Opinion
C. A. 6:23-cv-06450-MGL-KFM
03-05-2024
Douglas Singletary, Plaintiff, v. T.J. Hoye, Maj. Brown, Captain Patton, Unknown First Lieutenant, Defendants.
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
KEVIN F. MCDONALD UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The plaintiff, a pretrial detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and submit findings and recommendations to the district court.
The plaintiff's complaint was entered on the docket on December 12, 2023 (doc. 1). On February 6, 2024, the undersigned issued an order informing the plaintiff that his complaint was subject to dismissal as drafted and providing him with time to file an amended complaint to correct the deficiencies noted in the order (doc. 13). The plaintiff was informed that if he failed to file an amended complaint or cure the deficiencies outlined in the order, the undersigned would recommend that his claims be dismissed (id. at 7). The plaintiff has failed to file an amended complaint within the time provided; accordingly, the undersigned recommends that the instant matter be dismissed.
ALLEGATIONS
This is a § 1983 action filed by the plaintiff, a pretrial detainee at the Florence County Detention Center (“the Detention Center”), seeking damages from the defendants (doc. 1). The plaintiff alleges that he has been exposed to cruel and unusual punishment, inhumane treatment, mental anguish, physical peril, emotional distress, and sexual influence by the defendants (id. at 4). He contends that from September 26, 2023, to October 9, 2023, he was held in a booking cell and only allowed out each day for phone calls and showers (id. at 6). He contends that he was kept there with two other detainees even though the cell was only made to hold two detainees, which meant that his mattress was on the floor by the toilet (id. at 6-7). He contends that he was not allowed outdoor recreation during this time period, but was allowed showers and phone calls (id. at 7). He contends that Captain Patton and Maj. Brown were responsible for the housing arrangements as well as that Sheriff Hoye was responsible for the housing assignment as sheriff and head of the Detention Center (id.). The plaintiff's alleged injuries include emotional anguish and back pain from the uncomfortable mattress (id. at 7, 8). For relief, the plaintiff seeks money damages (id. at 8).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, the plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and “seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if the plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court is charged with screening the plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
As a pro se litigant, the plaintiff's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
This complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
DISCUSSION
As noted above, the plaintiff filed the instant action pursuant to § 1983, seeking damages from the defendants. However, the plaintiff's complaint is subject to summary dismissal.
No Personal Allegations
The plaintiff's claims against the defendants in this action are subject to dismissal because the plaintiff's complaint makes no personal allegations of wrongdoing against them. Although the plaintiff's allegations must be liberally construed, the plaintiff must provide more than general and conclusory statements to allege a plausible claim for relief. Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74-75 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1022 (1995); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (noting that liability under § 1983 “requires personal involvement”). Moreover, as recently reiterated by the Fourth Circuit, general, conclusory, and collective allegations against groups of defendants fail to allege a plausible claim. See Langford v. Joyner, 62 F.4th 122, 125 (4th Cir. 2023) (recognizing that the plaintiff's complaint failed to meet the plausibility standard when it did not set forth who the defendants were beyond being employees where he was incarcerated or in what capacity the defendants interacted with the plaintiff). As such, because the plaintiff's allegations against the defendants are limited and general and fail to show any personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violations, they are subject to summary dismissal. See, e.g., Collins v. Clarke, C/A No. 7:22-cv-00406, 2023 WL 4109773, at *3 (W.D. Va. June 21, 2023) (noting the plaintiff's allegations that the defendants were responsible for certain prison policies and were “‘made aware'” of the plaintiff's complaints were insufficient to state a claim against those defendants).
Additionally, to the extent the plaintiff's complaint can be construed as seeking damages based upon supervisory liability against the defendants, his claims are also subject to summary dismissal because the doctrines of vicarious liability and respondeat superior are generally not applicable to § 1983 suits. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”); Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (noting that “Section 1983 will not support a claim based on a respondeat superior theory of liability” (emphasis in original)). Indeed, to allege a plausible claim requires a showing that the supervisor (1) had actual or constructive knowledge that his/her subordinates engaged in conduct posing a pervasive or unreasonable risk of constitutional injury; (2) the supervisor's response to the knowledge was “so inadequate as to show deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices;” and (3) an affirmative causal link between the inaction by the supervisor and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff. Green v. Beck, 539 Fed.Appx. 78, 80 (4th Cir. 2013). Here, beyond conclusory allegations that the defendants are responsible for anything that happens in the Detention Center, the plaintiff has not alleged how the defendants were aware of the complained-of conditions or alleged a causal link between any knowledge these defendants may have had of the complained-of conditions and the plaintiff's alleged back pain or emotional distress. As such, the plaintiff's complaint also fails to state a supervisory liability claim against the defendants. See Ford v. Stirling, C/A No. 2:17-02390-MGL, 2017 WL 4803648, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 25, 2017); London v. Maier, C/A No. 0:10-00434-RBH, 2010 WL 1428832, at *2 (D.S.C. Apr. 7, 2010).
