Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 03-5092
March 10, 2004
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Presently before the Court is a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by the Petitioner, Willie Singletary, Jr. ("Petitioner"), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Petitioner is currently incarcerated in the State Correctional Institution, Albion. For the reasons that follow, it is recommended that the Petition should be denied and dismissed without an evidentiary hearing.
This information is taken from the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and the Response thereto.
On January 8, 2000, Petitioner pled not guilty in a waiver trial before the Honorable Renee Cardwell Hughes in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania. On January 10, 2001, Judge Hughes sentenced Petitioner to life imprisonment for a first degree murder conviction. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court on the basis that (1) the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to sustain a guilty verdict; and (2) the court erred in permitting the testimony of the victim's wife, in alleged violation of a sequestration order.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court denied the appeal on August 14, 2002, finding that the evidence was sufficient to establish first degree murder, and also sufficient to disprove self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. The court also found that the victim's wife violated a sequestration order, but because her testimony was consistent with that given at the preliminary hearing, petitioner failed to establish an abuse of discretion by the trial court. Resp., Ex. B; Commonwealth v. Singletary, 809 A.2d 965 (Pa.Super. 2002)(Table). Petitioner's request for allocatur was denied on January 6, 2003. Commonwealth v. Singletary, 815 A.2d 1041 (Pa. 2003) (Table).
On September 10, 2003, Petitioner filed the instant pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, and subsequently filed a Memorandum of Law in support of the Petition on October 23, 2003. The Petition contains the following claims for relief: (1) the verdict was against the weight of the evidence; and (2) the trial court erred when it permitted the testimony of the decedent's wife, Helena Campbell, after she violated a sequestration order. See Pet. at 9-10, 14. Respondents contend that Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief because (1) the evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction for first-degree murder; and (2) the claim involving a violation of a sequestration order is meritless and procedurally defaulted. Each claim is hereafter examined.
II. DISCUSSION.
A. Whether Petitioner's First Degree Murder Conviction Was Supported By Sufficient Evidence.
Petitioner claims that the evidence against him was, as a matter of law, insufficient to support his first degree murder conviction and that the prosecution failed to disprove his self-defense claim. Respondents note that this claim was reviewed by both Judge Hughes and the Pennsylvania Superior Court, and both found that the evidence presented was sufficient to support his conviction because it sufficiently established specific intent to kill and disproved self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.
In its decision affirming the judgments of sentence, the Superior Court first analyzed the law in Pennsylvania on intent to kill, and then stated:
Our review of the record supports the trial court's conclusions. When [Petitioner] stood over the decedent, he fired a deadly weapon on vital parts of the decedent's body. This action is sufficient evidence of a specific intent to kill to support a verdict of first-degree murder.
Resp., Ex. B at 5-7. Nonetheless, Petitioner argues that the Superior Court's findings were flawed because: (1) he never provoked the altercation; (2) the medical examiner was unclear about the order of each shot fired on the decedent, and therefore the prosecution did not establish that Petitioner stood over decedent, shooting him repeatedly; (3) the bullet casings on the street were proof that the decedent fired at Petitioner; (4) Petitioner testified that he thought he saw the decedent draw a gun on him; and (5) even if the decedent was unarmed, it is reasonable to fear for one's life even when an assailant is unarmed. Petitioner claims that the evidence, at the very most, established a shooting that "erupted from an intense and physical confrontation unprovoked by the [Petitioner]. Thus, the evidence proving [sic] by the Commonwealth established nothing more than voluntary manslaughter." Mem. Law in Supp. Pet. at 20-21.
Petitioner cites Judge Hughes in support of his argument that the shooting happened in the heat of the moment:
And the question becomes one of intent. I do not believe that Willie Singletary went there with the intent to kill anyone. I do believe, however, that the intent to kill was formed in the heat of anger.
Mem. Law in Supp. Pet. at 13 (citing N.T., 1/10/01, pp. 481-482.) Based on this citation, Petitioner argues that Judge Hughes should have concluded that the evidence was insufficient for a first degree murder conviction, but instead was only enough to convict him for voluntary manslaughter.
Respondents counter that Petitioner cites Judge Hughes out of context, and urge the Court to consider the Judge's entire statement, which reads as follows:
The question becomes one of intent. I do not believe Willie Singletary went there with the intent to kill anyone. I do believe, however, that the intent to kill was formed in the hear [sic] of anger, as evidenced by his testimony that he fired six bullets, five of which hit his intended target, three of them in the back. And the last one was just out of pure meanness, shooting him in the buttocks; it was out of pure unadulterated meanness.
You intended to hurt that man and you did.
