Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 02-0192 SECTION: "I"
April 26, 2002
ORDER AND REASONS
Petitioner, Joseph Singleton, filed this application for federal habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Upon review of the record and the law, the Court has determined that the record is sufficient, that no evidentiary hearing is required, and that petitioner is not entitled to relief because his federal application is untimely.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (e)(2), whether to hold an evidentiary hearing is now a statutorily mandated determination. According to Section 2254(e)(2), the district court may hold an evidentiary hearing only when the petitioner has shown that either the claim relies on a new, retroactive rule of constitutional law that was previously unavailable ( 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (e)(2)(A)(i) or the claim relies on a factual basis that could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence ( 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (e)(2)(A)(ii)); and the facts underlying the claim show by clear and convincing evidence that, but for the constitutional error, no reasonable jury would have convicted the petitioner ( 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (e)(2)(B)).
Petitioner is a state court prisoner incarcerated at the Washington Correctional Institute, Angie, Louisiana. On March 9, 1993, petitioner was convicted of manslaughter in violation of La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 14:31 (West 1992). On July 6, 1993, petitioner was sentenced to forty years imprisonment at hard labor with credit for time served. The state district court granted petitioner an out-of-time appeal on February 9, i994. On February 15, 1996, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed petitioner's conviction and sentence. Over one year later, on July 29, 1997, petitioner filed with the Louisiana Supreme Court an application for a writ of review or certiorari which was denied on February 6, i998.
State Rec., Vol. II of II, minute entry of March 9, 1993; State Rec., Vol. II of II, jury verdict form.
State Rec., Vol. I of II, minute entry of July 6, 1993.
State Rec., Vol. II of II, order dated February 9, 1994.
State v. Singleton, No. 94-KA-1171 (La.App. V Cir. Feb. 15, 1996) (unpublished); State Rec., Vol. II of II.
State Rec., Vol. I of II. Although the cover letter accompanying the writ application was dated July 21, 1997, the application was not received for filing until July 29, 1997. State Rec., Vol. 11 of II, docketing notice. However, even if the earlier date were considered the date of filing, the writ application would still have been untimely filed. See note 18, infra.
State v. Singleton, 709 So.2d 728 (La. 1998); State Rec., Vol. I of II.
On or after August 25, 1999, petitioner filed with the state district court an application for post-conviction relief which was denied. Petitioner filed with the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal an application for a supervisory writ. On Feb. 11, 2000, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal denied the writ application noting that it "has reviewed relator's application for post conviction relief and finds no merit to his claims." Petitioner then filed with the Louisiana Supreme Court an application for review which was denied on January 4, 2002.
StateRec., Vol. I of II. The state record filed with this Court does not indicate the date that the state post-conviction application was actually filed. However, because the affidavit accompanying that application was signed on August 25, 1999, the application could not have been filed prior to that date. The period of time that petitioner had to file a timely application for federal habeas corpus relief expired long before August 25, 1999. Accordingly, the actual date that the state postconviction application was filed is of no consequence. See note 20, infra, and accompanying text.
The state record filed with this Court contains no record of the denial; however, petitioner indicates in his federal application that his state post-conviction application was denied. Rec. Doc. 1, memorandum in support, p. 2.
state record filed with this Court does not contain a copy of the writ application.
State v. Singleton, No. 2000-K-0092 (La.App. 4th Cir. Feb. 11, 2000) (unpublished); State Rec., Vol. II of II.
State Rec., Vol. I of II.
State ex rel Singleton v. State, 805 So.2d 1184 (La. 2002); State Rec., Vol. I of II.
On January 11, 2002, petitioner filed an application for federal habeas corpus relief. In his application, petitioner claims that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction.
Rec. Doc. 2. Petitioner signed his application for federal habeas corpus relief on January 11, 2002. That date represents the earliest date that petitioner could have presented his application to prison officials for mailing and, therefore, the earliest date that this Court could deem his habeas petition to have been filed for statute of limitations purposes. See Cooper v. Brookshire, 70 F.3d 377, 379-80 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988)).
The state argues that petitioner's federal application is untimely. Generally speaking, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") requires that a petitioner bring his Section 2254 claims within one (1) year of the date on which his conviction or sentence became final.
Rec. Doc. 4, pp. 2-3.
28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d) provides:
(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period
shall run from the latest of —
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims is presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.
The Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed petitioner's conviction and sentence on February 15, 1996. Pursuant La.C.Cr.P. art. 922(B) (West 1996), petitioner's conviction became final on February 29, 1996, when petitioner failed to file an application for rehearing within the fourteen days allowed.
