Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. 00AS00602
SIMS, J.Appellant and judgment creditor Stephen Lipworth tried to enforce a judgment against respondent Raj Singh by obtaining a court order for the sale of a residence owned by respondent Singh. To fend off a judicial finding that he owned the residence, respondent in propria persona played an identity shell game, asserting that one “Kaus Singh,” who never appeared in court and for whose existence respondent produced no credible evidence, was the true owner. After the trial court determined that “Kaus Singh” was merely respondent’s alias, appellant obtained the court order he sought.
Moving for reconsideration, respondent produced a stipulation and order from a previously undisclosed family court proceeding, which purported to transfer the residence from “Rag Singh” (a stranger to this action who lacked any recorded claim of title) to his separated wife, Karen Singh, on condition that she surrender it to “Kaus Singh” whenever he chose to claim it. Respondent then submitted a declaration claiming that he was actually “Rag Singh.”
Appellant argued that respondent should be judicially estopped to assert an ownership interest in the property (under whatever name) which he had denied until then. Surprisingly, the trial court disagreed, granted respondent’s motion for reconsideration, and vacated the order for the sale of the property. We shall reverse.
We cannot simply reinstate the property-sale order, however. The family court’s award of the property to Karen Singh, even if it resulted from a fraud on that court, has made her an indispensable party to this litigation. She has never been named as a party, and neither appellant nor respondent can represent her interests. Therefore, we shall remand with directions that appellant join her as a party, unless the court determines that she is not subject to joinder. (Code Civ. Proc., § 389 (section 389).)
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2004, U-Save Auto Rental of America, Inc. (U-Save) won an arbitration award against respondent. U-Save petitioned in the trial court to confirm the award; respondent sued to set it aside, but failed. On February 2, 2005, the trial court (Judge Raymond Cadei presiding) awarded U-Save a judgment of $127,690.25 plus interest.
This explains why respondent Singh has been designated as plaintiff throughout this action.
On July 7, 2005, U-Save filed an acknowledgment of assignment of judgment to appellant Stephen Lipworth. The assignment showed respondent’s name and last known address as “Raj Singh, 1625 28th Street, Sacramento, California, 95816.”
On the same date, appellant filed a motion to amend the judgment to add aliases of respondent, namely Kaus Singh and Archana Singh. Appellant also obtained a temporary protective order restraining respondent and Kaus Singh from conveying, transferring, or encumbering the real property located at 1625 28th Street, Sacramento, until the motion to amend the judgment could be heard. (Respondent had opposed the application for the order, asserting that he was not “the same Kaus Singh who is the owner of 1625 28th Street, Sacramento.”) This restraining order (by a judge who had previously recused himself from the case) was vacated and replaced by an order issued by Judge Cadei on July 22, 2005.
In support of this motion, appellant filed the following documentation:
Appellant’s motion to amend the judgment was re-noticed before Judge Cadei for August 12, 2005; opposing the motion, respondent again claimed: “Raj Singh is not Kaus Singh who is the owner of 1625 28th Street, Sacramento.” Despite a continuance to September 16, 2005, to give respondent the opportunity to produce evidence that Kaus Singh was a separate person, respondent failed to produce any such evidence.
During part of this period, respondent was apparently serving a sentence for contempt of court. On August 26, 2005, after respondent testified at a hearing on Judge McMaster’s OSC, Judge Troy Nunley sentenced him to five days in jail because: (1) Respondent had misrepresented himself as Archana Singh and continued to do so; he had already conceded that “Archana Singh” was simply his alias, as Judge McMaster found, and though he now claimed “Archana Singh” was an actual person other than himself, he had presented no evidence to prove it. (2) He had used other aliases in court proceedings and had several judgments outstanding against him. (3) By filing suit in the name “Archana Singh,” he knowingly violated the court’s prior order. (3) His testimony was generally incredible and “flies in the face of reason”; he “walked right up to [the] line” of perjury. (4) During the hearing, he had shown an utter lack of respect for the court.
Meanwhile, on August 30, 2005, while the restraining order was in effect, Rag Singh and Karen Singh stipulated in family court that the subject real property is Karen’s separate property. On the same date, Family Court Judge Jerilyn Borack “[s]o ordered.”
