Opinion
Civil Action 7:21-cv-01138-DCC-JDA
08-27-2021
Ron Singleton, Plaintiff, v. Limestone University; Darrell F Parker, individually; Monica H. Baloga, individually, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Jacquelyn D. Austin, United States Magistrate Judge
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' motion to dismiss. [Doc. 13.] Plaintiff alleges discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (“Title VII”), as well as claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and a state law promissory estoppel claim. [Doc. 1-1.] Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2), D.S.C., all pretrial matters in employment discrimination cases and cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for consideration.
Plaintiff brought suit in the Cherokee County Court of Common Pleas on March 8, 2021. [Doc. 1-1.] Defendants removed the case to this Court on April 16, 2021, and, on May 21, 2021, filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. [Docs. 1; 13.] Plaintiff filed a response opposing the motion to dismiss on June 25, 2021, and on July 9, 2021, Defendants filed a reply. [Docs. 18; 21.] Accordingly, the motion is ripe for review.
For purposes of a motion to dismiss, a court must accept as true a plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations and may rely on the complaint and documents attached to the complaint as exhibits or incorporated by reference. See Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993); Simons v. Montgomery Cty. Police Officers, 762 F.2d 30, 31 (4th Cir. 1985). Thus, the following Background is a summary of the allegations contained in the Complaint, Docket Entry Number 1-1.
Defendant Limestone University (“Limestone”) is a Christian, coeducational, four-year liberal arts college located in Gaffney, South Carolina. [Doc. 1-1 at 23.] Defendant Darrell Parker is Limestone's President and Defendant Monica Baloga is its Provost. [Id. ¶ 6-7.]
At all times relevant to this case, Plaintiff was employed at Limestone as a professor and chaplain, as well as director of its Christian Education and Leadership Program (“CELP”). [Id. ¶ 9.] CELP is a voluntary student organization providing “an opportunity for students to participate in campus activities that deepen or help them find their faith in Christ, ” and “spread the Gospel of Jesus Christ through academic pursuits and services to the community at the local, national and international level.” [Id. ¶¶ 14, 15, 23 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Id. ¶ 11.] The program allows students to “receive scholarship support in exchange for meeting predetermined criteria.” [Id. ¶ 17 (internal quotation marks omitted).] For approximately 14 years, Plaintiff, in consultation with donors, ran the operational, fiscal, and administrative functions of CELP, and he secured additional funding, including two housing purchase donations that provide housing for CELP students during their time at Limestone. [Id. ¶¶ 21, 22.]
The program was initially funded by a $1,000,000 endowment gift from a Limestone Trustee. [Id. ¶¶ 12-13.] CELP has 20 to 25 $3,000 scholarships available each year for participating students. [Id. ¶¶ 23, 27.]
Sometime in late 2019 or early 2020 several CELP students filed a complaint with Limestone concerning Plaintiff under Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (“Title IX”). [Id. ¶ 38.] During the resulting internal investigation, Plaintiff presented substantial information and evidence to show that “all his conduct[] that he was being accused of as improper[] was not only false, but” also failed to take into account the Christian context of the CELP program and its specific requirements. [Id. ¶¶ 38, 42, 43, 44, 45.] For example, Plaintiff was accused of making students “feel[] compelled to meet with [him] and to discuss sensitive and emotionally-difficult personal matters.” [Id. at 85; id. ¶ 39.] However, Plaintiff presented information showing that “CELP was a ‘program to provide opportunity for students to deepen or find their faith in Christ'” and that each student was required, as part of the program, to undertake daily and weekly bible studies and turn those reflections in to Plaintiff. [Id. ¶ 39.]
In June 2020, Limestone terminated Plaintiffs employment. [Id. ¶ 42.] In a letter to Plaintiff dated June 23, 2020, Baloga stated:
After review of student complaints and materials submitted by you and by students, and our interview with you on June 11, 2020, we have determined that your actions and decisions demonstrated a divergence from Limestone College's policies, practices, and expectations. These same actions and decisions reflect that you did not comprehend, or at least did not consider, your unique authority over students in the [CELP], and the potential for, and eventual, negative impact of that authority on those students. Examples of your problematic actions and decisions include:
You employed [REDACTED] while they were students in your class and while they were dependent on you for CELP scholarship funds. This action could create questions about the integrity of their grades in your class and the voluntary nature of their performance of work for you. While we do not allege any improper motive or effect from your employing
these students, Limestone College's Conflicts of Interest policy prohibits even an appearance of a conflict between the personal interests and official responsibilities of an employee. You exhibited a lack of judgment in this regard and could have created the appearance of a conflict.
