Opinion
CIVIL ACTION, NO. 00-2240, SECTION "L"
August 13, 2003
ORDER AND REASONS
Pending before the Court is the motion of defendants Jefferson Parish School Board ("School Board"), Ron Cerutti, Melissa Caudle, and Sharon Sofford, for summary judgment on the claims of plaintiff Betty Sinegar, a former employee of John H. Martyn High School.
I. BACKGROUND
Between 1993 and 1998 plaintiff Betty Sinegar worked as a teacher's assistant and discipline clerk at John H. Martyn High School in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana. During the fall of 1998, the plaintiff and other staff members had a series of conflicts with Martyn school administrators. Those conflicts escalated late that year culminating in Ms. Sinegar's suspension and transfer from Martyn. Ms. Sinegar, an African-American, claims that Martyn High School administrators subjected her to harassment and retaliation, and she now seeks damages.
Ms. Sinegar initially was represented by counsel in this matter. During this litigation, she became dissatisfied with her attorney and initiated bar complaints against him and counsel for the defendants. The plaintiffs attorney then moved to withdraw as counsel of record. The Court granted that request and ordered Ms. Sinegar to appear to discuss her representation. At that appearance, Ms. Sinegar stated that she had not retained counsel and wished to proceed pro se.
Ms. Sinegar's claims relate to her 1998 conflicts with Martyn school administrators. On October 21, 1998, a group of John H. Martyn High School staff members, including the plaintiff, prepared, signed, and submitted a list of grievances to their union. Those grievances included complaints about the granting of break times, duty assignments, and concerns about student discipline. Some of those grievances were related to perceived disparity in the treatment of staff members based on race. That petition was revised and resigned, and the revised portion was submitted the following day.
Most of the signatories to the October lists of grievances also signed a December 7, 1998, letter addressed to the Jefferson Parish school superintendent indicating that each complaint had been fully resolved. The plaintiff did not sign the December letter and maintains that she does not believe that the grievances have been resolved.
During the period at issue, the plaintiff alleges she personally received a series of warnings about her attitude, her demeanor, and her failure to follow procedure. Principal Melissa Caudle held an administrative conference with the plaintiff on November 13, 1998, to address some of the conflicts between the school administrators and the plaintiff. Ms. Caudle had "written up" the plaintiff for unprofessional behavior including ignoring the principal's greetings, interfering with teacher and student matters, interfering with administrative interventions involving student behavior, failing to follow administrative directions, and telephoning parents without following school procedures.
Ms. Caudle held a special conference with Ms. Sinegar on November 16, 1998, relating to Ms. Sinegar's conduct during a teacher conference. During this special conference Ms. Caudle wrote up Ms. Sinegar for unprofessional behavior. That same day, Ms. Caudle recommended that Ms. Sinegar be terminated.
The plaintiff was suspended without pay beginning November 30, 1998. She was reinstated with full back pay on December 16, 1998, and then transferred to Grace King High School, another Jefferson Parish school. Ms. Sinegar disputes the defendants' claims that work performance or unprofessional behavior led to her suspension and transfer. The plaintiff alleges that the verbal warnings, conferences, write-ups, suspension and transfer were adverse employment actions taken in retaliation for signing the grievance. She also claims that the Martyn High School administrators racially harassed her and that the entire course of conduct constituted retaliation and harassment.
The plaintiff alleges that the following incidents, as well as the entire course of conduct at John H. Martyn High School, constitute actionable retaliation and harassment:
1. After the plaintiff had signed the October list of grievances, Melissa Caudle called the plaintiff into her office multiple times each day for informal meetings and to issue verbal warnings about employment matters.
2. Melissa Caudle asked the plaintiff to sign a document stating that all grievance problems had been cured. When the plaintiff refused to sign the list, she claims that Caudle threatened her job.