N.T., 1/10/01, pp. 481-482. Respondents also note that Judge Hughes stated that "the use of a deadly weapon on a vital part of the body is sufficient evidence of the specific intent necessary to support a verdict of first degree murder." See Resp., Ex. A at 6. The Judge also quoted Pennsylvania law when she stated that "[t]he pre-meditation necessary to support first degree murder can be found in an instant." Id. (quotingCommonwealth v. Hannibal, 753 A.2d 1265, 1270 (Pa. 2000)). Further, "[t]he evidence of the placement of the wounds; the sequence of the events and the amount of time involved in the incident provide more than sufficient basis to support the trial court's decision." Id.
A review of Judge Hughes' opinion reveals that she relied on Pennsylvania law in reaching her decision to convict Petitioner of first degree murder, and not voluntary manslaughter. Respondents correctly contend that Petitioner fails to show that the evidence against him was insufficient to support his conviction for first-degree murder since the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Petitioner also contends that the medical examiner's testimony presented an unclear picture of the order of shooting, i.e., the order of the decedent's injuries. According to Respondents, this argument does not impact this appeal because Dr. Greg McDonald, the Medical Examiner, stated that there was no way to determine which injury was sustained first. Based upon the testimony provided by prosecution witnesses, however, Petitioner shot the decedent once and then stood over him, firing four more times. N.T., 1/8/00, pp. 40, 122; 1/10/00, pp. 386-387. In her opinion, Judge Hughes states that she believed the testimony of these witnesses. As Respondents correctly note, credibility determinations by the trial court are given "presumptive weight." Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 115 (1985).
Petitioner also argues that the prosecution failed to disprove his self-defense claim. He states that: (1) the bullet casings on the street were proof that the decedent fired at Petitioner; (2) Petitioner testified that he thought he saw a gun being drawn on him; and (3) even if the decedent was unarmed, it is reasonable to fear for one's life even when an assailant is unarmed. Petitioner states "[i]t is inconceivable for one to think that every bullet fired went up and straight down to the ground without hitting a car or a wall. In fact the street . . . was packed with automobiles on the night in question." Pet.'s Mem. Law at 19. Respondents note that Judge Hughes also took note of this fact but interpreted it entirely differently, "if there was another gun on the scene that was, in fact, fired, I have no broken glass on a street full of cars; I have no other citizens hurt; I have no windows broken; I have [no] strikes anywhere; I have no evidence of another gun being fired." N.T., 1/10/00, p. 478. Judge Hughes found it inconceivable that every shot fired at Petitioner fell harmlessly to the ground, leaving no evidence that someone shot at him, and forcing him to act in self-defense.
Petitioner, in making his argument regarding the fired gunshots, ignores the testimony of the prosecution witnesses who repeatedly stated that the decedent was running away from Petitioner when he was initially shot. The Superior Court also examined this issue:
Where it is apparent that the decedent had been retreating in face of show of force at the time he was fatally shot by defendant, a claim of self-defense is properly rejected. Commonwealth v. Edwards, 353 A.2d 383, 466 (Pa. 1976).
Our review of the record reflects testimony that [Petitioner] stood over the unarmed deceased and fired upon him after decedent attempted to retreat. (N.T. 39-40, 92, 212, 122, 163.) This evidence demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was not a justifiable act of self-defense.
Ex. B at 9. Respondents contend that Petitioner has failed to make a showing that the evidence against him was insufficient to support his conviction for first-degree murder. The relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner has not met this standard. Therefore, this claim should be dismissed.
B. Whether Petitioner's Claim That Mrs. Campbell's Testimony Violated His Right To Due Process Is Procedurally Defaulted.
Mrs. Campbell, the widow of the decedent, testified at trial as a rebuttal witness for the prosecution. The trial court was aware that she had been in the courtroom for the entire trial, in violation of the sequestration order issued by the court. Respondents note that objections were taken on the record and a ruling was made as follows:
[ Prosecutor]: I would like to call Helena Campbell as the next witness. Now, I just want to advise the Court that she has been in the courtroom because I did not anticipate I would call her. Counsel has her statement.The Court: Okay.
[ Prosecutor]: So she is of record. And she also testified at the preliminary hearing, so I think we already have her testimony before she heard anything else under oath and —The Court: Have the two of you talked about this, Mr. McMonagle?
Mr. McMonagle [Defense Counsel]: . . . Obviously I believe it is a violation of sequestration. . . . I certainly object.
The Court: [G]iven what you have just shared with me and given I did impose sequestration, I will let her testify. But I don't normally in a waiver read the statements or the preliminary hearing notes, but it might be necessary, depending on how this shakes up.
N.T., 1/10/99, pp. 364-365. Defense counsel later renewed his objection, and the prosecutor explained that Mrs. Campbell was not originally called because "she wanted to be present. And because it was her husband [who had been killed], I decided I wasn't going to call her so that she could be present." Id. at 391.