You incurred a significant expense on behalf of [REDACTED]-a plane ticket to [REDACTED]-through the CELP program without [REDACTED] knowledge or agreement to the expense being incurred, and without approval to invoice [REDACTED] from the Business Office. You presented [REDACTED] with the invoice and gave [REDACTED] the option to pay it if he felt compelled to do so, despite knowing he did not have the ability to pay, thus leaving a burden on him at [an] already difficult time. This demonstrates a lack of judgment.
Students complained of feeling compelled to meet with you and to discuss sensitive and emotionally-difficult personal matters such as family deaths, illnesses, divorce of parents, and romantic relationships, because of your control over their CELP participation, scholarships, and housing. Inquiring into these difficult topics with students demonstrates a lack of awareness and/or a disregard of the impact of your authority as CELP Director.
On March 28, 2019, you barred [REDACTED], a student in your program, from entering the house or grounds of the male CELP house, and from attempting to communicate with another student, [REDACTED][, ] at the chapel. You required [REDACTED] to accept these requirements under threat of dismissal from the CELP program, eviction from the [REDACTED] CELP house where [REDACTED] lived, loss of future CELP scholarship, and loss of work support (income). You gave [REDACTED] no option other than to accept your requirements, cited no authority from Limestone for your actions, and did not notify [REDACTED] of anyone or any process that [REDACTED] could consult. You copied no other Limestone employee [REDACTED] and you failed to notify Campus Security of the no contact order.
Just a few days later, after learning that [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] had one conversation in the chapel in violation of your unilaterally imposed no-contact order, you evicted [REDACTED] from [REDACTED] housing, suspended
[REDACTED] from the CELP program, terminated [REDACTED] work study employment, and left any conditions for [REDACTED] reinstatement to the program undefined, except the requirement that [REDACTED] meet with the school counselor. Your conduct with regard to [REDACTED] was an overreach of your authority as CELP Director, particularly in light of its ultimate impact on [REDACTED] and showed a lack of judgment.
These actions and decisions have caused Limestone to lose confidence in your ability to effectively perform your positions as CELP Director and Chaplain, and therefore, result in separation of your employment from both posititions and all duties at Limestone, effective immediately.[Id. at 85-86.]
Plaintiff filed this action on March 8, 2021, alleging a claim against Limestone under Title VII for religious discrimination [id. ¶¶ 49-64]; claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Baloga and Parker individually for violation of his First Amendment and Equal Protection rights [id. ¶¶ 65-91]; and a state law promissory estoppel claim against Limestone [id. ¶¶ 92-97] As his relief, Plaintiff requests compensatory and punitive damages, as well as equitable and injunctive relief and court costs. [Id. at 20-21.]
APPLICABLE LAW
Motion to Dismiss Standard
Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a claim should be dismissed if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When considering a motion to dismiss, the court should “accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and should view the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993). However, the court “need not accept the legal conclusions drawn from the facts” nor “accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” Eastern Shore Mkts., Inc. v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000). Further, for purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court may rely on only the complaint's allegations and those documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference. See Simons v. Montgomery Cty. Police Officers, 762 F.2d 30, 31 (4th Cir. 1985). If matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion is treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d).
With respect to well-pleaded allegations, the United States Supreme Court explained the interplay between Rule 8(a) and Rule 12(b)(6) in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly:
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, ” in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the “grounds” of his “entitle[ment] to relief” requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (footnote and citations omitted); see also 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, at 235-36 (3d ed. 2004) (“[T]he pleading must contain something more . . . than a bare averment that the pleader wants compensation and is entitled to it or a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion that the pleader might have a legally cognizable right of action.”).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The plausibility standard reflects the threshold requirement of Rule 8(a)(2)-the pleader must plead sufficient facts to show he is entitled to relief, not merely facts consistent with the defendant's liability. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of “entitlement to relief.”'” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557)). Accordingly, the plausibility standard requires a plaintiff to articulate facts that, when accepted as true, demonstrate that the plaintiff has stated a claim that makes it plausible the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
DISCUSSION
Title VII Claim
Defendant argues that Plaintiff's Title VII claim should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. [Docs. 13-1 at 10-12; 21 at 6-8.] The Court agrees.