3. Melissa Caudle made racially derogatory remarks to Betty Sinegar during informal meetings.
4. On October 26, 1998, Dr. Sofford told the plaintiff that Caudle would "get everyone who signed the list." On November 13, 1998, Caudle then wrote up the plaintiff for violations of school procedure.
5. On November 16, 1998, Caudle wrote up the plaintiff a second time.
6. On November 16 or 17, 1998, the plaintiff received a letter recommending that she be terminated for threatening Caudle during the November 16, 1998, meeting.
7. Even after the plaintiff received notice of Caudle's intent to terminate her, the plaintiff claims that Caudle continued to meet informally with her and asked the plaintiff to acknowledge the resolution of the October grievances.
8. The plaintiff was suspended without pay for more than two weeks, and then reinstated and transferred to Grace King High School with full back pay.
Ms. Sinegar filed an EEOC charge on April 27, 1999, claiming that she was subjected to harassment and retaliation for complaining of a racially discriminatory work environment. She sought and obtained a right-to-sue notice from the EEOC. The plaintiff now seeks damages.
The plaintiff filed an EEOC complaint against the Jefferson Parish School Board alleging sexual harassment on March 24, 1998. Though the plaintiff references the sexual harassment complaints in her memorandum in opposition to summary judgment, those allegations are not before the Court and were dismissed by an earlier order of this Court. See Sinegar v. Jefferson Parish Sch. Bd., No. CIV.A. 01-1435, 2001 WL 1661897 (E.D. La. Dec. 27, 2001).
Ms. Sinegar's complaint against the School Board and the Martyn High School administrators is not an isolated one. Her claim is one of a series of matters brought by former employees of John H. Martyn High School alleging retaliation following their complaints of racial discrimination to administrators at Martyn High School. See Griffin v. Jefferson Parish Sch. Bd., No. CIV.A.99-1344, 2001 WL 946372 (E.D. La. Aug. 20, 2001). It is clear that there was a considerable amount of dissension, disagreement and "bad blood" between several employees and the administration. Ms. Sinegar's claim was consolidated with Griffin in September 2000. In August 2001, the Court granted summary judgment on the retaliation claims of Joyce Harrell, David Reynaud, and Paula Griffin. See id.
Defendants School Board, Ron Cerutti, the School Board's director of personnel, Melissa Caudle, principal of John H. Martyn High School, and Sharon Sofford, assistant principal of John H. Martyn High School, move for summary judgment on the claims of plaintiff Betty Sinegar. For the following reasons, the Court now grants the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment against plaintiff Betty Sinegar.
II. LAW ANALYSIS A. Summary Judgement Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate only when the "`pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). When considering a motion for summary judgment, the district court "will review the facts drawing all inferences most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Reid v. State Farm Mm. Auto. Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 577, 578 (5th Cir. 1986).
If the party moving for summary judgment demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact "the nonmovant must go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Willis v. Roche Biomedical Labs., Inc., 61 F.3d 313, 315 (5th Cir. 1995). "[A] dispute about a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. To oppose a motion for summary judgment, the non-movant cannot rest on mere allegations or denials but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 321-22 (1986).
The burden of demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue is not met by "metaphysical doubt" or "unsubstantiated assertions." Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). The Court must "resolve factual controversies in favor of the nonmoving party, but only when there is an actual controversy, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contrary facts." Id. The Court does not, "in the absence of proof, assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts." Id. If the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, no genuine issue exists for trial. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588. Finally, "the mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat a motion for summary judgment; Rule 56 requires that the fact dispute be genuine and material." Willis, 61 F.3d at 315. If the evidence leads to only one reasonable conclusion, summary judgment is proper. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).
B. Retaliation Claims
Betty Sinegar alleges that the verbal conferences, write-ups, suspension and transfer to Grace King constitute illegal retaliation. The plaintiff believes that she was retaliated against because she signed the October 1998 grievances complaining of racial employment discrimination and the discriminatory treatment of students and failed to sign the December 1998 memorandum indicated that the grievances had been resolved. The Court construes Ms. Sinegar's retaliation complaint as an allegation that the defendants violated both her First Amendment rights and also Title VII.
