Rather, the reviewing court must demonstrate that the lower court's exercise of discretion was "not justified by, and clearly against, reason and the evidence; * * * such action must plainly appear to effect an injustice to the appellant." Sinclair v. Sinclair (1954), 98 Ohio App. 308, 57 O.O. 347, 129 N.E.2d 311.Henson, supra at 704.
Ordinarily, temporary spousal and child support orders are not final appealable orders. See Daughtry v. Daughtry (1973), 47 Ohio App.2d 195, 1 O.O.3d 275, 353 N.E.2d 641 (findings and recommendations of a referee concerning temporary alimony and support which are approved by the trial court do not constitute a final appealable order); see, also, Sinclair v. Sinclair (1954), 98 Ohio App. 308, 57 O.O. 347, 129 N.E.2d 311 (an order for temporary alimony is not a final appealable order); Wisdon v. Wisdon (1954), 97 Ohio App. 357, 56 O.O. 126, 125 N.E.2d 747; McMahon v. McMahon (1951), 156 Ohio St. 280, 46 O.O. 143, 102 N.E.2d 252 (an order for alimony pendente lite is not a final order); cf. Lowman v. Lowman (1955), 98 Ohio App. 254, 57 O.O. 284, 129 N.E.2d 213 (an order allowing temporary alimony and ordering husband to pay medical and hospital expenses of wife contrary to and in disregard of separation agreement is a final appealable order). Because a temporary support order is provisional in nature, subject to modification at any time, it does not determine the ultimate rights of the parties involved.
Whenever a trial court's discretion is subject to appellate review, it is to be examined to determine whether the exercise of that discretion was arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 5 OBR 481, 482, 450 N.E.2d 1140, 1142, and Sinclair v. Sinclair (1954), 98 Ohio App. 308, 310-313, 57 O.O. 347, 348-349, 129 N.E.2d 311, 314-315. An abuse of discretion is not shown by the mere fact that the reviewing court would have come to a different conclusion.
In simple and straightforward language, this court has previously defined abuse of discretion as "discretion exercised to an end or purpose not justified by, and clearly against, reason and evidence." State, ex rel. Democratic Executive Committee, v. Brown (1974), 39 Ohio St.2d 157, 161 [68 O.O.2d 100]; State, ex rel. Shafer, v. Ohio Turnpike Comm. (1953), 159 Ohio St. 581, 591 [50 O.O. 465]; State, ex rel. Wilms, v. Blake (1945), 144 Ohio St. 619, 624 [30 O.O. 220]. See, also, Sinclair v. Sinclair (1954), 98 Ohio App. 308, 311 [57 O.O. 347]. Cf. Huffman v. Hair Surgeon, Inc. (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 83, 87. Conversely, the exercise of honest judgment is not an abuse of discretion. "Error of judgment does not invalidate discretion, exercised in good faith." State, ex rel. Shafer, supra, at 593.
It provides that appellant must establish its position "to the satisfaction of the court." A review of the record in this case does not reflect that the probate court's determination was clearly unreasonable or untenable or against the logic of the facts and of the deductions reasonably drawn therefrom. It was therefore not an abuse of discretion. Sinclair v. Sinclair, 98 Ohio App. 308, 129 N.E.2d 311 (1954); Schaub's, Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 153 Cal.App.2d 858, 315 P.2d 459 (1957); Oneal v. Colton Consolidated School District No. 306, 16 Wn. App. 488, 557 P.2d 11 (1976); Weeks v. Burnor, 132 Vt. 603, 326 A.2d 138 (1974); Redwine v. Fitzhugh, 78 Wyo. 407, 329 P.2d 257, reh. den. 78 Wyo. 426, 330 P.2d 112 (1958); Howard v. Lindmier, 67 Wyo. 78, 214 P.2d 737 (1950); Puterman v. Puterman, 66 Wyo. 89, 205 P.2d 815 (1949). See footnote 2.
