Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-0026.
July 1, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Presently before the court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 10), and plaintiffs' opposition thereto. (Doc. No. 11.) For the reasons stated below, defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
Summary judgment is proper only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). At the summary judgment stage, "the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all inferences must be drawn in that party's favor. Celotex, 477 at 325.
This matter arises from an incident which occurred on September 7, 2001. Plaintiff Barbara Singer alleges she was injured on that date when she slipped and fell due to water and ice which had accumulated on the floor of a cafeteria operated by Guckenheimer Enterprises, located at the Motorola plant where plaintiff worked. Defendant moves for summary judgment, alleging that "[t]here is no evidence in the record that the Defendant had actual or constructive notice of the ice and water, nor can Plaintiff prove that Defendant had a hand in creating the alleged harmful condition." (Def.'s Mot. Summ. J., ¶ 7.) Upon review of the submissions of the parties, in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, this court finds that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether defendant, by virtue of its negligence, caused harm to plaintiff Barbara Singer, and/or whether defendant had actual or constructive notice of the condition which allegedly caused plaintiff's injuries.
As a possessor of land, defendant was responsible for managing and maintaining the cafeteria in which Barbara Singer was allegedly injured. Under Pennsylvania law, a possessor of land is responsible for physical harm caused to invitees such as Ms. Singer if it:
a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and should realize that is involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and
b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and
c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger.
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 343 (1965) (adopted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Carrender v. Fitterer, 469 A.2d 120, 123 (Pa. 1983). See also Kirschbaum v. WRGSB Associates v. Insignia Commercial Group, 243 F.3d 145, 152 (3d Cir. 2001) (discussing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343.) In her affidavit, Jocelyn Wright, an employee of the defendant, indicated that the water which caused plaintiff to slip and fall had accumulated as a result of a clogged drain located under the salad bar. (Pls.' Resp. to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J, Ex. A, ¶ 10, Affidavit of Wright.) Ms. Wright further noted that "[s]everal times before the day of Barbara Singer's accident, water had accumulated on the floor in the same area as where Barbara Singer fell due to a blocked drain located under the ice bin of the salad bar." Id. at ¶ 9. Furthermore, Robert Burkey, an employee of Motorola, testified that he had seen accumulations of water in the area where Ms. Singer fell. In addition, Mr. Burkey stated that he had slipped in the area where plaintiff had fallen. (Pls.' Resp. to Def's Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. B; Dep. of Burkey at 16: 11-19.) Mr. Burkey also testified that it was "relatively common" to see warning signs placed in the area of the fall. Id. The evidence, if believed by a jury, is sufficient to show that defendant had actual or constructive notice of the ice and water before the accident and "had a hand in creating the alleged harmful condition." (Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. at ¶ 7.) Accordingly, defendant's motion for summary judgment is DENIED. An appropriate order follows.