Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. BS105001. David P. Yaffe, Judge.
Tim Simpson, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Aleshire & Wynder, David J. Aleshire and Fred Galante for Defendant and Respondent.
Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Tim Simpson appeals from the trial court’s denial of his petition for writ of mandate (Petition) for relocation benefits after plaintiff entered into a settlement agreement with the Irwindale Community Redevelopment Agency (Agency). We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Agency acquired property at 848 Meridian Street in Irwindale on November 30, 2004. Before acquiring the property, the Agency’s relocation consultant attempted to inform potential tenants of their rights to relocation benefits. The Agency was not able to verify that plaintiff was a lawful occupant of the property and initially denied him any relocation benefits. Plaintiff requested an appeal.
The Agency offered to settle his right to prove his lawful occupancy for $1,500. Plaintiff requested payment of relocation benefits. The Agency offered and plaintiff accepted $10,000, and the parties executed an All Inclusive Settlement Agreement (Settlement Agreement). The Settlement Agreement at paragraph 1(b) provided in part as follows: “Simpson agrees that the payment received pursuant to paragraph 1(a) above constitutes full satisfaction of any and all obligations of the Agency to Simpson, including without limitation any obligations for relocation assistance[ and] relocation benefits . . . .” Paragraph 3(f) provided: “This Agreement represents a settlement of doubtful and disputed claims between the Parties and does not constitute any admission of liability by either party to the other party to this Agreement. Nor does this Agreement represent any acknowledgment or concession by the Agency that Simpson is lawfully occupying the Property or is entitled to any relocation benefits or other assistance by the Agency as a result of the Agency’s acquisition of the Property.”
The Settlement Agreement was signed on February 12, 2004, and plaintiff was paid $10,000. Plaintiff did not follow up on his request for an appeal. He did not raise any issue again until he filed a claim with the City of Irwindale (City) on June 15, 2006. On September 6, 2006, plaintiff filed the Petition against the City seeking to have the trial court order the City to require the Agency to grant him an appeal of the denial of his relocation benefits. On January 4, 2007, following the hearing on the Petition, the trial court entered its judgment denying the Petition in its entirety. The trial court found that plaintiff’s claim for a priority right to a new house was a claim for relocation assistance. The trial court further found that pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, plaintiff waived his rights to relocation assistance, whether he realized that he had such a right at the time that he signed the Settlement Agreement or not. Plaintiff thus waived his claim for a priority right to a new house when he signed and accepted the benefits of the Settlement Agreement.
On March 20, 2007, after a hearing on the City’s motion for attorneys’ fees, the trial court awarded the City $18,000 in attorneys’ fees as the prevailing party under the attorneys’ fees clause in the Settlement Agreement.
DISCUSSION
Settlement Agreement Settled Plaintiff’s Claim that he was a Displaced Person
California Relocation Assistance Law (Gov. Code, § 7260 et seq.) requires a public agency to provide certain relocation benefits to those persons meeting the definition of a “displaced person” (id., § 7260, subd. (c)). A “displaced person” does not include one unlawfully occupying the property. (Id., subd. (c)(2)(A).)
Plaintiff alleged that he was a tenant of the property and paid rent, even though the property was industrially zoned, which would have prohibited plaintiff from residing as a tenant. Plaintiff alleged he was a caretaker and lawfully on the property.
Plaintiff was not able to verify that he was lawfully on the property as a caretaker, however. He produced a handwritten affidavit from his brother, who operated Charlie’s Fence Company on the property, indicating that plaintiff was a “tenant” of the property. The owner of the property, Ronald Secor, testified at his deposition that he allowed plaintiff to stay on the property “on a trial basis.” The Agency nonetheless paid plaintiff relocation benefits under the Settlement Agreement.
The Settlement Agreement is clear in terminating any further responsibility by the Agency or City to provide plaintiff with relocation assistance. Civil Code section 1541 provides that “[a]n obligation is extinguished by a release therefrom given to the debtor by the creditor, upon a new consideration, or in writing, with or without new consideration.”
While plaintiff contends that he does not read or write, there is no allegation made to the trial court that the Settlement Agreement was obtained by fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, duress, or undue influence. The written release extinguishes obligations contained in the release as long as it is not the product of fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, duress, or undue influence. (Skrbina v. Fleming Companies (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1366.)
Plaintiff contends in his opening brief that he was deceived by the Agency staff when he entered into the Settlement Agreement. This court does not consider on appeal issues that were not raised at the trial court level, and we decline to address this contention. (Cf. Havstad v. Fidelity National Title Ins. Co. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 654, 661.)
Plaintiff also asserts that he was a lawful occupant of the property. This question was resolved by the Settlement Agreement, under which he received relocation benefits as though he were a lawful occupant of the property.
Defendant argues that the Petition properly was denied on the basis that it was brought against the wrong party, i.e., the City versus the Agency, and it was brought beyond the applicable statute of limitations. We do not need to reach these issues, since we determine that the terms of the Settlement Agreement are clear and plaintiff waived his right to relocation assistance by agreeing to accept $10,000 from the Agency.
Title 25 of the Code of California Regulations, section 6088, provides in part that “[a]ll claims filed with the public entity shall be submitted within eighteen months of the date on which the claimant receives final payment for the property or the date on which he moves, whichever is later. . . .”
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: MALLANO, Acting P. J., ROTHSCHILD, J.