Judge Hughes explained her decision to admit Mrs. Campbell's testimony in her trial court opinion:
In the instant matter, the trial court found that a technical violation of the sequestration order occurred, but that it had no impact on the witness or the trial and that it was not serious. The witness in question, the wife of the victim, was present during the presentation of evidence for both the Commonwealth and the defense case in chief. The witness had no prior knowledge that she would be testifying at trial. Her violation of the sequestration order was unintentional and did no [sic] prejudice [Appellant] as her testimony was very limited. The witness had testified at the preliminary hearing. The preliminary hearing record gave the trial court a basis to determine whether or not the witness attempted to change her testimony. The witness' testimony was wholly consistent with that of the preliminary hearing as well as a prior statement given to homicide detectives, which was introduced by defense counsel. Where the record is devoid of any suggestion that the witness attempted to change her direct testimony so as to conform with what she had learned during trial, a new trial is not warranted. Commonwealth v. Ulen, 607 A.2d 779, 414 Pa. Super. 502 (1992).
Resp., Ex. A, p. 7. Thus, the admission of Mrs. Campbell's testimony complied with Pennsylvania law. As the Superior Court noted in its decision affirming Judge Hughes' decision:
A trial court, in its discretion, may select a remedy for the violation of a sequestration order. Commonwealth v. Smith, 346 A.2d 757, 760 (Pa. 1975). The trial court should consider the seriousness of the violation, its impact on testimony of the witness, and its probable impact on the outcome of the trial. Smith, 346 A.2d at 760. The remedy of a new trial will not be afforded because of prosecutor misconduct unless it was a deliberate attempt to mislead the jury. [ Commonwealth v.] Pierce, 645 A.2d 189, 197 [ Pa. 1994].
Our review of the record supports the trial court's conclusions. The record reflects that the witness, decedent's wife, Helena Campbell, was permitted to testify as an eyewitness, despite having been in the courtroom hearing testimony from the other witnesses. . . . The trial judge, in this non-jury trial, found that the violation was a technical one causing no prejudice because she could evaluate her veracity by referring to her prior testimony at a preliminary hearing. [Trial Court Opinion at 7.]
The record reflects that the wife's testimony at the preliminary hearing, of which defense had knowledge, was the same given at trial. Therefore, her testimony neither surprised nor adversely impacted Appellant. Thus, Appellant failed to establish an abuse of discretion by the trial court in allowing the decedent's wife to testify in violation of the sequestration order.
Resp., Ex. B., pp. 10-12.
When Petitioner's counsel raised the issue of the admission of Mrs. Campbell's testimony in the state court, he exclusively cited Pennsylvania case law and made no mention of any violation of Petitioner's due process. Thus, Respondents contend that the instant due process claim is procedurally defaulted. In the alternative, Respondents argue that the claim is entirely meritless.
On direct appeal, Petitioner claimed that "[t]he trial court erred in permitting the testimony of Helena Campbell after she had violated the sequestration order." See Resp., Ex. C at 17. Petitioner did not reference the due process clause or federal case law in making this argument, and the Superior Court decided the issue based entirely on Pennsylvania law. See Resp., Ex. B. at 9-12. Petitioner's current claim before this Court is that Mrs. Campbell's testimony was admitted in violation of his due process rights, which is an entirely new federal issue. Further, because Petitioner cannot return to the state courts to file a timely PCRA petition because the claim was previously litigated under the PCRA and is not reviewable, the claim is procedurally defaulted. See 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9543(a)(3), 9544(a)(2). Because of the way Petitioner presented his state law claim, i.e., with no reference or indication to the state court that he was advancing a federal claim, the state courts, including the Pennsylvania Superior Court, addressed the claim solely as a state law claim. Thus, Petitioner has not satisfied the exhaustion requirement. See Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 366 (1995) (holding petitioner did not fairly present his due process claim where claim advanced in state court relied only on state law).
Federal courts may review a claim, notwithstanding its procedural default, only where the petitioner "can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). First, Petitioner does not allege cause and prejudice, therefore the procedural defaults cannot be excused on this basis. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298 (1989) (holding that petitioner's failure to allege cause for his default precluded federal habeas review of defaulted claim). Secondly, Petitioner has not shown that he is actually innocent, a requirement of the fundamental miscarriage of justice argument from a failure to consider the defaulted claims. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). Thus, it is inappropriate for the Court to review this claim. Sistrunk v. Vaughn, 96 F.3d 666, 674-675 (3d Cir. 1996) (stating state court finding that unexhausted claim is previously litigated under PCRA constitutes a state procedural default barring federal habeas review).
Therefore, I make the following:
RECOMMENDATION
AND NOW, this day of March, 2004, IT IS RESPECTFULLY RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 should be DENIED and DISMISSED. There is no probable cause to issue a certificate of appealability.