Simpkins v. Snow

29 Citing cases

  1. Collins v. Univ. of New Hampshire

    664 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2011)   Cited 45 times
    Concluding that a professor's "campus ban, ... did not work a sufficiently serious harm to plaintiff to rise to the level of the deprivation of a liberty interest"

    Furthermore, New Hampshire recognizes a qualified privilege for untrue statements if they were made in good faith, without malice, and with reasonable belief in their truth. See Simpkins v. Snow, 139 N.H. 735, 661 A.2d 772, 776–77 (1995). The district court found that the privilege applied.

  2. Collins v. University of New Hampshire

    746 F. Supp. 2d 358 (D.N.H. 2010)   Cited 8 times

    "A statement is not actionable if it is substantially true." Simpkins v. Snow, 139 N.H. 735, 770, 661 A.2d 772, 776 (1995). To determine whether a statement is defamatory, a court must read the statement "in the context of the publication taken as a whole."

  3. State v. Bennett

    144 N.H. 13 (N.H. 1999)   Cited 10 times
    Holding that because "the defendant's statement was never introduced" at trial, "evidence of the circumstances surrounding it were not necessary to explain its context"

    "Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement." Simpkins v. Snow, 139 N.H. 735, 737, 661 A.2d 772, 774 (1995) (quotation omitted); see N.H. R. Ev. 801(c). "Hearsay is inadmissible unless it falls within one of the exceptions provided in the rules of evidence."

  4. Krishnan v. Blueprint Healthcare LLC

    19-cv-11708-DJC (D. Mass. Sep. 17, 2021)

    “A statement is not actionable if it is substantially true.” Simpkins v. Snow, 139 N.H. 735, 740 (1995). A qualified privilege exists, however, “if the facts, although untrue, were published on a lawful occasion, in good faith, for a justifiable purpose, and with a belief, founded on reasonable grounds of its truth,' provided that the statements are not made with actual malice.”

  5. Musekiwa v. Am. Airlines, Inc.

    Case No. 12-cv-120-SM (D.N.H. Jul. 18, 2013)

    Importantly, however, "[a] statement is not actionable if it is substantially true." Simpkins v. Snow, 139 N.H. 735, 740 (1995). Moreover, under New Hampshire law, a conditional privilege exists "if the facts, although untrue, were published on a lawful occasion, in good faith, for a justifiable purpose, and with a belief, founded on reasonable grounds of its truth, provided that the statements are not made with actual malice."

  6. Moss v. Camp Pemigewassett, Inc.

    Civil No. 01-220-M (D.N.H. Oct. 9, 2001)

    Independent Mech. Contractors, Inc. v. Gordon T. Burke Sons, Inc., 138 N.H. 110, 118 (1993) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977); R. MCNAMARA, 8 NEW HAMPSHIRE PRACTICE, PERSONAL INJURY, TORT AND INSURANCE PRACTICE § 2 (1988)). A statement is defamatory if it "tends to lower the plaintiff in the esteem of any substantial and respectable group of people," Nash v. Keene Publ'g Corp. 127 N.H. 214, 219 (1985) (citing Duchesnaye v. Munro Enters., Inc., 125 N.H. 244, 252 (1984)), and this determination is a question of law for the court, Duchesnaye, 125 N.H. at 252-53 (citing Thomson v. Cash, 119 N.H. 371, 373 (1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 614 (1977); W. PROSSER, TORTS § 111, at 747-48 (4th ed. 1971)). However, neither a statement of fact that is substantially true,see Simpkins v. Snow, 139 N.H. 735, 740 (1995) (citation omitted), nor a statement of opinion, see Nash, 127 N.H. at 219 (citations omitted), is actionable as defamation. The first allegedly defamatory statement that Moss identifies, Grabill's claim that he had received a complaint about Moss "through `the State of New Hampshire'" (Compl. ¶ 20), is not actionable because: (1) it is not defamatory; and (2) it is substantially true. "It is axiomatic that `[w]ords alleged to be defamatory must be read in the context of the publication taken as a whole.'"

  7. Moss v. Camp Pemigewassett, Inc.

    312 F.3d 503 (1st Cir. 2002)   Cited 42 times
    Construing New Hampshire law

    The district court went on to hold that the statement about the complaint through the State was also substantially true. "A statement is not actionable [defamation] if it is substantially true." Simpkins v. Snow, 139 N.H. 735, 661 A.2d 772, 776 (1995). The district court interpreted the complaint as not disputing that two other complaints had been made against Moss.

  8. Riley v. Harr

    292 F.3d 282 (1st Cir. 2002)   Cited 47 times
    Finding assertion that plaintiff was lying to be protected opinion where basis for the opinion was disclosed and both sides of the issue were exposed

    As the district court noted, under New Hampshire law "[a] statement is not actionable if it is substantially true." Simpkins v. Snow, 139 N.H. 735, 740, 661 A.2d 772 (1995). Moreover, under the fair report privilege, "'the publication of defamatory matter concerning another in a report of an official . . . proceeding . . . that deals with a matter of public concern [is privileged] if the report is accurate and complete or a fair abridgement of the occurrence reported.'"

  9. Chalifoux v. Proto Labs

    23-cv-23-SE (D.N.H. Dec. 28, 2023)

    Moss v. CampPemigewassett, Inc., 312 F.3d 503, 509 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing Duchesnaye v. Munro Enters., Inc., 480 A.2d 123, 125 (N.H. 1984)). “A statement is not actionable [defamation] if it is substantially true.” Moss, 312 F.3d at 509 (citing Simpkins v.Snow, 661 A.2d 772, 776 (N.H. 1995)). Defamation claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

  10. Ortolano v. City of Nashua

    677 F. Supp. 3d 41 (D.N.H. 2023)

    "A statement is not actionable [defamation] if it is substantially true." Moss, 312 F.3d at 509 (citing Simpkins v. Snow, 139 N.H. 735, 661 A.2d 772, 776 (1995)).