Opinion
C. A. 6:19-2982-JMC-KFM
01-15-2021
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Kevin F. McDonald United States Magistrate Judge
The plaintiff, a pretrial detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and submit findings and recommendations to the district court.
The plaintiff's complaint was entered on the docket on October 21, 2019 (doc. 1). By order filed October 24, 2019, the plaintiff was given a specific time frame in which to bring his case into proper form for judicial screening (doc. 6). The plaintiff complied with the Court's Order, bringing his case into proper form. By order filed December 3, 2019, the plaintiff was informed that his complaint was subject to summary dismissal because it failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and that he could attempt to cure the defects identified in his complaint by filing an amended complaint within fourteen days (doc. 11). The plaintiff was informed that if he failed to file an amended complaint or otherwise cure the deficiencies outlined in the order, the undersigned would recommend that his case be dismissed (id. at 5-6). On December 20, 2019, the plaintiff's amended complaint was entered on the docket (doc. 13). However, because the amended complaint likewise fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the undersigned recommends dismissal of the case.
ALLEGATIONS
The plaintiff, a pretrial detainee at the Florence County Detention Center (“the Detention Center”) asserts that his rights have been violated because he is being served bagged lunches and dinners which do not provide appropriate nutrition or sustenance (doc. 13). He alleges that in January 2019, his hot meals were replaced with bag food for lunch and dinner (id. at 24-25). The plaintiff contends that Director Johnson has kept him from hot meals by his “orders” (id. at 6-7). The plaintiff further asserts that not only is he malnourished because he is only served peanut butter sandwiches, but also that he has been constipated continually from the amount of peanut butter-although he admits that he did not seek medical attention because he did not want to have to pay for a stool softener or laxative (id. at 6-7, 26-27, 30-31, 41-42). He also contends that Ms. McGee, Ms. Rebecca, and Ms. Ponay (collectively “the Kitchen Supervisors”) have violated his rights by providing sandwiches which have rotten, discolored meat or by serving “ghetto p[i]mento cheese” sandwiches (id. at 8, 25-28). The plaintiff asserts that he occasionally received “soy burgers” or burritos, but that he was mostly served peanut butter sandwiches (id. at 26, 30). He contends that he (and other inmates) sent complaints to these defendants multiple times via the Detention Center officers, including Lt. Black and Sgt. Capers (id. at 8-10, 28-29). Despite the complaints, and knowing that the food served was spoiled or nutritionally inadequate, the plaintiff contends that the Kitchen Supervisors have continued to serve the same food to the plaintiff and other inmates (id. at 37-38). The plaintiff further contends that since he requested a “no-meat” diet, the defendants have not let him resume the “meat” diet (id. at 34).
The plaintiff also asserts that the water in his cell is not “clean” and turns the sink blue/green (id. at 32-34). There is a water fountain that inmates can use, but the plaintiff contends that he has been prevented from doing so (id. at 32). The plaintiff asserts that the one cup of juice provided with his meal is not enough to drink (id.).
The plaintiff alleges that the kitchen supervisors were ready to serve hot meals again, but Director Johnson decided to keep the inmates (and the plaintiff) on bagged/cold food (id. at 35). The plaintiff contends that the lack of nutrition has caused him to suffer from depression and mental/emotional conflict (id. at 7). For injuries, the plaintiff alleges loss of weight, constipation, mental and emotional conflict, depression, humiliation, and distress (id. at 12). For relief, the plaintiff seeks money damages (id. at 11).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, ” is “frivolous or malicious, ” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, the plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and “seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if the plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court is charged with screening the plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
As a pro se litigant, the plaintiff's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
This case is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
DISCUSSION
As noted above, the plaintiff filed the instant action pursuant to § 1983, seeking damages from the defendants. Nevertheless, the plaintiff's amended complaint is subject to summary dismissal.