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to discriminate against any individual with respect to . . . compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
The statute defines “religion” to include “all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's . . . religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).
The Fourth Circuit has explained that
Title VII authorizes two causes of action against employers: disparate treatment (intentional discrimination) and disparate impact. Although they are similar in their objectives, each cause of action has different elements. A disparate treatment claim requires proof of discriminatory motive, although the impermissible motive can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment. A disparate impact claim, in contrast, does not require proof of discriminatory motive. Instead, disparate impact claims involve employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity.Abdus-Shahid v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 674 Fed.Appx. 267, 274 (4th Cir. 2017) (alteration, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff argues that his Complaint states a claim under both of those theories. [Doc. 18 at 5-9.] The Court addresses the two theories seriatim, keeping in mind that “[i]n the context of a Title VII case, an employment discrimination plaintiff need not plead a prima facie case of discrimination to survive a motion to dismiss, ” but rather, “is required to allege facts to satisfy the elements of a cause of action created by that statute.” Bing v. Brivo Sys., LLC, 959 F.3d 605, 616 (4th Cir. 2020) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Failure To Accommodate
The essence of Plaintiff's argument that he states a failure-to-accommodate claim appears to be that his Complaint alleges that his “actions as CELP Director, to include all interactions with CELP students, were in furtherance of Plaintiff's and the CELP's Christian religion values.” [Doc. 1-1 ¶ 57; see Doc. 18 at 7-8.] At its core, Plaintiff's complaint about his termination appears to be that Defendants failed to properly appreciate that some of the conduct they terminated him for was actually perfectly defensible when properly considered in the context of CELP's purposes and Christian principles. What Plaintiff appears not to appreciate is that a failure-to-accommodate liability must be based not on an employer's failure to understand that conduct that he was punished for actually had a religious justification, but rather, on the employer's making an employee's “religious practice, confirmed or otherwise, a factor in [an] employment decision[].” EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U.S. 768, 773 (2015).
Here, Plaintiff does not plausibly allege that Defendants' knowledge or suspicion of his personal religious beliefs played any role in his termination. Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that his religion required “that he be allowed to counsel and require those students in CELP houses to practice abstinence.” [Id. ¶ 60.] Plaintiff also claims that Defendants essentially terminated him for doing so. [Id. ¶ 61 (“[W]hat Limestone has done in ignoring Plaintiff's religious accommodation request is establish a hard line universal ‘no sex talk' with Limestone students by any person of ‘authority' [and thus] created indirect policy that eliminates a strong Christian religious maximum (abstinence)”).] However, the Court concludes that his allegation that he was terminated partly for requiring the CELP students to practice abstinence and choosing to counsel them regarding abstinence is not plausible.
In his Complaint Plaintiff references Baloga's letter, which he attached to the Complaint. [Doc. 1-1 ¶¶ 42, 46, 72, 84; id. at 85-86.] Explaining the reasons for Plaintiff's termination, that letter references several “problematic actions and decisions” that Plaintiff made. [Id. at 85.] Plaintiff's Complaint focuses on one group of such actions and decisions, that being that Plaintiff made students feel “compelled to meet with [him] and discuss sensitive and emotionally-difficult personal matters such as family deaths, illnesses, divorce of parents, and romantic relationships, because of [his] control over their CELP participation, scholarships, and housing” and that he “[i]nquir[ed] into these difficult topics with students[, ] demonstrat[ing] a lack of awareness and/or a disregard of the impact of [his] authority as CELP Director.” [Id.] But although Baloga's letter references Plaintiff's having the students discuss their “romantic relationships” with him, the letter does not suggest that Baloga objected to Plaintiff's counseling students to abstain from sex or requiring them to do so. [Id.] Rather, her objection was to his meeting with students and questioning them about the details of their lives-not just their “romantic relationships” but also “family deaths, illnesses, [and] divorce of parents”-under circumstances where the students might feel coerced into sharing such information. [Id.] In this way, her objection was at most to the particular methods that Plaintiff employed to counsel students regarding abstinence (and other subjects). Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that Defendants suspected that his religious beliefs required that he employ these particular objectionable methods, let alone that their suspicion played any role in the termination decision. Thus, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege facts to state a failure-to-accommodate cause of action.