On September 16, 2005, Judge Cadei granted the motion to amend the judgment nunc pro tunc to add respondent’s aliases. Judge Cadei also issued an abstract of judgment against respondent and Kaus Singh, denied respondent’s ex parte application to take Kaus Singh’s deposition “with 2 to 3 days verbal notice,” and denied respondent’s motion for stay of execution.
At the hearing on September 16, 2005, respondent stated: “The property in question has been transferred to somebody else by the Order of the Court.” Judge Cadei answered: “Actually, the court order was to the contrary: that you could [not] transfer to the property to anyone at all. [¶] So it sounds like you’ve just put on the record that you violated a court order, that you were personally advised of[,] not to transfer the property[.]” In hindsight, it appears respondent was referring to the family court proceedings discussed below, though his claim that a court order had transferred the property already was premature.
On September 23, 2005, respondent Singh filed a motion for reconsideration and/or rehearing of the order adding aliases to the judgment, calendaring the hearing date for March 24, 2006. In support of his motion, respondent later submitted the transcript of a purported deposition of Kaus Singh taken on January 27, 2006, without notice to appellant.
On January 19, 2006, appellant applied for and obtained an OSC setting a hearing date on his application for order for sale of the 28th Street residence. Unsuccessfully opposing the application, respondent relied on the “Kaus Singh deposition transcript,” denied his ownership of the property, and asserted: “Neither Court nor anyone else (besides GOD) can convert Plaintiff into alleged Kaus Singh[.]”
On March 17, 2006, appellant’s application for property sale order was taken off calendar. On the same date, Judge Cadei orally denied respondent’s motion. Judge Cadei entered a written order denying the motion on April 5, 2006.
Judge Cadei’s minute order states in part: “[M]otions for reconsideration . . . require the moving party to show new facts, circumstances, or law. Plaintiff Singh has not made any such showing, as any facts bearing on the issue of whether Raj Singh uses the aliases ‘Kaus Singh’ or ‘Archana Singh,’ or whether these are all separate individuals, would have been in existence at the time of the Court’s prior orders and thus are not ‘new facts.’ Moreover, the very brief transcripts of purported depositions of ‘Kaus Singh’ and ‘Archana Singh’ taken in the absence of judgment creditor or any other interested party, and evidently without notice to any such party, are not persuasive evidence in support of plaintiff Singh’s contentions.”
On April 20, 2006, appellant obtained a new OSC on his application for order for sale of the real property, setting a hearing date of June 2, 2006. Again, respondent opposed the application, claiming he did not own the property and citing the purported Kaus Singh deposition transcript.
On May 3, 2006, respondent filed an ex parte motion to set aside all prior rulings related to the subject property; on May 5, 2006, he filed a motion to recall and quash execution and vacate levy and to dismiss all proceedings and orders related to the subject property. A pleading filed in support of these motions on May 30, 2006, asserted: “FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT ASSUME THAT Raj Singh is the owner of the subject property. Then, a judge of Sacramento Superior Court awarded the subject property to someone else. Lipworth and his attorney are aware of this order.” (Original capitalization, bolding, and underscoring.)
This pleading, signed by one RadhaKrishna Narayan (who has also signed proofs of service in this action, but whose standing to file pleadings is unexplained), bears an extraordinary stylistic and typographical resemblance to the papers respondent has filed under his own name.
On May 31, 2006, the trial court (Judge Shelleyanne W. L. Chang) heard and denied respondent’s motion(s). The court found: Despite respondent’s claim that not he but Kaus Singh owned the property, it had already been determined that Kaus Singh was respondent’s alias. Respondent’s purported deposition of Kaus Singh was not properly noticed and appellant did not have the opportunity to question the deponent. But if Kaus Singh existed and owned the property, he could oppose the sale himself rather than relying on respondent’s “apparently altruistic opposition to the sale of another’s property to satisfy his debt.”
At the hearing, however, respondent presented a document which changed the litigation’s course: a “Stipulation for a Property” entered into in family court proceedings between “Rag Singh” and Karen Singh (Sacramento Superior Court Case No. 03FL00651) and signed “So ordered” by Judge Jerilyn Borack on May 12, 2006. The stipulation states in part (italics added): “Petitioner Rag Singh (‘Rag’) and Respondent Karen Singh (‘Karen’) reached an agreement and stipulate the following: [¶] The following property is and shall be Karen’s sole separate and personal property: [¶] 1625 28th Street, Sacramento, California [¶] . . . [¶] The parties also stipulate that Karen will transfer the above stated property to Kaus Singh if Kaus Singh, who lives outside California and who is not Raj Singh or Rag Singh, claims his interest in the above stated property.” The ruling of May 31, 2006, states that the court did not consider this document, but Judge Chang soon reassessed its significance.
On June 2, 2006, Judge Chang entered a further tentative ruling which states in part: “Although the ‘Stipulation for a Property’ entered as an order in 03FL00651 on May 12, 2006 is an admission by the judgment debtor that on that date he owned an interest in the property, the judgment creditor must show why this court is not bound by that order, transferring ownership of the property in question to Karen Singh, thereby preventing this court from granting the judgment creditor’s requested relief.” After a hearing, Judge Chang continued the matter to June 28, 2006, and ordered further briefing.
In his subsequent briefing, appellant asserted that since respondent Raj Singh had consistently denied owning the property, he was judicially estopped to claim that he owned it under the name Rag Singh and could lawfully transfer it to a third person. Appellant also asserted that if (1) Kaus Singh was not Rag Singh or Raj Singh, as the family court stipulation and order stated, and (2) Kaus Singh owned the property, as respondent had claimed until now, then (3) Rag Singh had no claim of title and could not transfer what he did not own.
Respondent submitted a declaration averring that he was the petitioner in the family law case and signed all the papers in that case as Rag Singh.
The declaration does not explain why respondent chose to use one name in the family court proceeding and another in this action. We note, however, that in the above-cited request for admissions filed in Raj Singh v. Southgate Professional Condominium Owners Association, respondent was also asked to admit that his legal name was Raghvendra Singh (which evidently could be shortened to “Rag”) and that he and “Kiran R. Singh” (another name by which Karen Singh is known, according to the family court order) were married as of February 2003. Respondent denied the first statement, but admitted the second. Whether or not “Raghvendra” is respondent’s legal first name, the use of an abbreviated form of that name in the family court proceeding, rather than “Raj,” the name he has used in other actions, would fit with his consistent strategy of multiplying identities to confuse courts and opposing parties.
On June 28, 2006, Judge Chang issued an order vacating the previous tentative ruling, denying appellant’s application for order for sale of dwelling, and discharging the order to show cause. Judge Chang found that in light of the family court order, by which the present court was bound, respondent did not have a fee interest in the property. Judge Chang did not address appellant’s judicial-estoppel argument.
Appellant moved for reconsideration of the order denying his application for order for sale of dwelling, renewing his claim of judicial estoppel.
On August 17, 2006, Judge Chang granted the motion for reconsideration, but again denied appellant’s application for order of sale of dwelling.
In her tentative ruling, Judge Chang rejected appellant’s judicial-estoppel claim for the following reasons: “First, the judgment debtor’s position in this matter, that he is Rag Singh, is consistent with his position in the family law proceeding, 03FL00651. Second, judicial estoppel may be invoked only where ‘the party was successful in asserting the first position.’ [(]Jackson v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171, 183.[)] In this matter, the judgment debtor did not successfully assert that he was not Rag Singh or Kaus Singh. Indeed, the court modified the judgment so that it would include the name of Kaus Singh.”
After argument, Judge Chang entered a ruling on submitted matter which added the following:
“At hearing, the judgment creditor relied on two cases, which he had not previously cited, for the proposition that a party need not previously have been successful for the doctrine of judicial estoppel to apply. Neither is helpful. In the first, Drain v. Betz Laboratories, Inc. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 950, 951, the court applied judicial estoppel where ‘no factual findings’ demonstrated that the party had been successful earlier. Here, the record demonstrates that the judgment creditor was not successful earlier. In other words, there was a finding that Kaus Singh is Raj Singh. In the second, Thomas v. Gordon (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 113, 119, the party to be estopped did receive some benefit from its earlier position, even though her bankruptcy petition was dismissed. ‘Because of the singular nature of bankruptcy law, we believe appellant obtained a legal benefit from the prior statements as soon as they were made. The filing of bankruptcy petitions result [sic] in an automatic stay.’ (Id.)
