Opinion
A149864
06-29-2018
PATRICIA SIMPSON, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. WOOLLS RANCH, LLC, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Napa County Super. Ct. No. 26-65985)
Woolls Ranch, LLC (the Ranch) appeals following the trial court's statement of decision finding the Ranch holds an implied easement, limited to agricultural and residential use, over property owned by plaintiff Patricia Simpson (Simpson). We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Simpson owns a 24-acre parcel referred to by the parties and the trial court as Lot 14. The Ranch owns four parcels adjoining Lot 14, referred to as Lots 16, 17, 18, and 54. All five parcels were previously owned by one or both of Simpson's parents. In 1993, Simpson's parents transferred all five parcels into a family trust. Lot 14 was owned by Simpson's father, Clarence Pieratt (Pieratt), as his separate property. In the grant deed transferring Lot 14 to the family trust, Pieratt reserved an easement "for road and utility purposes and all uses usually incidental thereto" over an existing driveway that ran across approximately 200 feet of the western corner of Lot 14, "appurtenant to the property of the grantor immediately Northwest of the tract hereby conveyed."
Pieratt passed away in 2004. Simpson inherited Lot 14. Other family members inherited the remaining four lots and, in 2007, sold them to the Ranch or related entities. In 2009, the Ranch placed several acres of vineyard on Lot 54. In 2015, the county approved a use permit for the Ranch to operate a winery on Lot 54 with tours, tastings, and marketing events. The sole access for these activities is the driveway that crosses Lot 14.
Simpson sued the Ranch for declaratory relief regarding the existence and scope of the easement. Following a bench trial, the trial court issued a detailed statement of decision concluding: "Lot 54 does not have an express access easement over Lot 14. Lot 54 has an implied access easement over Lot 14 at the location of the existing driveway, the scope of which is limited to agricultural and limited residential use." The court issued a permanent injunction prohibiting the Ranch from using the easement "for winery or visitor center purposes" and from engaging in construction on Lot 14 other than minimal repairs, maintenance, and remedial measures.
Simpson also sought declaratory relief regarding a water agreement, which the trial court denied as unripe and which is not at issue on appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. Use Restriction
The Ranch argues no substantial evidence supports the trial court's limitation of the scope of the easement to agricultural and residential use. We reject the challenge.
"[T]he use of an easement, whether created by express grant, implication, or prescription, cannot be altered to impose an unreasonable or unintended burden on the servient tenement." (Thorstrom v. Thorstrom (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1422 (Thorstrom).) "The owner of the dominant tenement must use his or her easements and rights in such a way as to impose as slight a burden as possible on the servient tenement. [Citation.] Every incident of ownership not inconsistent with the easement and the enjoyment of the same is reserved to the owner of the servient estate." (Scruby v. Vintage Grapevine, Inc. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 697, 702.)
The trial court's statement of decision found that, at the time of the 1993 easement, "[f]ewer than 10 car trips per day used the driveway to access the residences on Lots 17 and 18. The driveway was not used for any commercial use and was used to access Lot 54 very rarely. Lot 54 was used only for cattle grazing . . . . [¶] Regarding future uses . . . , there was no evidence as to what [Pieratt] contemplated in 1993 for the future use of Lot 54 other than continued grazing. Furthermore, for 14 years -- from 1993 through . . . the conveyance of Lot 54 to Woolls Ranch in 2007 -- the driveway continued to be used only for limited residential access to Lots 17 and 18, and Lot 54 continued to be used for grazing. . . . [¶] The record is devoid of any evidence that commercial use of Lot 54 was contemplated by [Pieratt]." (Footnote omitted.) The court noted that under the Ranch's county-issued use permit, "[a] new winery with production of up to 50,000 gallons is permitted, with resulting increase in employee and delivery traffic in an undetermined amount. A visitor's center with tours and marketing events is permitted to have up to 22,840 guests a year which, assuming two guests per vehicle, will create over 22,000 one-way trips on the driveway. . . . [D]riveway improvements [required by the use permit] include 'the removal of the embankment along the southeast corner of the driveway, including shotcrete reinforcement or an approved equivalent.' " The court concluded "that the development of Lot 54 for a winery and visitor center was not reasonable or foreseeable and that the impacts from the proposed commercial development create an unreasonable burden on Lot 14."
Substantial evidence supports the court's findings. The Ranch argues there was no evidence that Pieratt only contemplated grazing or agriculture as future uses of Lot 54. The trial court could reasonably infer from the historic use of Lot 54 and the limited means of access to the property that its use as a winery and visitor center was not contemplated by Pieratt or reasonably foreseeable.
The Ranch argues evidence that the physical terrain of Lot 54 precludes other access roads "is consistent with the inescapable conclusion [Pieratt ] did not intend to land lock Lot 54." But such a conclusion does not mean Pieratt contemplated commercial activity on Lot 54. Instead, as noted above, the trial court could reasonably conclude the opposite.