As an initial matter, throughout his amended complaint, the plaintiff references “us inmates” (see generally doc. 13). It is unclear whether he is attempting to assert claims on behalf of others; however, it is well-settled that a prisoner cannot file or maintain a lawsuit on behalf of others. See Hummer v. Dalton, 657 F.2d 621, 625-26 (4th Cir. 1981) (a prisoner cannot act as a “knight-errant” for others). As such, to the extent the plaintiff's amended complaint can be read as asserting claims on behalf of other inmates imprisoned with the plaintiff, such claims should be dismissed.
Inadequate Food/Nutrition Claim
Even as amended, the plaintiff's food/nutrition claim is subject to summary dismissal. At all relevant times herein, the plaintiff was a pretrial detainee; thus, his claims are evaluated under the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment (which is used to evaluate conditions of confinement claims for individuals convicted of crimes). See City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 243-44 (1983). To state a claim that conditions of confinement violate constitutional requirements, a plaintiff must show that he was deprived of a basic human need and that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to that deprivation. Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1379 (4th Cir. 1993). The first prong of the Strickler analysis requires an objective showing that the deprivation was sufficiently serious, such that significant physical or emotional injury resulted from it, while the second prong is a subjective test requiring evidence that prison officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Id. (citing and partially quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)).
It is well-established that prisons and detention centers must provide “nutritionally adequate food that is prepared and served under conditions which do not present an immediate danger to the health and well being of the inmates who consume it.” Johnson v. S.C. Dep't of Corrs., C/A No. 3:06-2062-CMC-JRM, 2007 WL 904826, at *7 n.11 (D.S.C. Mar. 21, 2007) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); Shrader v. White, 761 F.2d 975, 986 (4th Cir. 1985) (same). Here, even liberally construing the plaintiff's amended complaint, his assertion that he is being served peanut butter sandwiches, as well as pimento sandwiches, the occasional burrito (and sometimes sandwiches with “bad” meat) does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Wright v. Newsome, C/A No. 2:18-1587-JMC-MGB, 2019 WL 6091065, at *5 (D.S.C. June 25, 2019), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2019 WL 3852506 (D.S.C. Aug. 16, 2019) (noting that cold food, “while unpleasant, does not amount to a constitutional deprivation” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Hamm v. Dekalb Cty., 774 F.2d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir. 1985)). Indeed, it is unclear on what occasion the plaintiff has received the “bad” meat sandwiches, in light of his assertion that he is on a “no-meat” diet and unable to change back to the “meat” diet (compare doc. 13 at 8, 39 with doc. 13 at 34). The same analysis is fatal to the plaintiff's claim regarding the amount of juice and/or water he is provided at meal times (see doc. 13 at 32-34). See Jamison v. Myers, C/A No. 9:05-3364-RBH, 2006 WL 3802196, at *8 (D.S.C. Dec. 21, 2006) (adopting Report and Recommendation which recognized that pretrial detainee did not have the right to receive the beverage of his choice while incarcerated), appeal dismissed 266 Fed.Appx. 243 (4th Cir. 2008). Nevertheless, one-time or intermittent mishaps with respect to food are not a constitutional violation. See e.g., Blakely v. Wards, C/A No. 4:10-718-RMG-TER, 2011 WL 2559601, at *3-4 (D.S.C. May 10, 2011), Report and Recommendation adopted sub nom. by Blakely v. Ozmint, 2011 WL 2559536 (D.S.C. June 28, 2011) (collecting cases and rejecting constitutional claim based on fact that prison food service workers did not wear hair nets); Jacobs v. Food Serv. Branch of S.C. Dep't of Corr., C/A No. 2:11-319-RBH-BHH, docs. 9; 12 (D.S.C. 2011) (summarily dismissing civil rights action based on the one-time presence of plastic object in turkey sausage served to prisoner); Lunsford v. Reynolds, 376 F.Supp. 526, 528 (W.D. Va. 1974) (noting that “occasional incidents of a foreign object contained in food, while regrettable, does not present a question of constitutional proportion.”). Moreover, the plaintiff's conclusory assertions that his meals are nutritionally inadequate, absent plausible factual allegations, fail to state a claim of constitutional magnitude. See Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74-75 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1022 (1995) (noting that even under liberal construction, a plaintiff must provide more than general and conclusory statements to allege a plausible claim for relief). As such, the plaintiff's claim regarding inadequate food/nutrition does not meet the first Strickler prong and is subject to summary dismissal.
