Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-4634-12T1
04-22-2014
BALWANT SINGH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PILOT GAS STATION, a business entity; PILOT CORPORATION, Defendants-Respondents.
Randi S. Greenberg argued the cause for appellant (Stathis and Leonardis, attorneys; Ms. Greenberg, on the brief). Michael L. Trucillo argued the cause for respondents (Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP, attorneys; Martin J. Sullivan, of counsel and on the brief; Mr. Trucillo, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Sapp-Peterson and Hoffman.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County, Docket No. L-6909-12.
Randi S. Greenberg argued the cause for appellant (Stathis and Leonardis, attorneys; Ms. Greenberg, on the brief).
Michael L. Trucillo argued the cause for respondents (Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP, attorneys; Martin J. Sullivan, of counsel and on the brief; Mr. Trucillo, on the brief). PER CURIAM
The issue presented by this appeal is whether the applicable New Jersey or Tennessee statute of limitations governs an action for damages resulting from a slip-and-fall accident that occurred in Tennessee. We conclude that under the "most significant relationship" test that now controls the resolution of choice-of-law questions in tort actions, Tennessee's one-year limitations period for filing such a claim requires the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint.
I.
On December 16, 2010, plaintiff Balwant Singh, a resident of Carteret, suffered injuries when he slipped and fell on snow and ice at a Pilot Gas Station in White Pine, Tennessee. Defendant Pilot Travel Centers, LLC, a Tennessee corporation, owns numerous Pilot Travel Centers throughout the United States and Canada including at least six in New Jersey. Following the accident, plaintiff received treatment for his injuries in New Jersey. Plaintiff's only contact with Tennessee was the trip when the subject accident occurred.
Improperly pled as Pilot Gas Station and Pilot Corporation.
On October 19, 2012, plaintiff filed a complaint in New Jersey against defendant alleging negligence based on premises liability. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Rule 4:6-2. The motion judge originally denied defendant's motion on January 25, 2013, indicating New Jersey has jurisdiction over the parties, venue is proper, and the doctrine of forum non conveniens does not dictate transfer to Tennessee; however, the judge did not address the statute of limitations issue. Defendant then moved for reconsideration pursuant to Rule 4:49-2, arguing dismissal was required because the action was barred by Tennessee's one-year statute of limitations. The same motion judge heard arguments on May 3, 2013, and acknowledged the statute of limitations issue was not addressed in deciding the original motion. After completing a conflict-of-laws analysis, the judge granted defendant's motion to dismiss. The judge found "Tennessee has the most significant relationship to this particular occurrence, and therefore, Tennessee law applies, including the statute of limitations." This appeal follows. Plaintiff argues New Jersey's two-year statute of limitations should apply rather than Tennessee's one-year statute of limitations. For the reasons that follow, we disagree and affirm the motion judge's dismissal of plaintiff's claim.
II.
"We exercise plenary review of a trial court's ruling on a choice-of-law issue." DeMarco v. Stoddard, 434 N.J. Super. 352, 367 (App. Div. 2014) (quoting Bondi v. Citigroup, Inc., 423 N.J. Super. 377, 418 (App. Div. 2011), certif. denied, 210 N.J. 478 (2012)). See also N. Jersey Neuro. Assocs., P.A. v. Clarendon Nat'l Ins. Co., 401 N.J. Super. 186, 191 (App. Div. 2008) ("Choice-of-law determinations are reviewed as matters of law, and we must review the trial court's determination de novo, with no deference to the trial court's views.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
Because New Jersey is the forum state, we evaluate a conflict-of-laws issue under New Jersey's choice-of-law principles. Rowe v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 189 N.J. 615, 621 (2007); Gantes v. Kason Corp., 145 N.J. 478, 484 (1996). Choice-of-law determinations "must be made on an 'issue by issue' basis, in which each issue is analyzed separately, and different issues in the same litigation may be governed by the law of different states." N. Jersey Neuro. Assocs., supra, 401 N.J. Super. at 192 (citing Rowe, supra, 189 N.J. at 621).
In P.V. ex rel. v. Camp Jaycee, 197 N.J. 132, 136 (2008), our Supreme Court adopted the "most significant relationship" test as set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971) for determining conflict-of-law questions in tort actions. The test begins by asking whether there is a conflict in the laws between the interested states. Id. at 143. If there is a conflict, the first contact examined is the location of the injury; the law of the place of injury controls, "unless another state has a more significant relationship to the parties and issues." Ibid.
We first determine whether a conflict of laws actually exists, which is "done by examining the substance of the potentially applicable laws to determine whether there is a distinction between them." Ibid. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). This is clearly satisfied here by the conflict in the length of the limitations periods. Tennessee's statute of limitations requires actions for injuries to the person "shall be commenced within one (1) year after the cause of action accrued," Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(1), whereas New Jersey has a two-year statute of limitations for such claims. N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2(a).