La.C.Cr.P. art. 922 (West 1997) provides:
A. Within fourteen days of rendition of the judgment of the supreme court or any appellate court, in term or out, a party may apply to the appropriate court for a rehearing. The court may act upon the application at any time. B. A judgment rendered by the supreme court or other appellate court becomes final when the delay for applying for a rehearing has expired and no application therefore has been made.
C. If an application for a rehearing has been made timely, a judgment of the appellate court becomes final when the application is denied.
D. If an application for a writ of review is timely filed with the supreme court, the judgment of the appellate court from which the writ of review is sought becomes final when the supreme court denies the writ.
The Court notes that La.C.Cr.P. art. 922(D), which provides that a "timely filed" application for a writ of review will delay the finality of a judgment of a Court of Appeal, is inapplicable in this case. Although petitioner filed an application for a writ or review or certiorari, it was not "timely filed" as required by La.C.Cr.P. art. 922 (D).
Louisiana Supreme Court Rule X, § 5(a) provides in pertinent part: "An application seeking to review a judgment of the court of appeal after an appeal to that court . . . shall be made within thirty days of the mailing of the notice of the original judgment of the court of appeal . . . ." Notice of the Court of Appeal's judgment was mailed on February 15, 1996. Rec. Doc. 7. Therefore, petitioner had only thirty days from that date to file a timely writ application with the Louisiana Supreme Court. Petitioner's application for a writ of review or certiorari was not even signed until July 16, 1997, and it was not actually filed with the Louisiana Supreme Court until July 29, 1997. State Rec., Vol. 1 of II. Accordingly, it was not timely and it had no effect on the date that petitioner's conviction became final.
With respect to prisoners such as Singleton whose conviction and sentence became final prior to the enactment of the AEDPA, the Fifth Circuit has held that a one-year grace period applies and petitions may be considered timely if filed no later than April 24, 1997. Flanagan v. Johnson, 154 F.3d 196, 200-02 (5th Cir. 1998); see also United States v. Flores, 135 F.3d 1000 (5th Cir. 1998) (applying one-year grace period to actions filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255). The AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations is tolled for the period of time during which a properly filed application for state post-conviction relief or other collateral review attacking a conviction or sentence is pending in state court. See Fields v. Johnson, 159 F.3d 914, 916 (5th Cir. 1998); 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(2). "`[A] properly filed application' is one submitted according to the state's procedural requirements, such as the rules governing notice and the time and place of filing." Villegas v. Johnson, 184 F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Lovasz v. Vaughn, 134 F.3d 146, 148 (3rd Cir. 1998)); Williams v. Cain, 217 F.3d 303 (5th Cir. 2000).
The effective date of the AEDPA was April 24, 1996, Flanagan v. Johnson, 154 F.3d 196, 198 (5th Cir. 1998).
From April 24, 1996, to April 24, 1997, petitioner had no state court applications for post-conviction or other collateral relief pending before Louisiana state courts which would toll the AEDPA's statute of limitations. Therefore, in order for his application for federal habeas corpus relief to be timely, it had to be filed no later than April 24, 1997. Petitioner's federal application was not filed until January 11, 2002, which was well after the one-year grace period. Accordingly, this Court finds that petitioner's federal habeas corpus petition was untimely filed.
Petitioner's filing of a state post-conviction application on or after August 25, 1999, and the subsequent state court proceedings in no way affect the untimely nature of petitioner's federal habeas corpus application. Once the federal filing period elapses, subsequent state filings have no bearing on the timeliness of an application for federal habeas corpus relief. See Magee v. Cain, 2000 WL 1023423, at *4 (E.D. La. July 24, 2000) ("A proper application for state post-conviction relief filed after the expiration of the AEDPA's one-year grace period cannot convert [a petitioner's] federal writ of habeas corpus into a timely filed petition".), aff'd, 253 F.3d 702 (5th Cir. 2001); Williams v. Cain, 2000 WL 863132, at *2 (E.D. La. June 27, 2000).
In petitioner's "Opposition to State's Response," Rec. Doc. 5, he argues that on July 16, 1997, and thereafter, he filed various pleadings which would toll the running of the statute of limitations. As noted, however, the statute of limitations expired on April 24, 1997, and such subsequent filings are, therefore, irrelevant for tolling purposes.
The Fifth Circuit has held that the AEDPA one-year statute of limitations can, in rare and exceptional circumstances, be equitably tolled. See Davis v. Johnson, 158 F.3d 806, 811 (5th Cir. 1998). However, "[e]quitable tolling applies principally where the plaintiff is actively misled by the defendant about the cause of action or is prevented in some extraordinary way from asserting his rights." Coleman v. Johnson, 184 F.3d 398, 402 (5th Cir. 1999) (quotation marks omitted). This Court knows of no reason which would support equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. Accordingly, petitioner's application for federal habeas corpus relief is DENIED.