1. Section 1983 Retaliation Claims
To prevail on her First Amendment retaliation claim, Sinegar must show that: (1) she suffered an adverse employment action for exercising her First Amendment rights; (2) her speech involved a matter of public concern; (3) her interest in commenting on matters of public concern outweighs the defendants' interest in promoting efficiency; (4) her exercise of free speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse employment action. Bradshaw v. Pittsburg Indep. Sch. Dist., 207 F.3d 814, 815-16 (5th Cir. 2000); Benningfield v. City of Houston, 157 F.3d 369, 375(5th Cir. 1998).
The plaintiffs First Amendment retaliation claim fails because she has suffered no adverse employment action as defined by the law. In First Amendment retaliation cases, "[a]dverse employment actions are discharges, demotions, refusals to hire, refusals to promote, and reprimands." Benningfield, 157 F.3d at 376. The Fifth Circuit has noted that "[a] federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to seek redress over `faculty disputes concerning teaching assignments, room assignments, administrative duties, classroom equipment, teacher recognition, and a host of other relatively trivial matters.'" Harris v. Victoria Ind. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 216, 220-21 (5th Cir. 1999).
The plaintiffs chief allegation of retaliation surrounds her transfer to Grace King High School. Although some transfers may support retaliation claims, not all transfers are actionable adverse employment actions. A transfer constitutes an actionable, adverse employment action only where an employee can show that she "has suffered some serious, objective, and tangible harm as a result of [her] transfer. "Serna v. City of San Antonio, 244 F.3d 479, 483 (5th Cir. 2001). The Fifth Circuit has stated that "the personal preferences and subjective perceptions of the plaintiff are insufficient to establish that [her] transfer inflicted a constitutional injury." Id.
Following her initial suspension, Ms. Sinegar was reinstated, fully paid, and transferred to another high school to work in the same capacity. The plaintiff has not asserted how her duties at Grace King differ in any way from her duties at John H. Martyn High School. Although the temporary suspension and the transfer were involuntary and undesirable in Ms. Sinegar's eyes, they arc not the type of objective adverse employment actions that establish constitutional injury.
Furthermore, it is not clear that the grievances on the October 1998 lists were matters of public concern. For speech to be of public concern, the plaintiff must speak "primarily as a citizen rather than as an employee." Bradshaw, 207 F.3d at 816. Very few of the October 1998 grievances dealt with the treatment of students or the provision of education. The vast majority concerned employment conditions, the treatment of specific groups of staff members, and the allocation of work assignments. The complaints more closely resemble the objections of employees than the protests of concerned citizens. The defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on the plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claim is GRANTED.
2. Section 1981 and Title VII Retaliation Claims
The Court also reviews Ms. Sinegar's retaliation claims under Section 1981 and Title VII. An employee's complaint that she was subjected to retaliation because she complained of racial discrimination is a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b). Foley v. Univ. of Houston Sys., 324 F.3d 310, 315 (5th Cir. 2003). The same complaint is also actionable under Title VII, which requires that the plaintiff prove the same elements in order to establish liability. Id. at 316, n. 7. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under either § 1981 or Title VII, a plaintiff must show: (1) she participated in a statutorily protected activity; (2) an adverse employment action occurred; and (3) that causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse action. Thomas v. Exxon, U.S.A., 943 F. Supp. 751, 763 (S.D. Tx. 1996), aff'd, 122 F.3d 1067 (5th Cir. 1997).
In Foley, the Fifth Circuit noted that the difference between the two actions is that relief under Title VII is available only against an employer whereas relief under § 1981 is available against an individual supervisor or fellow employee. 324 F.3d at 316, n. 7.