With this conflict identified, section 146 of the Restatement establishes the presumption that Tennessee law, as the state where the personal injury and tort occurred, will apply and determine the rights and liabilities of the parties unless "some other state has a more significant relationship under the principles stated in § 6 to the occurrence and the parties, in which event the local law of the other state will be applied." Restatement (Second) § 146. See P.V., supra, 197 N.J. at 144-45. "Once the presumptively applicable law is identified, that choice is tested against the contacts detailed in section 145 and the general principles outlined in section 6 of the Second Restatement." P.V., supra, 197 N.J. at 136.
Section 145 specifically describes the general principle for torts: "The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in § 6." Restatement (Second) § 145(1). Accordingly, we consider the following factors set forth in section 145, and find nearly all weigh in favor of applying the Tennessee statute of limitations:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
[Restatement (Second) § 145(2)(a)-(d).]
Here, both the injury and the conduct causing the injury occurred in Tennessee. Notably,
[w]hen both conduct and injury occur in a single jurisdiction, with only "rare exceptions, the local law of the state where conduct and injury occurred will be applied" to determine an actor's liability. That isDefendant is incorporated in Tennessee with its corporate headquarters in Knoxville, Tennessee while plaintiff is a New Jersey resident. Finally, the relationship between the parties is undoubtedly centered in Tennessee. Plaintiff's accident occurred in Tennessee and the whole relationship between the parties stems from that Tennessee accident; plaintiff voluntarily chose to visit Tennessee and stop at defendant's business in that state.
so because "a state has an obvious interest
in regulating the conduct of persons within its territory and in providing redress for injuries that occurred there."
[P.V., supra, 197 N.J. at 145 (alteration in original) (quoting Fu v. Fu, 160 N.J. 108, 125-26 (1999); Restatement (Second) § 145 comment d) (internal citations omitted).]
Next, we weigh the section 145 factors against the section 6 factors to determine if the presumption has been overcome. See P.V., supra, 197 N.J. at 147. Section 6 should be used "to measure the significance of the contacts in order to determine whether the presumption" that the law of the state in which the injury occurred has been overcome. Id. at 143. The section 6 principles, reduced to their essence, are: "(1) the interests of interstate comity; (2) the interests of the parties; (3) the interests underlying the field of tort law; (4) the interests of judicial administration; and (5) the competing interests of the states." Ibid. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Notably, when applying these factors to a specific case, the "'qualitative, not the quantitative, nature of a state's contacts ultimately determines whether its law should apply.'" Fu, supra, 160 N.J. at 139 (quoting Pfizer, Inc. v. Emplrs Ins., 154 N.J. 187, 198 (1998).
Weighing these factors does not diminish Tennessee's greater interest in this case. Although both states have some interest in the subject matter of this case, New Jersey's interest in seeing that a tort victim is compensated for an alleged act of negligence that occurred in Tennessee, does not rise to the level of Tennessee's interest in maintaining a tort system that is fair, efficient and predictable.
Evaluating the parties' respective interests requires a court to determine the expectations of the parties and their need for predictable results. Fu, supra, 160 N.J. at 123. Although plaintiff asserts that he was only in Tennessee once and thus had no expectation he would be bound by Tennessee's statute of limitations, this argument lacks merit. As noted by the Third Circuit,
[w]hen a person chooses to travel across state lines, he should expect the laws of the place in which he is located to govern his transactions. "By entering the state . . . the visitor has exposed himself to the risks of the territory and should not expect to subject persons living there to aBecause plaintiff willingly traveled to Tennessee, he should have expected that Tennessee's state laws would apply to him while a visitor. Likewise, defendant should be able to expect suit to be filed within one year of the date of a Tennessee accident.
financial hazard that their law had not created."
[Lebegern v. Forman, 471 F.3d 424, 433 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Colley v. Harvey Cedars Marina, 422 F. Supp. 953, 957 (D.N.J. 1975)).]
When one state's laws are stricter than the other state's laws, applying the more relaxed law interferes with the policies of the stricter state, and undermines uniformity and predictability of judicial administration. Cornett v. Johnson & Johnson, 414 N.J. Super. 365, 381 (App. Div. 2010), affirmed in part and modified in part 211 N.J. 317 (2012). Tennessee's statute of limitations reflects state policy that tort claims be filed promptly. Applying New Jersey law in this case would impair Tennessee's ability to regulate conduct within its borders according to its own standards. Ibid. For the same reasons, interstate comity is furthered when we "defer[] to the rights of other jurisdictions to regulate conduct within their borders[,]" especially when that conduct is continual and directed at both residents and non-residents. P.V., supra, 197 N.J. at 153.
To conclude, "in balancing the relevant elements of the most significant relationship test," we "seek to apply the law of the state that has the strongest connection to the case." P.V., supra, 197 N.J. at 155. We find Tennessee has the strongest connection to the case and therefore, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's slip-and-fall negligence suit because it is barred by the Tennessee statute of limitations.
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION