Opinion
22-1446
08-05-2024
MANPREET SINGH, Petitioner, v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General of the United States, Respondent.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
Argued May 20, 2024
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals. No. A209-396-283
Before JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
ORDER
Manpreet Singh, a Sikh Indian national, came to the United States illegally in 2016. He requests asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. The immigration judge denied relief, and the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed his appeal. Before us is Singh's petition to review that dismissal.
Background
In India, Manpreet Singh was a member of the Mann Party, which supports Sikh interests in India. In November 2015, while walking home from a Mann Party event, he was confronted by a group of men belonging to the Badal Party, an opposition party. The men asked Singh what party he belonged to, and when he told them he was part of the Mann Party and did not want to join theirs, they beat him until he lost consciousness. His father and grandfather went to the police, but no report was filed.
In May 2016, while walking home from a Sikh temple, another group of men stopped Singh. They also said he should have ceased working with the Mann Party and beat him, but Singh escaped into a field. He overheard them warn that he would be killed the next time. After the second attack, Singh hid in fields near his aunt's house for around a month and a half, then he took a bus to Delhi. In Delhi, he caught a flight to South America.
He entered the United States through Tijuana, Mexico into Otay Mesa, California on October 1, 2016. On November 3, 2016, the Department of Homeland Security charged him with inadmissibility, as he lacked valid entry documents. After Singh conceded he should be removed, the immigration court ruled that the government established removal. Singh then applied for asylum, and on May 30, 2019, the court heard his application.
At the hearing, the evidence before the IJ included Singh's testimony, U.S. State Department reports on human rights in India, and affidavits. The IJ found Singh's testimony to be credible. The DHS objected to the affidavits because the authors were not available for cross-examination. The IJ "admitted the documents but gave them appropriate evidentiary weight."
The IJ denied Singh's application on June 4, 2019, concluding that Singh was not eligible for asylum because he had not established that he suffered past persecution or that he had a well-founded fear of future persecution if forced to return to India. The IJ explained that "two incidents of harm in India" wherein Singh suffered "only minor injuries" did not rise to the level of persecution. The death threats, too, were not enough because they were "not sufficiently imminent as the respondent overheard them as he was running away." As for future persecution, the IJ reasoned that Singh had no evidence to support his claim that Sikhs could not live anywhere within India or that the Mann Party was specifically persecuted. Singh's only support for his argument of widespread Sikh persecution were old documents, from 2003 and 2005, and according to the most recent State Department country reports and the Indian constitution, there is not nationwide persecution of Sikhs. Similarly, Singh did not have evidence of persecution against the Mann Party specifically.
The IJ also denied the other grounds Singh raised. Because the standard for withholding removal is higher than the standard for asylum, the IJ explained, Singh also could not meet his burden to show he was entitled to withholding removal. And the IJ dismissed his application for CAT protection because Singh had not demonstrated past torture, can relocate within India to avoid any harm, and had not shown that torture even happens against Mann Party members.
Singh appealed the IJ's decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals, and the Board affirmed in full.
Discussion
Singh petitions for review of the Board's decision, arguing he was entitled to asylum, his application for withholding removal should have been granted, and his application for CAT protection should have been granted. We review the Board's decision de novo as to legal conclusions and accept its factual conclusions if they were supported by substantial evidence. Orellana-Arias v. Sessions, 865 F.3d 476, 484 (7th Cir. 2017).
Singh also contends the IJ did not accord his affidavits full evidentiary weight. His proof is that the IJ said she would give the affidavits "appropriate evidentiary weight." But the IJ also said she found the affidavits to be "probative" and admitted them over the DHS's objection. Singh does not point to any examples of the IJ discounting the affidavits, so this argument may place form over substance.
A. Past persecution or well-founded fear of future persecution
Eligibility for both asylum and withholding of removal requires a showing of persecution. Asylum applicants must show "persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion" in the home country. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158(b)(1)(A); see Kamaljit Singh v. Garland, 89 F.4th 602, 605 (7th Cir. 2024). To be eligible for withholding of removal, an applicant must show there is a "clear probability of persecution" upon the applicant's return to his home country. Kamaljit Singh, 89 F.4th at 605 (quotations omitted); Torres v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 616, 625 (7th Cir. 2008). Because the withholding of removal standard is higher, if an asylum application fails, it takes the withholding of removal application with it. Torres, 551 F.3d at 625. An applicant's ability to relocate creates grounds to reject both forms of relief. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b)(3), 1208.16(b)(1)(i)(A)-(b), (c)(3).
The first way Singh could establish asylum status is by showing he has suffered past persecution. See Kamaljit Singh, 89 F.4th at 605. The Board correctly affirmed the IJ's conclusion that Singh could not make this showing. Earlier this year, this court held that a Mann Party member who also was attacked twice by Badal Party members did not suffer past persecution. Id. at 606, 604. That case and this one are remarkably similar. There, like here, Kamaljit Singh was engaged in Mann Party activities when the Badal Party attackers approached him by car; his attackers also beat him after he rejected their invitation to join the Badal Party; he too went to the police and was turned away; he also was attacked a second time and fled afterward; and members of the Badal Party also threatened his family after he fled India. See id. at 604. There, this court decided that these "brief, isolated incidents" did not rise to persecution, especially where there was no "further abuse or humiliation." Id. at 606. "On substantial evidence review," we held that no past persecution occurred. Id.
Manpreet Singh argues that the credibility finding against the petitioner in Kamaljit Singh, as well as that Manpreet Singh lost consciousness, render that case distinguishable from this case. We disagree. Our court concluded in Kamaljit Singh that even putting the lack of credibility to the side, the petitioner's case there failed on the persecution finding. Id. And while loss of consciousness is a factor in determining past persecution, worse facts than these have not risen to that level. See, e.g., Mema v. Gonzales, 474 F.3d 412, 416-18 (7th Cir. 2007) (abduction at gunpoint followed by detention and physical abuse, resulting in petitioner losing consciousness, did not compel conclusion that petitioner suffered past persecution).
Kamaljit Singh controls here. We held that the same type of harm the petitioner experienced in that case did not rise to the level of persecution. The only other distinction between that case and this one is the death threat here. The IJ correctly explained, though, that this distinction does not make a difference. The threat here was not "sufficiently imminent," as Singh was running away when he heard it. Cf. N.L.A. v. Holder, 744 F.3d 425, 431-32 (7th Cir. 2014) ("[C]redible threats of imminent death or grave physical harm can .. amount to past persecution, provided they are credible, imminent and severe.").
The second way Singh could establish asylum status is by demonstrating that he has a well-founded fear that he will be persecuted upon returning to India. See Kamaljit Singh, 89 F.4th at 605. A well-founded fear of future persecution must be "subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable in light of credible evidence." Granados Arias v. Garland, 69 F.4th 454, 463 (7th Cir. 2023) (quotations omitted). Singh can demonstrate that his fear is objectively reasonable in one of two ways: there is "a reasonable possibility he ... would be singled out individually for persecution," or there is "a pattern or practice" of persecution of Sikhs or the Mann Party. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii); Granados Arias, 69 F.4th at 463.
The IJ correctly decided that Singh could relocate to parts of India where there is no persecution of Sikhs or the Mann Party. Singh's evidence, the IJ explained, did not support his argument that India as a whole is unfavorable toward Sikhs. On appeal Singh cites to the same country reports, plus some of his affidavits. But the portions of the affidavits that he cites simply restate how his father and grandfather were turned away from the police station after his first attack. And the country reports, as the IJ explained, do not discuss violence against Sikhs or the Mann Party, let alone nationwide violence. To the contrary, one of the country reports shows the Indian government attempting to protect religious minorities. Substantial evidence supports the conclusion that internal relocation is safe and reasonable for petitioner.
B. Significant risk of being tortured
To receive protection under the Convention Against Torture, an applicant must demonstrate that, "more likely than not," he would be tortured if returned. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2); Herrera-Garcia v. Barr, 918 F.3d 558, 561 (7th Cir. 2019). Torture is "the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering for the purpose of coercion, punishment, or discrimination." Id. (cleaned up); see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1). Several factors affect the torture determination: "Evidence of past torture"; "[e]vidence that the applicant could relocate to a part of [his home country] where he . is not likely to be tortured"; "[e]vidence of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights within the country of removal"; and "[o]ther relevant information regarding conditions in [his home country]." 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3)(i)-(iv).
Substantial evidence supports the Board's decision that Singh did not face a significant risk of torture. As the IJ noted, Singh has not been tortured in the past and could relocate to a place where he has not been persecuted (which means he could relocate to a place where it is unlikely he would be tortured). And the Board explained that "even considering general country conditions," the IJ "did not clearly err" when determining that it was unlikely that he would "be targeted for [torture]."
On appeal, Singh challenges the IJ and the Board's consideration of the evidence of general country conditions and evidence of past torture. First, there is no evidence that Singh has been tortured-as discussed above, the intentional infliction of pain Singh endured is not severe enough to rise to the level of persecution, so it does not rise to the level of torture either. Second, to support his argument that general country conditions make torture a significant possibility, Singh cites to the four India Human Rights Reports between 2019 and 2022. These reports contain, as he explains it, warnings about governmental abuse of political dissidents, including torture by police and prison officials. Yet, the Mann Party is not mentioned in any of the four reports. The only report to reference violence against Sikhs is the 2022 report, which gives no details other than that some number of Sikhs were killed, the attacks were targeted at them, and the perpetrators were terrorists. 2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: India, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE 3 (March 20, 2023). We have held that "evidence of generalized violence is not enough" and instead, "there must be a substantial risk that the petitioner will be targeted specifically." Herrera-Garcia, 918 F.3d at 562 (cleaned up) (alteration omitted). The generalized violence Singh points to does not support his argument on the country conditions factor. Singh's arguments on the current state of Indian politics were not presented until very recently, and the Board considered what evidence it could.
Singh cannot overcome the evidentiary hurdle necessary to overturn the Board's decision. There is substantial evidence in support of the conclusions of the IJ and the Board. Singh has not shown that he was persecuted or that he has a well-founded fear of future persecution. This resolves his asylum and withholding of removal arguments. And none of the factors for deciding whether it is more likely than not that he will be tortured in India cut in his favor, so he is not entitled to protection under the Convention Against Torture.
For these reasons, we DENY the petition for review.