“Finally, application of judicial estoppel is especially inappropriate here because the family law court has previously ordered that the property is Karen Singh’s separate property. The judgment debtor [sic] presents no authority that this court may rule in a manner that voids that order.
“This ruling is made without prejudice to the judgment debtor [sic] seeking appropriate relief regarding the stipulation and court order.”
DISCUSSION
I
Appellant contends that the trial court erred by refusing to apply judicial estoppel. We agree. Therefore, we shall reverse and remand with directions that the court vacate its order denying judicial estoppel and enter a new order in accordance with this opinion.
“The doctrine of judicial estoppel has been recognized by numerous state and federal courts, including this court. [Citations.] Although the precise parameters of the doctrine have not been clearly defined, we have agreed with the court in Jackson [v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th 171] that it quite clearly should be applied in the following situation: when ‘“(1) the same party has taken two positions; (2) the positions were taken in judicial or quasi-judicial administrative proceedings; (3) the party was successful in asserting the first position (i.e., the tribunal adopted the position or accepted it as true); (4) the two positions are totally inconsistent; and (5) the first position was not taken as a result of ignorance, fraud [by another], or mistake. [Citations.]”’ [Citations.]” (Thomas v. Gordon (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th at pp. 117-118 (Thomas); italics added.)
“As we recognized in Drain [v. Betz Laboratories, Inc., supra, 69 Cal.App.4th 950], ‘“[j]udicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine aimed at preventing fraud on the courts.”’ [Citations.] ‘“[T]he ‘essential function and justification of judicial estoppel is to prevent the use of intentional self-contradiction as a means of obtaining unfair advantage in a forum provided for suitors seeking justice.’ [Citation.]” . . . The primary purpose of the doctrine is not to protect the litigants, but to protect the integrity of the judiciary. [Citations.]’ [Citations.] Accordingly, in Drain, we agreed with Jackson that ‘because judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine, [the court] could not “rule out the possibility that, in a future case, circumstances may warrant application of the doctrine even if the earlier position was not adopted by the tribunal.” [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (Thomas, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 118; italics added.)
“Other California courts have acknowledged that there is no hard and fast rule which limits application of the doctrine to those situations where the litigant was successful in asserting the contradictory position. [Citations.] Other courts [outside California] have [also] concluded that judicial estoppel may be applied without regard to the party’s success in the earlier litigation. [Citations.]” (Thomas, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at pp. 118-119.)
Thus, contrary to the trial court’s ruling, Thomas and the authorities it cites hold that a party may be judicially estopped even if its prior inconsistent position did not bring success. This is so because judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine primarily intended to protect the integrity of the courts. In other words, a party caught tampering with the courts to obtain undeserved success may properly be punished by invoking judicial estoppel, even if the attempt failed.
In Thomas, as the trial court noted, the judicially estopped party had obtained a legal benefit from taking her prior position. (Thomas, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 119.) But before the Thomas court so found, it had already said this: “We believe that this is a situation which warrants application of the doctrine of judicial estoppel even absent proof of success in the earlier litigation. Appellant brazenly admits that she transferred her most valuable asset -- her income stream -- to a corporation owned wholly by her paramour in order to keep it out of the hands of her creditors. She then filed for bankruptcy, clearly expecting to reclaim her funds from her trusted friend after all of her lawful debts were discharged. Not once, but three times, she signed documents under oath for filing with the bankruptcy court which claimed to list all of her assets but said nothing about any interest in Women’s Health or Nationwide or the funds she allegedly believed were being held for her there. Assuming that the doctrine of judicial estoppel should be applied to an unsuccessful litigant only in the rare situation where the litigant has made an egregious attempt to manipulate the legal system, we agree with the trial court that ‘this is as egregious as it gets . . . .’” (Ibid.; italics added.)