Conditions of Confinement Claims
The plaintiff's conditions of confinement claims are also subject to summary dismissal. The plaintiff's complained-of conditions include being held in a small booking cell with two other detainees from September 26, 2023, to October 9, 2023, being locked down (except for showers and phone calls each day), and being denied outdoor recreation (doc. 1 at 6, 7). At all relevant times herein, the plaintiff was a pretrial detainee; thus, his claims are evaluated under the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment (which is used to evaluate conditions of confinement claims for individuals convicted of crimes). See City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 243-44 (1983). In any event, “[the] due process rights of a pretrial detainee are at least as great as the [E]ighth [A]mendment protections available to the convicted prisoner.” Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 870 (4th Cir. 1988). Recently, the Fourth Circuit held in a published decision that pretrial detainees could state a Fourteenth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to a serious risk of harm on a purely objective basis that the challenged action is not related to a legitimate non-punitive governmental purpose or is excessive in relation to that purpose. Short v. Hartman, 87 F.4th 593, 611 (4th Cir. 2023) (citing Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 398 (2015)).
Here, the plaintiff's complained-of conditions do not rise to the level of constitutional violations. See Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d 162, 166 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)) (noting that the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, and only deprivations which deny the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities are sufficiently grave to provide the basis of a § 1983 claim); Thompson v. Brown, C/A No. 3:11-cv-318-TMC-JRM, 2011 WL 6012592, at *1-2 (D.S.C. Nov. 8, 2011) (rejecting conditions of confinement claim where the plaintiff claimed “his mattress and blanket were confiscated for six days, he was not allowed to have any toilet tissue for six days, his clothes were taken away from him for six days, his cell was cold, he had no running water in his cell, and he was forced to sleep on a steel cot for six days”), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2011 WL 6012550 (D.S.C. Dec. 2, 2011). For example, courts have found that being denied outdoor recreation for a few months - far longer than the plaintiff alleges herein that he was denied outdoor recreation - does not rise to the level of a serious deprivation to state a constitutional claim. See Collins v. Williams, C/A No. 6:18-cv-01491-RMG, 2019 WL 4751718, at *4 (D.S.C. Sept. 27, 2019); see also Snyder v. W. Reg' JailAuth., C/A No. 3:18-cv-01433, 2019 WL 6523198, at *13 (S.D. W.Va. Nov. 4, 2019) (noting no deprivation of constitutional rights where the plaintiff did not allege being denied any recreation opportunities), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2019 WL 6521989 (S.D. W.Va. Dec. 3, 2019). Further, being housed in a cell with two other inmates is not per se unconstitutional. See Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1380-81 (4th Cir. 1993) (finding not cognizable constitutional deprivation for double bunking absent proof of unsanitary or dangerous conditions which cause deprivation of an identifiable human need). Indeed, other than alleging back pain, the plaintiff's assertions that he has suffered mental anguish from the complained-of conditions also fails because there is no federal constitutional right to be free from emotional distress, mental anguish, or psychological stress. See Williams v. Pruitt, C/A No. 8:13-cv-01812-JMC, 2013 WL 4500436, at *2 n.2 (D.S.C. Aug. 19, 2013) (citing Grandstaff v. City of Borger, Tex., 767 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 480 U.S. 916 (1987); Rodriguez v. Comas, 888 F.2d 899, 903 (1st Cir. 1989)). As such, the plaintiff's conditions of confinement claims are subject to summary dismissal.
RECOMMENDATION
By order issued February 6, 2024, the undersigned provided the plaintiff an opportunity to correct the defects identified in his complaint and further warned the plaintiff that if he failed to timely file an amended complaint or failed to cure the identified deficiencies, the undersigned would recommend to the district court that the action be dismissed with prejudice and without leave for further amendment (doc. 13). The plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint within the time provided and a prior order of this Court has been returned as undeliverable mail. As such, in addition to the reasons discussed herein, this action should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to comply with a court order. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the district court dismiss this action with prejudice, without further leave to amend, and without issuance and service of process. See Britt v. DeJoy, C/A No. 20-1620 (4th Cir. Aug. 17, 2022) (published) (noting that “when a district court dismisses a complaint or all claims without providing leave to amend . . . the order dismissing the complaint is final and appealable”). The attention of the parties is directed to the important notice on the following page.
The plaintiff is warned that if the United States District Judge assigned to this matter adopts this report and recommendation, the dismissal of this action for failure to state a claim could later be deemed a strike under the three-strikes rule. See Pitts v. South Carolina, 65 F.4th 141 (4th Cir. 2023).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committees note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
250 East North Street, Room 2300
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).