. He contends that these depositions are “necessary to determine the extent of the [alleged] spoliation, ” Pl.'s Br. in Supp. 27, as well as “to try to reduce the [alleged] prejudice to Plaintiff and to determine the extent to which it would be appropriate to afford less drastic relief than adverse inference jury instructions against Defendants at trial, ” id. at 9; See also Pl.'s Reply Br. 5. See generally Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(e)(1), (2)(B) (providing that, if Rule 37(e)'s threshold requirements are met, “the court: (1) upon finding prejudice to another party from loss of the information, may order measures no greater than necessary to cure the prejudice; or (2) only upon finding that the party acted with the intent to deprive another party of the information's use in the litigation may . . . (B) instruct the jury that it may or must presume the information was unfavorable to the party”); Sines v. Kessler, No. 3:17cv72, 2021 WL 4943742, at *3 (W.D. Va. Oct. 22, 2021) (“If the movant makes the [four-part] threshold showing under Rule 37(e), the court must then consider whether the movant has established one of two options that would permit imposing” either a remedy under Rule 37(e)(1), or a harsher sanction under Rule 37(e)(2)). I disagree.
It is apparent that Plaintiff has made a “good-faith attempt” to explore alternatives for replacing or restoring the destroyed DLA documents. Sines v. Kessler, No. 3:17-CV-00072, 2021 WL 4943742, at *9 (W.D. Va. Oct. 22, 2021).