Not every change in the employment status quo gives rise to liability for retaliation. Only "ultimate employment decisions" satisfy the adverse employment action element of a Title VII claim. Banks v. E. Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd. 320 F.3d 570, 575 (5th Cir. 2003). The Fifth Circuit has held that "[a]n employment action that `does not affect job duties, compensation, or benefits' is not an adverse employment action under Title VII." Id. (quoting Hunt v. Rapides Healthcare Sys., LLC, 277 F.3d 757, 769 (5th Cir. 2001)).
The incidents that the plaintiff cites as retaliatory were not adverse employment actions under Title VII or § 1981. In its prior ruling in the companion cases, this Court already held that the alleged write ups, conferences, and warnings did not constitute adverse employment actions. See Griffin v. Jefferson Parish Sch. Bd., No. CIV.A.99-1344, 2001 WL 946372, at *6 — *7 (E.D. La. Aug. 20, 2001). Though the warnings, reprimands, and threats to fire Ms. Sinegar may have placed her in jeopardy of future discharge, they did not constitute actual discharge and were not ultimate employment decisions. Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997).
Ms. Sinegar's assertion that her suspension and transfer to Grace King were retaliation is likewise without merit. Ms. Sinegar does not assert that the transfer affected her pay, title, promotional opportunities, or that it was objectively less prestigious than her assignment at Martyn. Nothing indicates that the transfer was a demotion. Indeed, the record reveals that the transfer was a prudent response to the conflicts occurring at John H. Martyn High School during the fall of 1998. Ms. Sinegar's preference for Martyn High School and opposition to the transfer, without more, is not a compensable, ultimate employment action. Hunt v. Rapides Healthcare Sys., 277 F.3d 757, 771 (5th Cir. 2001).
C. Racial Harassment Claims
The plaintiff claims that the defendants' actions and the entire course of her employment constitutes harassment. Racial harassment in employment is actionable after employment contract formation. Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, Inc., 965 F.2d 1363, 1364 (5th Cir. 1992). Normally, a plaintiff must prove five elements to assert a prima facie case of racial harassment alleging hostile work environment: (1) the employee is a member of a protected group; (2) the employee was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based on race; (4) the harassment affected "a term condition or privilege of employment"; and (5) the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt, remedial action. Celestine v. Petroleos de Venezuella SA, 266 F.3d 343, 353 (5th Cir. 2001). Where the employee claims that the harassment was made by a supervisor, the plaintiff employee must satisfy only the first four of the elements to establish her prima facie case, and the employer is held vicariously liable for the supervisor's conduct. Id.
Not all comments, insults and epithets give rise to an actionable claim for harassment.
The harassment must be severe enough to affect a term, condition, or privilege of employment. The alleged harassment must be "`sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment.'" Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (quoting from Meritor Savs. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986)). All of the circumstances should be considered in determining whether a hostile work environment existed, including "the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance." Walker v. Thompson, 214 F.3d 615, 625 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting from Harris, 510 U.S. at 23).
The conduct about which Ms. Sinegar complains does not constitute actionable racial harassment under Title VII or § 1981. The incidents were not so severe or so pervasive as to create a hostile work environment. Certainly some of the purported conduct, such as referring to two students using racially-charged nicknames and derogatorily referring to Ms. Sinegar's hairstyle, was inappropriate and offensive. Such incidents cannot be condoned. Nevertheless, isolated incidents and offhand comments are not the type of cognizable allegations that give rise to liability. Under the law, these isolated incidents do not affect the terms or conditions of employment and do not constitute harassment. See Shepard v. Controller of Pub. Accounts, 168 F.3d 871, 874 (5th Cir. 1999).
Moreover, several of the incidents that the plaintiff alleges to be racial harassment have nothing to do with race. The conferences ordered by Ms. Caudle, the multiple write ups, and even complaints that Ms. Caudle was out to "get" the signatories to the October list are not related to the plaintiffs race and are not racial harassment. Accordingly, the defendants are entitled to Summary Judgment on the plaintiffs racial harassment claims.
II. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.