eighth Amendment imposes various duties on prison officials, including a duty “to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners”). An inmate must satisfy a two-part test, consisting of both an objective and a subjective inquiry, for liability to attach.
First, for the objective inquiry, “the inmate must establish a serious deprivation of his rights in the form of a serious or significant physical or emotional injury, or a substantial risk thereof.” Raynor v. Pugh, 817 F.3d 123, 127 (4th Cir. 2016) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. This inquiry “requires a court to assess whether society considers the risk that the prisoner complains of to be so grave that it violates contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone unwillingly to such a risk.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36 (1993) (emphasis in original).
Second, as to the subjective inquiry, the inmate must show the prison official had a “sufficiently culpable state of mind,” which, in this context, consists of “deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (internal quotation marks omitted). This inquiry requires “evidence suggesting that the prison official had actual knowledge of an excessive risk to the plaintiff's safety.” Danser v. Stansberry, 772 F.3d 340, 347 (4th Cir. 2014). This is a very high standard, such that the prison official must “be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (emphasis added). The inmate can prove a prison official's actual knowledge of a substantial risk “in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence.” Id. at 842. That is, “a factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.” Id.
Here, Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the subjective prong, as he has presented no evidence to support a claim that any of these Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's safety. As an initial matter, as already discussed above, Plaintiff has failed to show Defendants had any personal involvement; thus, the subjective prong-which requires actual knowledge of a risk of harm-is not satisfied. See Danser, 772 F.3d at 347. As mentioned above, Plaintiff has presented few factual details about the alleged assault, including the name of his purported assailant, how or where the assault occurred, what precipitated the assault, and Plaintiff's own involvement in the incident. Plaintiff has also failed to show, much less allege, facts that would support a finding of liability for the numerous Defendants he has sued.
Again, as noted above, Plaintiff merely levels conclusory allegations that do not provide factual detail beyond averring generally that Defendants violated his constitutional rights. See ECF No. 1; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (noting that a court is not bound to accept as true a complaint's threadbare, conclusory legal statements that are couched as factual allegations).
Defendants, on the other hand, have provided various affidavits from several of the Individual Defendants, wherein they note Plaintiff never raised any safety concerns while he was in the HLBMU. For example, in his affidavit, Defendant Inabinet (the former HLBMU Program Director who is now retired from SCDC) provided a detailed description of the HLBMU Program, its purpose, and the fact that it involved a maximum of twenty-four inmates. See ECF No. 41-7. Defendant Inabinet testified that, as the Program Director, he knew Plaintiff and had interactions with him; yet Plaintiff “never expressed or raised any safety concerns to me about Inmate Pearson.” ECF No. 41-7 at 3. He explained that “[o]n April 6, 2019, and prior [] to that date, I was not aware of any history of physical altercations or threats of violence between [Plaintiff] and Inmate Pearson. I was not aware of any issues between the two inmates.” ECF No. 41-7 at 3. Defendant Inabinet further attested:
At no time did [Plaintiff] make any request to me, nor any request to my knowledge to other HLBMU staff, for protective custody or a cell transfer based on threats of violence or fear of physical harm from Inmate Pearson. I am likewise not aware of any grievance or request to staff member filed by [Plaintiff] regarding any safety concerns or the failure of any staff to address such requests related to threats of violence or fear of physical harm.ECF No. 41-7 at 3.
Other Defendants who were directly involved in the HLBMU Program at or near the time of the alleged April 6, 2019, assault also testified via affidavit that they had no knowledge of any hostilities or problems between Plaintiff and inmate Pearson. Specifically, Defendants Labrador, Paquette, Stover, Berry, Marshall, and Gill have submitted affidavits denying knowledge of any safety concerns voiced by Plaintiff, including any threats from inmate Pearson, nor any requests from Plaintiff for protective custody. See ECF Nos. 41-2, 41-3, 41-4, 41-5, 41-6, 41-8. Each of these Defendants attested that they were unaware of any threats to Plaintiff's safety and did not knowingly fail to provide him protection.
Consequently, Plaintiff has not met his burden in showing a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249 (noting that, in the face of a properly supported motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff cannot rest on his allegations to get to a jury without “any significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint”). The undersigned therefore recommends granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants on this claim.
4. Qualified Immunity
Defendants also assert they are entitled to qualified immunity. The Court agrees.
