Opinion
No. 2011–1375 K C.
2012-05-11
Mark P. SIMPSON, Respondent, v. Joe BROMSON, Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Reginald A. Boddie, J.), entered January 25, 2011. The judgment, after a nonjury trial, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $1,500 and dismissed defendant's counterclaim.
Present: WESTON, J.P., PESCE and RIOS, JJ.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.
Plaintiff, defendant's former tenant, commenced this small claims action to recover a security deposit in the amount of $1,800. Defendant interposed a counterclaim to recover the sum of $1,900 for lost rent due to the renovation of the premises necessitated by the damage caused by plaintiff. After a nonjury trial, the Civil Court awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $1,500 and dismissed defendant's counterclaim. On appeal, defendant contends that the court should have set off the sum sought by defendant in his counterclaim against the amount awarded.
Upon a review of the record, we find that the judgment provided the parties with substantial justice according to the rules and principles of substantive law (CCA 1804, 1807; see Ross v. Friedman, 269 A.D.2d 584 [2000];Williams v. Roper, 269 A.D.2d 125, 126 [2000] ). The decision of a fact-finding court should not be disturbed upon appeal unless it is obvious that the court's conclusions could not be reached under any fair interpretation of the evidence ( see Claridge Gardens v. Menotti, 160 A.D.2d 544 [1990] ). This standard applies with greater force to judgments rendered in the Small Claims Part of the court ( see Williams v. Roper, 269 A.D.2d at 126). Furthermore, the determination of a trier of fact as to issues of credibility is given substantial deference, as the trial court's opportunity to observe and evaluate the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses affords it a better perspective from which to assess their credibility ( see Vizzari v. State of New York, 184 A.D.2d 564 [1992];Kincade v. Kincade, 178 A.D.2d 510, 511 [1991] ).
It is well settled that a security deposit remains the property of a tenant (General Obligations Law § 7–103[1] ) and must be returned at the conclusion of the tenancy ( Cruz v. Diamond, 6 Misc.3d 134[A], 2005 N.Y. Slip Op 50187[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2005] ) absent, for example, proof that the tenant caused damage beyond that attributable to ordinary wear and tear ( see generally Finnerty v. Freeman, 176 Misc.2d 220, 222 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 1998] ). As defendant did not properly establish the damages he claimed ( seeCCA 1804), we find no basis to disturb the Civil Court's award in favor of plaintiff and its dismissal of defendant's counterclaim. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.