To the extent the plaintiff intends to assert a conditions of confinement claim regarding the water in his cell, such a claim is subject to summary dismissal as even liberally construed it does not rise to the level of a Fourteenth Amendment violation. See Thompson v. Brown, C/A No. 3:11-318-TMC-JRM, 2011 WL 6012592, at *1-2 (D.S.C. Nov. 8, 2011) (rejecting conditions of confinement claim where the plaintiff claimed “his mattress and blanket were confiscated for six days, he was not allowed to have any toilet tissue for six days, his clothes were taken away from him for six days, his cell was cold, he had no running water in his cell, and he was forced to sleep on a steel cot for six days”), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2011 WL 6012550 (D.S.C. Dec. 2, 2011).
Supervisory Claims
Additionally, to the extent the plaintiff intends to assert claims against the defendants in their supervisory capacities at the Detention Center, the plaintiff's claims are subject to summary dismissal because the doctrines of vicarious liability and respondeat superior are generally not applicable to § 1983 suits. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”); Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (noting that “Section 1983 will not support a claim based on a respondeat superior theory of liability” (emphasis in original)). Indeed, to allege a plausible claim requires a showing that the supervisor (1) had actual or constructive knowledge that his/her subordinates engaged in conduct posing a pervasive or unreasonable risk of constitutional injury; (2) the supervisor's response to the knowledge was “so inadequate as to show deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices;” and (3) an affirmative causal link between the inaction by the supervisor and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff. Green v. Beck, 539 Fed.Appx. 78, 80 (4th Cir. 2013). The plaintiff has not alleged how any of the defendants were responsible for or involved in the conditions complained of herein beyond conclusorily asserting that Director Johnson decided to continue the bagged meals and oversaw the Kitchen Supervisors (see generally doc. 13). Even assuming, arguendo, that Director Johnson knew and/or could be held responsible for the actions of the Kitchen Supervisors, the plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that Director Johnson was aware of a risk of constitutionally cognizable harm to the plaintiff (and, as outlined above, has not asserted a constitutional violation), much less an affirmative causal link between inaction by Director Johnson and the injury suffered by the plaintiff. As such, the claims against Director Johnson in his supervisory capacity is subject to summary dismissal. See Ford v. Stirling, C/A No. 2:17-2390-MGL, 2017 WL 4803648, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 25, 2017); London v. Maier, C/A No. 0:10-434-RBH, 2010 WL 1428832, at *2 (D.S.C. Apr. 7, 2010).
RECOMMENDATION
By order issued December 3, 2019, the undersigned gave the plaintiff an opportunity to correct the defects identified in his complaint and further warned the plaintiff that if he failed to file an amended complaint or failed to cure the identified deficiencies, the undersigned would recommend to the district court that the action be dismissed with prejudice and without leave for further amendment. Despite filing an amended complaint, the plaintiff has not cured the deficiencies identified in the order dated December 3, 2019 (doc. 11). Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the district court dismiss this action with prejudice and without issuance and service of process. See Workman v. Morrison Healthcare, 724 Fed.Appx. 280, 281 (4th Cir. 2018) (in a case where the district court had already afforded the plaintiff an opportunity to amend, the district court was directed on remand to “in its discretion, either afford [the plaintiff] another opportunity to file an amended complaint or dismiss the complaint with prejudice, thereby rendering the dismissal order a final, appealable order”) (citing Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc'y, Inc., 807 F.3d 619, 630 (4th Cir. 2015)). The plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.