Disparate Impact
Assuming that a disparate impact claim is cognizable in a religious discrimination case, Plaintiff has not alleged facts that could support such a claim here. Here, Plaintiff does not allege any employment practice of Defendants' that falls more harshly on Christians as a group. Rather, he alleges only an isolated employment decision that resulted in his termination. Although he suggests that the reasoning underlying his termination would have a disparate impact on Christians were Limestone to develop it into policy, Plaintiff does not plausibly allege that Limestone did so. Moreover, Plaintiff does not plausibly allege that the bases for his termination, if developed into policy, would fall more harshly on Christians. As the Court has already discussed, Plaintiff appears to claim that he was fired in part for requiring CELP students to practice abstinence and for counseling them to do so [Doc. 1-1 ¶ 61], but he does not identify facts that would make plausible the allegation that that was a basis for his termination. As such, the Court concludes that Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim under a disparate impact theory.
The Court notes that “some courts have held that disparate impact claims are not available in religious discrimination cases, holding that ‘[c]ourts recognize only two theories in asserting religious discrimination claims,' which are denominated as the ‘disparate treatment' and ‘failure to accommodate' theories.” Tolle v. Rockwell Control Techs., Inc., No. 1:20-cv-174 (LMB/JFA), 2020 WL 3316984, at *6 (E.D. Va. June 18, 2020).
Accordingly, because the Court concludes that Plaintiff does not state a claim under either a failure-to-accommodate or a disparate-impact theory, the Court recommends that Defendants' motion to dismiss be granted regarding Plaintiff's Title VII claim.
Section 1983 Claims
Defendants next argue that Plaintiff's claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Parker and Baloga must be dismissed because they fail to plead facts sufficient to plausibly allege that Parker or Baloga acted under color of state law, as required by a § 1983 action. [Docs. 13-1 at 3-10; 21 at 2-6.] The Court agrees.
Section 1983, which provides a private cause of action for constitutional violations by persons acting under color of state law, “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). Accordingly, a civil action under § 1983 allows “a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief.” City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999).
Section 1983 provides, in relevant part,
“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or any person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . .”42 U.S.C. § 1983. To establish a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove two elements: (1) that the defendant “deprived [the plaintiff] of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States” and (2) that the defendant “deprived [the plaintiff] of this constitutional right under color of [State] statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage.” Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 310 (4th Cir. 2001) (third alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The under-color-of-state-law element, which is equivalent to the “state action” requirement under the Fourteenth Amendment,
reflects judicial recognition of the fact that most rights secured by the Constitution are protected only against infringement by governments. This fundamental limitation on the scope of constitutional guarantees preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and avoids imposing on the State, its agencies or officials, responsibility for conduct for which they cannot fairly be blamed.Id. (quoting Dowe v. Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke Valley, 145 F.3d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 1998)) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, “the deed of an ostensibly private organization or individual” may at times be treated “as if a State has caused it to be performed.” Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001). Specifically, “state action may be found if, though only if, there is such a ‘close nexus between the State and the challenged action' that seemingly private behavior ‘may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.'” Id. (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)). State action requires both an alleged constitutional deprivation “caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State . . . or by a person for whom the State is responsible” and that “the party charged with the deprivation [is] a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). A determination of whether a private party's allegedly unconstitutional conduct is fairly attributable to the State requires the court to “begin[ ] by identifying ‘the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.'” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 51 (1999) (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982)).
Whether a private individual's or corporation's action rises to the level of state action necessarily depends on the relationship between the activity and the State. The inquiry involves “whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action . . . so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” Jackson, 419 U.S. at 351. In Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982), the Supreme Court held that a state is responsible for private action “only when it has exercised coercive power or has provided significant encouragement” in the implementation of the action.