The Ranch argues a 1990 county ordinance about wine marketing provides evidence that the development of a winery on Lot 54 was foreseeable. The Ranch provides no record citation that the ordinance was presented to or argued in the trial court, and it may not rely on it now. (Kashmiri v. Regents of University of California (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 809, 830 [" ' "[I]t is fundamental that a reviewing court will ordinarily not consider claims made for the first time on appeal which could have been but were not presented to the trial court." Thus, "we ignore arguments, authority, and facts not presented and litigated in the trial court." ' "]; Professional Collection Consultants v. Lauron (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 958, 970 [" 'Any statement in a brief concerning matters in the appellate record—whether factual or procedural and no matter where in the brief the reference to the record occurs—must be supported by a citation to the record.' "].) Even if the issue were properly preserved and presented, it does not negate the substantial evidence relied on by the trial court.
The Ranch complains the trial court "failed to take evidence on what the burden of a winery operation alone would be." We are unclear whether the argument is contrasting the burden of a winery alone as opposed a winery and visitor center, or the actual burden of a winery as opposed to the maximum visitor traffic permitted by the use permit. In either event, the Ranch again fails to provide any record citation that it attempted to present such evidence or raised the claim of error in the trial court. The Ranch also argues the question of "whether actual (not estimated) future winery traffic volume may unreasonably burden [Lot 14] is not yet ripe for adjudication." The Ranch cites no authority that the issue of an unreasonable burden cannot be adjudicated until the assertedly burdensome change has taken place. (Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956 (Cahill) [" ' "When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived." ' "].) We decline to consider these issues.
Finally, the trial court found that "[e]ven if the 1993 Easement is deemed to be effective as an express easement, the same analysis regarding scope of use applies." (See Thorstrom, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 1422 ["[T]he use of an easement, whether created by express grant, implication, or prescription, cannot be altered to impose an unreasonable or unintended burden on the servient tenement."].) The Ranch argues if the easement is express its challenge to the use restriction applies "even more strongly" because the easement in the grant deed is for " 'road and utility purposes and all uses usually incidental thereto' " and contains "no use restrictions whatsoever." The trial court rejected this argument, finding "[t]his language does not necessarily allow for unlimited use of the easement area for any purpose" and "[t]he intention of the parties and the burdens imposed on Lot 14 must still be assessed . . . ." The Ranch cites no authority or analysis to support its contrary contention and we decline to consider it. (Cahill, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 956.) Accordingly, we need not and do not resolve the Ranch's contention that the easement was express rather than implied.
II. The County Use Permit
The Ranch argues Simpson's lawsuit improperly attempts to appeal the validity of its county-issued use permit. We disagree. The issue on appeal is limited to the easement. If another means of access to the winery is available, the judgment does not preclude the Ranch from developing it.
Simpson's lawsuit also sought a writ of mandate challenging the county's use permit, which the trial court dismissed on procedural grounds.
Although the Ranch suggests the county resolved the scope of the easement in proceedings approving the use permit, the county properly acknowledged that "[n]either the Planning Commission nor the Board of Supervisors have jurisdiction over disputes involving private matters such as the validity of what appears to be a valid recorded easement." The scope of the easement was not before the county in the use permit proceedings and Simpson was not estopped from litigating it in this action.
III. Laches
Finally, the Ranch argues that laches bars Simpson's entitlement to injunctive relief as a matter of law. We disagree.
"The affirmative defense of laches may be applied to bar relief to a plaintiff who has delayed unduly in seeking equitable relief. [Citation.] The existence of laches is generally a factual question, and the trial court is given great discretion in determining whether to apply laches to bar relief. [Citation.] The key question is whether defendants have demonstrated prejudice, making it unjust to grant relief to plaintiffs." (Committee to Save the Beverly Highlands Homes Assn. v. Beverly Highlands Homes Assn. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1247, 1266.)
The Ranch fails to provide record citations showing it raised this issue below, and has therefore forfeited the argument. We would reject it in any event. Simpson filed the instant lawsuit one month after the county board of supervisors denied her appeal of the use permit (an appeal which argued, among other grounds, that she did not consent to the required improvements to the driveway). Although her complaint did not seek injunctive relief, it sought declaratory relief providing that any easement held by the Ranch "is limited to residential and light agricultural traffic only, not commercial winery traffic." The Ranch complains that Simpson did not seek an injunction until 16 months after filing the lawsuit, and during that time the Ranch proceeded with construction of the winery. Simpson's prompt declaratory relief action put the Ranch on notice that she was contesting the scope of the easement. The Ranch's apparent contention that it was prejudiced because it believed Simpson, if successful on her declaratory relief claim, would not seek injunctive relief, is not persuasive.
Simpson's request for injunctive relief was apparently prompted by the Ranch commencing construction work on the Lot 14 driveway.
In contrast, in Los Angeles Athletic Club v. City of Long Beach (1932) 128 Cal.App. 427, relied on by the Ranch, the plaintiff's "action was not commenced until . . . . over six months after the completion of the work sought to be abated." (Id. at p. 433.) --------
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover her costs on appeal.
/s/_________
SIMONS, Acting P.J. We concur. /s/_________
NEEDHAM, J. /s/_________
BRUINIERS, J.