Here, too, the litigant against whom judicial estoppel is urged “has made an egregious attempt to manipulate the legal system . . . ‘as egregious as it gets.’” (Thomas, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 119.) As documented in this opinion, respondent has played an endless game of “Now you see it -- now you don’t” with the courts. He has filed pleadings and made appearances in various actions under multiple names, to the point of being jailed for contempt of court. He has manufactured false or deceptive documents aside from the family court stipulation and order at issue here (e.g., the unnoticed “deposition” of “Kaus Singh” and the unrecorded “assignment” of title to the subject property to himself by “Kaus Singh”). And the stipulation itself was a gross fraud on the family court.
First, it did not reveal how “Rag Singh” could properly claim title or transfer title to another. Second, it declared that “Kaus Singh” had an unspecified interest in the property which would entitle him to claim it at any time from Karen Singh, yet did not explain how “Rag Singh” could pass title without regard to that interest. Third, it declared that “Kaus Singh” was not Raj Singh, though respondent knew that other courts had already found the two were one, and he had admitted the same under penalty of perjury in another action. Fourth, the record before us suggests that in August 2005, when respondent originally submitted the stipulation to the family court, a restraining order in this action (entered July 22, 2005) barred respondent from conveying or transferring the subject property, but the stipulation failed to disclose that fact. Finally, in light of the above, the stipulation bore all the earmarks of a sham designed to “transfer” the property (using Karen Singh as a conduit) from respondent as “Rag Singh” to himself as “Kaus Singh,” while concealing from the family court that his interest in the property was subject to an outstanding judgment.
Being well aware of respondent’s attempts to trifle with the judicial system, the trial court could and should have used its equitable power to vindicate the system’s integrity by applying judicial estoppel. The court’s failure to do so was error.
II
Originally, the parties did not consider the question whether the family court order made Karen Singh an indispensable party to this litigation. After requesting and obtaining supplemental briefing on this issue, we have concluded that she is. Therefore, on remand she must be joined as a party, if possible, to protect whatever interest in the subject property she may have.
“(a) A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If he has not been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a party.” (§ 389.)
“(b) If a person as described in paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (a) cannot be made a party, the court shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed without prejudice, the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court include: (1) to what extent a judgment rendered in the person’s absence might be prejudicial to him or those already parties; (2) the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; (3) whether a judgment rendered in the person’s absence will be adequate; (4) whether the plaintiff or cross-complainant will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.” (§ 389.)
“The controlling test for determining whether a person is an indispensable party is, ‘Where the plaintiff seeks some type of affirmative relief which, if granted, would injure or affect the interest of a third person not joined, that third person is an indispensable party. [Citation.]’ More recently, the same rule is stated, ‘A person is an indispensable party if his or her rights must necessarily be affected by the judgment. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Save Our Bay, Inc. v. San Diego Unified Port Dist. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 686, 692-693.)
Here, Karen Singh meets all the tests for indispensability under section 389. Appellant seeks affirmative relief which, if granted, would injure Karen’s interest in the subject property, awarded her by the family court. Appellant has not suggested any measures by which the possible prejudice to her from an order in appellant’s favor could be avoided or lessened, and we cannot imagine any such measures.
Appellant argues in his supplemental brief, as he did in his original briefing, that Karen Singh is not the true owner of the property because respondent purported to make her such by a fraud on the family court. This puts the cart before the horse. Whatever the record before us might suggest, we cannot decide this issue, which has not been litigated below, in her absence. She must be given the opportunity to defend any interest in the property which has been awarded her.
Appellant also argues that it was not feasible to join Karen Singh in the trial court. (See Kraus v. Willow Park Public Golf Course (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 354, 367.) Whether or not that was so before, the argument is now moot. By remanding the matter to the trial court with directions to appellant to join her as a party, if feasible, we shall make it feasible to do so.
On remand, appellant is directed to join Karen Singh as a party, unless the court determines that it is not feasible to do so.
Should the superior court ultimately determine that conveyance of the subject real property to Karen Singh in the family court proceeding was in violation of a restraining order issued by the superior court, or was otherwise obtained by fraud, the superior court shall vacate the stipulation and order of the family court conveying the real property to Karen Singh.