In contrast, a private actor does not engage in state action by merely engaging with the State in performing the challenged conduct. For example, it is “well settled that a private person does not act under color of state law simply because he invokes state authority, such as by reporting a crime or making statements about suspected criminal activity to police.” Cole v. Montgomery, No. 4:14-cv-4462-RMG, 2015 WL 2341721, at *11 (D.S.C. May 12, 2015) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, that a private party's action is taken “with the . . . approval or acquiescence of the State” is not sufficient to make the private party action “state action.” American Mfrs., 526 U.S. at 52. Whether the action is “state action” depends on “indices of the Government's encouragement, endorsement, and participation.” Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 615-16 (1989).
Plaintiff's Complaint alleges several times that Parker and Baloga “act[ed] under the color of law” and are “state actor[s].” [Doc. 1-1 ¶¶ 66, 76, 81, 88.] Plaintiff appears to base these legal conclusions on another legal conclusion-that Limestone “is, upon information and belief, a non-profit ‘governmental entity,' ‘state,' secondary school.” [Id. ¶ 2 (footnote omitted).] In support of the conclusion that Limestone is a “‘governmental entity, ‘state,' secondary school, ” Plaintiff alleges two facts: first, that Limestone receives state and federal funding [id. ¶ 3]; and second, that, in 2016, Limestone pled reference to the South Carolina Tort Claims Act (“SCTCA”) as an affirmative defense in a trip-and-fall case against it and thus classified itself as a “state governmental entity” [id. ¶ 4]. The Court concludes that neither of these factual allegations are sufficient for Plaintiff's Complaint to plausibly allege that Limestone or either of the other two Defendants engaged in state action.
The Court begins its analysis with the fact that “court[s] have consistently held that private universities cannot be sued under § 1983.” Moore v. Northeastern Univ., No. 1:18CV324, 2019 WL 825802, at *2 (M.D. N.C. Feb. 21, 2019). And the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Limestone is not a public college or university. See S.C. Code § 59-101-10 (designating state colleges and universities); see also Allen v. FDIC of Md., 515 F.Supp. 1185, 1189 (D.S.C. 1981) (“The Court takes judicial notice that the existing statutes of the State of South Carolina provide for many levels and types of law enforcement agencies and officials.”). That Limestone receives substantial state funding does not make Limestone a state actor. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840-41 (1982) (holding that receipt of almost all of a private school's income from government funding did not convert the school's terminations of employees into state action); Moore, 2019 WL 825802, at *1 (“Almost universally, courts have found that the mere receipt of state funds is not sufficient to treat an educational institution as a state actor”). Its receipt of federal funding does not either. See Counts v. Vorhees College, 312 F.Supp. 598, 606 (D.S.C. 1970); see also Moore, 2019 WL 825802, at *3 n.1 (“Because § 1983 requires state action, ‘the federal government's involvement can be discounted for jurisdictional purposes, since § 1983 . . . ha[s] no applicability to federal action.'” (alterations in original)).
Plaintiff argues in his memorandum opposing summary judgment that the funding and regulation aspects of Title IX constitute coercive power over Limestone. [Doc. 18 at 4-5.] However, Title IX is a federal law, not a state law, and it is thus not apparent why Plaintiff believes that this federal law would be relevant to whether Limestone is a state actor. See Moore, 2019 WL 825802, at *3 n.1.
As for Plaintiff's allegation that in 2016, Limestone pled reference to the SCTCA as an affirmative defense in a trip-and-fall case against it, that pleading does not suggest that Limestone was claiming to be a state government entity. Rather, the only plausible explanation is that Limestone asserted the defense to invoke the SCTCA's damages cap as referenced in and applied to the South Carolina Solicitation of Charitable Funds Act, S.C Code Ann. § 33-56-10 et seq. That law states in relevant part that “[a] person sustaining an injury or dying by reason of the tortious act of commission or omission of an employee of a charitable organization . . . may recover in an action brought against the charitable organization only the actual damages he sustains in an amount not exceeding the limitations on liability imposed in the SCTCA in Chapter 78 of Title 15.” S.C. Code Ann. 33-56-180. In the lawsuit in which Limestone invoked the SCTCA, the plaintiff had alleged that Limestone was a non-profit educational institution and did not allege that Limestone was a governmental entity [Doc. 13-2], and it appears Limestone invoked the SCTCA as it pertained to the damages cap on negligent actions against charitable organizations. See Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that courts “may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record” and that at the motion to dismiss stage, courts may “consider documents attached to the complaint, as well as those attached to the motion to dismiss, so long as they are integral to the complaint and authentic” (internal citation omitted)). Accordingly, Plaintiff's allegation regarding the 2016 Answer provides no support for a conclusion that Limestone is a governmental entity.