April 25, 1963.Morris D. Rosen, Esq., of Charleston, for Appellant, cites: As to the Ohio decree sued on being subject, in Ohio,to retroactive modification and, also, the decree fails tosegregate the amounts due plaintiff and her minor children: (Ohio) 124 N.E.2d 485; 20 Ohio App. 224, 151 N.E. 786; 42 N.E.2d 778; 51 N.E.2d 229; (Ohio) 46 Ct. of Apps. Ops. (6th Dist.) 311; 137 P.2d 971; 45 P.2d 246; 199 P. 764; 123 Cal.App.2d 819, 268 P.2d 151; 177 App. Div. 249, 163 N. Y.S. 435; 46 Cal.2d 313, 294 P.2d 1; 178 N.E.2d 258; 151 N.E. 786; 73 N.E.2d 814; 129 N.E.2d 311. As to error on part of trial Judge in requiringappellant to support children who had reached their majority,the Ohio law being to the contrary: 46 N.E.2d 472; 62 N.E.2d 652; 154 Ohio St. 530; 137 N.E. 906; 51 N.E.2d 620. As to failure of plaintiff to reduce her Ohioinstallment judgment to a lump sum judgment barring herrecovery in South Carolina: 151 N.E. 786; 73 N.E.2d 814; 132 N.E.2d 742; 123 Cal.App.2d 819, 268 P.2d 151. As to plaintiff not being entitled to interest: 164 Md. 107, 163 A. 874; 199 F.2d 163, 33 A.L.R.2d 1451. As to error on part of trial Judge in failing tofind that plaintiff was guilty of laches by virtue of her longsilence and delay of at least eight (8) years in proceedingunder the Ohio decree, considered together with defendant'schange in circumstances: 27 C.J.S., Divorce p. 1034; 17 A.J. 811; 137 A.L.R. 894; 154 Kan. 340, 118 P.2d 544, 137 A.L.R. 880; 17 N.J. Misc. R. 127, 5 A.2d 768; 179 N.Y.S. 51; (Ill.) 24 N.E.2d 871; 11 Ohio Supp. 20. As to the Circuit Cour
See Cox v. Fisher Fazio Foods, Inc. (1984), 13 Ohio App.3d 336, 469 N.E.2d 1055. Rather, the reviewing court must demonstrate that the lower court's exercise of discretion was "not justified by, and clearly against, reason and the evidence; * * * such action must plainly appear to effect an injustice to the appellant." Sinclair v. Sinclair (1954), 98 Ohio App. 308, 129 N.E.2d 311. It is under this standard that we will determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in adopting the magistrate's findings of fact. 2.
Rather, the reviewing court must demonstrate that the lower court's exercise of discretion was "not justified by, and clearly against, reason and the evidence; * * * such action must plainly appear to effect an injustice to the appellant." Sinclair v. Sinclair (1954), 98 Ohio App. 308, 129 N.E.2d 311. It is within these bounds that we will review the juvenile court's exercise of discretion, and determine if its disposition order was "unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable."
Rather, the reviewing court must demonstrate that the lower court's exercise of discretion was "not justified by, and clearly against, reason and the evidence; * * * such action must plainly appear to effect an injustice to the appellant." Sinclair v. Sinclair (1954), 98 Ohio App. 308, 129 N.E.2d 311. Against this backdrop, we will consider whether the trial court abused its discretion by finding the appellant in contempt. {ΒΆ 23} The record shows that during the sentencing of her boyfriend, appellant became upset, cried out loudly and stormed out of the courtroom.
Rather, the reviewing court must demonstrate that the lower court's exercise of discretion was "not justified by, and clearly against, reason and the evidence; * * * such action must plainly appear to effect an injustice to the appellant." Sinclair v. Sinclair (1954), 98 Ohio App. 308, 129 N.E.2d 311. Against this backdrop, we will consider whether the trial court abused its discretion in the case sub judice. A.