The doctrine of qualified immunity offers some protection to a government employee being sued in his or her individual capacity. The Supreme Court has held that “[g]overnment officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Renn by and Through Renn v. Garrison, 100 F.3d 344, 349 (4th Cir. 1996).
“The threshold inquiry a court must undertake in a qualified immunity analysis is whether a plaintiff's allegations, if true, establish a clear constitutional violation.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 736 (2002). If a violation of a constitutional right in fact exists, qualified immunity nonetheless shields a prison official from liability, unless the violation was of a “clearly established right of which a reasonable person would have known.” Wilson v. Kittoe, 337 F.3d 392, 397 (4th Cir. 2003) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
As noted above, Plaintiff has not shown Defendants violated his constitutional rights. Because Plaintiff has failed to show a clear constitutional violation, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
5. State law tort claims
Defendants argue that, to the extent Plaintiff is alleging state law claims pursuant to the South Carolina Tort Claims Act (“SCTCA”), those claims fail. Specifically, they argue the Individual Defendants are entitled to immunity under the SCTCA, and, nevertheless, the statute of limitations has run. The Court agrees.
Plaintiff also appears to allege a violation of Article I, § 15 of the South Carolina Constitution. This claim fails, as there is no private right of action for money damages under the South Carolina Constitution. See Palmer v. State, 829 S.E.2d 255, 261 (S.C. Ct. App. 2019) (declining to create an implied cause of action for a violation of a constitutional provision in South Carolina's Constitution, as “the South Carolina Constitution does not provide for monetary damages for civil rights violations and the legislature has not enacted an enabling statute”), cert. denied, Palmer v. South Carolina, 142 S.Ct. 765 (2022).
a. Immunity under the SCTCA
The SCTCA acts as a partial waiver of South Carolina's sovereign immunity. See S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-20. The SCTCA governs all tort claims against state governmental entities and is the exclusive civil remedy available in an action against a state governmental entity or its employees, with a few exceptions not relevant here. See id.; Huggins v. Metts, 640 S.E.2d 465, 466 (S.C. Ct. App. 2006). “Under the Tort Claims Act, an employee of a governmental entity who commits a tort while acting within the scope of his official duty is generally not liable, and the plaintiff must sue the governmental agency itself.” Roberts v. City of Forest Acres, 902 F.Supp. 662, 671 (D.S.C. 1995) (citing S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-70(a)).
Here, to the extent Plaintiff may have alleged any state law tort claims arising under the SCTCA against the Individual Defendants, that claim is barred. Rather, SCDC is the proper party. See id. Thus, the undersigned recommends dismissing any purported SCTCA claims alleged against the Individual Defendants. See Faulkner v. York Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 0:21-CV-02090-JMC, 2022 WL 673684, at *5 (D.S.C. Mar. 7, 2022) (dismissing, inter alia, gross negligence claim against a state employee where the state employer was the proper party for that claim pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-70(c)).
However, even though Defendant SCDC is the proper party, Plaintiff's SCTCA claims still fail for the reasons already discussed above; namely, he has failed to plead sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference that Defendant SCDC is liable for any misconduct. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
b. Statute of Limitations
In any event, Plaintiff's state law claims are barred by the statute of limitations. The statute of limitations for any action under the SCTCA is two years. See S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-110.
Plaintiff is suing about an alleged assault that occurred on April 6, 2019. Plaintiff did not file his Complaint until March 22, 2022. ECF No. 1. Therefore, any SCTCA claims are barred by the two-year statute of limitations.
Nevertheless, Plaintiff argues his action should be equitably tolled because he was pursuing his administrative remedies at the time. See ECF No. 58 at 33-34. Plaintiff's argument fails. Although exhaustion of administrative remedies is required before bringing suit under § 1983, exhaustion of SCDC's administrative remedies is not required before filing an action pursuant to the SCTCA. See Buff v. S.C. Dep't of Corrs., C. A. No. 5:13-01901-TLW-KDW, 2014 WL 3867996, at *4 (D.S.C. Aug. 6, 2014) (citing S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-80(f)). “Therefore, the two-year SCTCA statute of limitations is not tolled while plaintiffs pursue administrative remedies.” Id. Consequently, Plaintiff's state law tort claims are untimely.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 41) be GRANTED.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to the next page for their rights to file objections to this recommendation.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).