In its memorandum opposing Defendants' motion to dismiss, Plaintiff argues that Limestone should be treated a state actor because the State delegated Limestone a public function by virtue of the Educational Facilities Authority Act for Private Nonprofit Institutions of Higher Learning (“EFAA”), SC Code Ann. § 59-109-10 et seq. [Doc. 18 at 3.] Initially, the Court notes that, although Plaintiff advances this argument in its response to Defendants' motion to dismiss, Plaintiff made no allegation in his Complaint concerning the EFAA delegating authority to Limestone. [Doc. 1-1.] In any event, the Court concludes that even the facts alleged in Plaintiff's memorandum opposing Defendants' motion to dismiss are not sufficient to plausibly allege that Limestone is a state actor.
The EFAA establishes an “Authority, ” defined as “the State Fiscal Accountability Authority, acting as the Educational Facilities Authority for Private Nonprofit Institutions of Higher Learning” for the purpose of providing “a measure of assistance and an alternative method to enable institutions for higher education in the State to provide facilities and structures which are sorely needed to accomplish the purposes of this chapter, all to the public benefit and good . . . “ S.C. Code Ann. § 59-109-20, -30. “The purpose of the [A]uthority is to assist institutions of higher learning in the acquisition, construction, financing, and refinancing of projects” and the EFAA gives the Authority many powers to accomplish this purpose. Id. § 59-109-50. In short, the EFAA creates an entity to help certain private nonprofit educational institutions to provide facilities and structures to assist in educating youth. Id. The EFAA also provides that when the Authority or an institution of public learning provides those facilities, doing so “constitute[s] the performance of an essential public function” and “neither the [A]uthority nor its agent shall be required to pay any taxes or assessments upon or in respect of a project or any property acquired or owned by the [A]uthority under the provisions of this chapter or upon the income therefrom.” Id. § 59-109-150.
The Court notes that the EFAA defines “institution for higher learning” as a nonprofit educational institution in South Carolina authorized to provide education beyond high school “which does not receive state financial support.” S.C. Code Ann. § 59-109-30(5). However, Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that Limestone receives state funding. [Doc. 1-1 ¶ 3.]
Although Plaintiff suggests that the EFAA delegated state authority to Limestone, Plaintiff does not explain what authority it claims EFAA delegated and what relationship such authority bore to Defendants' challenged actions in this case. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff cannot be said to have plausibly alleged state action by Limestone or the other two Defendants based on any delegation of authority by the EFAA.
In sum, for the reasons discussed, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that Limestone or either of the other two Defendants engaged in state action, and the Court therefore recommends that Defendants' motion to dismiss be granted as to Plaintiff's four § 1983 claims.
State Law Claim
Plaintiff's state law claim could be heard by this Court through the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction, which allows federal courts to hear and decide state law claims along with federal law claims. Federal courts are permitted to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), however, if “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” In deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, courts look at “convenience and fairness to the parties, the existence of any underlying issues of federal policy, comity, and considerations of judicial economy.” Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106, 110 (4th Cir. 1995). Further, the Supreme Court has warned that “[n]eedless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law. . . . [I]f the federal claims are dismissed before trial . . . the state law claims should be dismissed as well.” United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
A civil action for Plaintiff's state law claim could be cognizable in this Court under the diversity statute, if that statute's requirements are satisfied. However, this Court does not have diversity jurisdiction in this case because the Complaint does not allege the required diversity of citizenship of the parties. [See Doc. 1-1 at ¶¶ 1-2 (alleging Plaintiff is a citizen and resident of South Carolina and that Limestone is a “secondary school of higher learning organized and existing under the laws of South Carolina and owning property and transacting business in the . . . State”)]; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
In the instant case, remand of the state law claims is appropriate in light of the Shanaghan factors. This claim presents state-law questions and this case is only at the motion-to-dismiss stage. The Court therefore recommends that the district judge decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claim in this case.
RECOMMENDATION
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that Defendants' motion to dismiss [Doc. 13] be GRANTED as to Plaintiff's Title VII and § 1983 claims and that the action be remanded to state court to address Plaintiff's state law claim.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.