Opinion
No. 2:03-CV-00591-MCE-GGH.
June 8, 2007
ORDER
On March 5, 2007, this Court entered judgment in Defendant's favor following a defense verdict returned by the jury following trial on March 2, 2007. On March 19, 2007, Plaintiff moved for a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 and Local Rule 59-291. As set forth below, Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial ("Motion") is denied.
All further references to "Rule" or "Rules" are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless otherwise noted.
Plaintiff's new trial request is premised on the assertion that this Court committed legal error in two respects, and that those purported errors substantially prejudiced Plaintiff's case, thereby entitling him to relief under Rule 59. First, Plaintiff alleges that the Court made an erroneous evidentiary ruling by excluding evidence pertaining to the propriety of disciplinary proceedings instituted against him for assault as a result of the prison altercation underlying this litigation. Second, Plaintiff contends that the Court improperly denied Plaintiff's so-calledBatson/Edmondson challenge to Defendant's peremptory removal of the sole African-American individual from the jury.
In opposition to Plaintiff's Motion, Defendant makes a preliminary procedural argument that the Motion is untimely on grounds that it was filed on March 19, 2007, more than ten days following the March 5, 2007 entry of judgment, in contravention of Rule 59(b). Although Defendant is correct that the Court cannot extend the ten-day window for bringing a Motion for New Trial under Rule 59(b), and that said time limitation is akin to a jurisdictional limitation (See Rule 6(b); Tillman v. Ass'n of Apartment Owners of Ewa Apartments, 234 F.3d 1087, 1089 (9th Cir. 2000)), Defendant neglects to point out that Rule 6(a) expressly provides that where the prescribed time for taking action under the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure is eleven days or less, "intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation." Plaintiff's Motion is in fact timely when that exclusion from counting the requisite ten days is considered.
Plaintiff's arguments do not, however, fare as well on a substantive basis. With respect to the Court's allegedly erroneous evidentiary ruling, it granted Defendant's pre-trial Motion in Limine to exclude evidence undermining the propriety of Defendant's prison disciplinary proceedings, on grounds that such evidence would run afoul of the strictures of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a prisoner in state custody (like Plaintiff herein) cannot use a Section 1983 action to challenge the fact or duration of his confinement. Id. at 481. Unless the prisoner has first directly invalidated his conviction/sentence through relief sounding in habeas corpus, Heck bars damages sought in a Section 1983 action based on theories that "necessarily imply the unlawfulness of a (not previously invalidated) conviction or sentence." Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81 (2005); see also Muhammad v. Close, 54 U.S. 749, 751 (2004) (where "success in a . . . [§] 1983 damages action would implicitly question the validity of conviction or the duration of sentence, the litigant must first achieve favorable termination of his available state, or federal habeas, opportunities to challenge the underlying conviction or sentence.").
Plaintiff argues that he is not pursuing the Heck-proscribed avenue of challenging the additional 150-day sentence he received as a result of the altercation at issue. While he instead claims he is seeking only damages, his case nonetheless falls squarely within the purview of Heck because he has not directly invalidated the result of the disciplinary proceedings instituted against him. The Court's ruling on the Motion in Limine at issue barred introduction of evidence showing that Plaintiff acted in self-defense during the course of the altercation. Such evidence runs afoul of Heck since, if Plaintiff did act in self-defense, the punishment he received for the incident would be presumably invalid. Unlike Wilkinson, where the prisoners sought relief that would only render invalid the procedures used to suitability or eligibility for parole, and would not go to the substance of the prisoners' case, here introduction of evidence going to thesubstantive offense itself would operate to impermissibly nullify the proceedings resulting in Plaintiff's increased sentence. In the present case, the only legitimate inquiry for section 1983 purposes was whether Defendant used excessive force in response to the assault Plaintiff was found to have perpetrated. Evidence as to excessive force was permitted because it did not operate to necessarily invalidate the result of the disciplinary proceedings otherwise unchallenged by Plaintiff through habeas corpus. See Sanford v. Motts, 258 F.3d 1117, 1119-20 (9th Cir. 2001) (a successful section 1983 suit based on excessive force would not necessarily imply the validity of conviction because the officer's use of excessive force occurred subsequent to the conduct for which plaintiff was convicted.).
Plaintiff's second challenge concerns the propriety of jury selection in this matter. After Defendant exercised a peremptory challenge removing the only black juror from the jury panel, Plaintiff made a Batson/Edmondson challenge. Plaintiff claims the Court's denial of that challenge constituted legal error.
In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the Supreme Court held that a black criminal defendant's equal protection rights are abridged if the prosecutor utilized peremptory challenges, in a purposefully discriminatory, systematic manner, so as to purposefully remove from a jury members of the defendant's own race. The rationale of Batson was extended to peremptory challenges in civil actions by Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
Batson/Edmondson claims are analyzed using a three-prong standard. First, a prima facie showing must be made that a juror or jurors have been challenged on the basis of race. Secondly, once this prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the opposing party to articulate a neutral, nondiscriminatory reason for the peremptory challenge. Finally, the Court must then weigh whether purposeful discrimination has been shown on the basis of the evidence before it. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 328-29 (2003). The facts and circumstances surrounding the exercise of the peremptory challenge must raise an inference of discrimination. Cooperwood v. Cambria, 245 F.3d 1042, 1045-46 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied 534 U.S. 900 (2001).
The black juror challenged by Defendant in this case was the only African-American individual in the jury panel. Defendant's first two challenges, however, were to remove Caucasian candidates. Given the fact that there was necessarily no pattern of excluding black jurors under these circumstances, it appears questionable whether Plaintiff can even make a prima facie case of exclusion based on race.
Even if one assumes that Plaintiff can surpass that initial hurdle, however, Defendant articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for challenging the juror in question by arguing that she lacked the life experiences that Defendant's counsel sought in selecting a jury favorable to the defense. Defendant's counsel explained, at the time Plaintiff made his oral challenge during the voir dire process, that Price, the juror ultimately chosen over the challenged black candidate (McReynolds) had family members possessing both law enforcement and prison-related experience. McReynolds' background, on the other hand, matched none of the criteria included within Defendant's preferred juror profile, according to defense counsel. While Plaintiff argues that the Court should have engaged in a detailed side-by-side comparison of all retained jurors to the rejected black panelist, the Court disagrees. There were no multiple challenges to black jurors in this case. Moreover, defense counsel did identify a non-discriminatory reason for rejecting the particular juror in question. There is no requirement that any more stringent showing be made. There simply was no inference of discrimination under these circumstances pursuant to which a valid Batson-Edmondson challenge should have been sustained.
As delineated in the Declaration of Misha D. Igra filed in Opposition to this Motion, Price possessed military service, had a child employed at Folsom State Prison, and had two sons-in-law that either were or had been incarcerated. Ms. McReynolds, on the other hand, had no such background. Igra Decl., ¶ 8. The trial transcript supports Ms. Igra's claims in this regard in indicating that she indeed voiced the opinion, at the time theBatson/Edmondson challenge was made, that Price's life experience mad his a more favorable defense juror because of his background and that of his family members.
Because the Court does not find that legal error was committed as to either of the proffered grounds for seeking a new trial under Rule 59(b), Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial is DENIED.
Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, the Court ordered this matter submitted on the briefing. E.D. Cal. Local Rule 78-230(h).
IT IS SO ORDERED.