It seems clear that the master found it necessary to consider the doctrine of estoppel in this case because of the principle of law which holds that a deed in which the name of the grantee has not been inserted is inoperative as a conveyance so long as the blank remains unfilled. Simpson v. Hirshberg, 1947, 159 Fla. 25, 30 So.2d 912; Annotation, 1947, 175 A.L.R. 1294. This principle of law applies to this case and we therefore hold that the deed in blank from the Conways to Miami Gardens is inoperative as a conveyance of the lands in question in this suit. Having so decided it is readily apparent that the doctrine of merger does not operate here since such doctrine operates only when "* * * a greater estate and a less coincide, and meet in one and the same person, in one and the same right, without any intermediate estate."

The complaint states a cause of action. Belcher Center LLC correctly asserts that a deed from the owner to a nonexistent entity is a nullity, see Daniels v. Berry, 513 So.2d 250, 251 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987), and a deed not containing the names of the grantees is void, see Simpson v. Hirshberg, 159 Fla. 25, 30 So.2d 912, 912 (1947). We, therefore, must reverse the dismissal with prejudice for further proceedings to consider the application of the affirmative defense of the doctrine of estoppel by deed or equitable estoppel.