III
Along with his supplemental brief, respondent filed a request to sanction appellant for a frivolous appeal. The request is denied. (In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637, 650.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment (order denying application for order to sell dwelling) is reversed, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in light of this opinion. Appellant Lipworth shall recover his costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(3), (a)(5).)
We concur: SCOTLAND, P.J., HULL, J.
The arbitrator’s award begins with the following statement, which aptly characterizes respondent’s litigation style in this proceeding as well: “Coming to grips with Claimant’s [respondent’s] claims in this matter has proved to require entry into an Alice-in-Wonderland world where rigid rules, fabricated principally from disconnected scraps of legal principle and doubtful if not disreputable practices, are sought to be applied with draconian certainty to factual assertions built upon Claimant’s fervent assertions of truth, most made without regard to glaring gaps in allegation, proof or both. Of the assertions thus made that are in any way material to Claimant’s claims in this matter and that have not clearly been waived, virtually all that are disputed by [U-Save] are either utterly implausible or downright incredible, and none finds support in the credible evidence. [¶] There are also a troubling number of instances, in or related to this proceeding, in which there is every appearance that Claimant has sought to benefit from trickery of various kinds. Some of these instances are presented in [U-Save]’s documentary evidence . . .; others have taken place within the personal perception of the arbitrator in the course of this proceeding.”
A. Respondent’s response to request for admissions, dated June 16, 2004, in an action titled Raj Singh v. Southgate Professional Condominium Owners Association/Southgate Professional Condominium Owners Association v. Raj Singh et al. (Sacramento Superior Court Case No. 02AS02083), in which he admitted under penalty of perjury that “[t]he individual using the name Raj Singh is the same person as the individual using the name Kaus Singh.”
B. A pleading filed by respondent in that action, dated November 14, 2003, in which he stated: “Raj Singh’s motions should be reconsidered and granted considering that Raj Singh is Kaus Singh.”
C. An answer filed in that action on February 19, 2005, by Archana Singh as defendant.
D. A minute order by Judge Loren McMaster in that action dated April 14, 2005, stating in part: “Raj Singh has filed a document in which he has conceded that he is Archana Singh, and that he has used the name Archana Singh in this litigation. [¶] The documents in question in the underlying lawsuit were signed by one Archana Singh. Raj Singh filed motions to disqualify the court under CCP section 170.6 which were denied since Raj Singh, not being a party to the action, had no standing to file[] such a motion. Thereafter a motion to disqualify under CCP section 170.6 was filed and signed by Archana Singh. It was apparent that a fraud upon the court and the parties was being committed since the signature of Archana Singh on the 170.6 motion was substantially different tha[n] the signature of Archana Singh on the answer to the complaint. Because of the wide disparity it was clear to the court that the documents were signed by two different people. For these reason[s], the Court ordered Archana Singh to appear in court with a photo identification so the court could ascertain whether the 170.6 motion was indeed made by Archana Singh. [¶] Raj Singh and not Archana Singh appeared at the hearing. Since the papers represented that Archana Singh was someone different than Raj Singh and since Archana Singh had not appeared, the Court denied the motion. Now Raj Singh has represented that he is in fact Archana Singh and that he uses that name. While this may very well include an admission of a fraud by Raj/Archana Singh, given the unequivocal representation, the Court will treat the papers as a renewed 170.6 by Raj Singh, who has indicated that he uses the name Archana Singh.”
E. An order to show cause (OSC) issued on June 24, 2005, by Judge McMaster to “Raj Singh, aka Archana Singh,” why he should not be held in contempt and otherwise sanctioned for violating a court order requiring him, as a vexatious litigant, to obtain a pre-filing order before filing a lawsuit in propria persona, to wit, a complaint filed on March 13, 2005, entitled “Archana Singh v. Stephen Lipworth.”
Respondent also submitted a unrecorded “assignment,” supposedly executed on September 1, 1996, whereby Kaus Singh, as “record owner” of the subject property, assigned to respondent all of his right, title, obligation, and interest in the property. Judge Chang’s subsequent order assigned no weight to this document because the court had already determined that respondent and Kaus Singh were one and the same. We also note that if this document had really existed at any time before respondent produced it in this action, its discovery would have proved embarrassing to respondent’s claim that Kaus Singh owned the property and respondent did not.