Furthermore, New Hampshire recognizes a qualified privilege for untrue statements if they were made in good faith, without malice, and with reasonable belief in their truth. See Simpkins v. Snow, 139 N.H. 735, 661 A.2d 772, 776–77 (1995). The district court found that the privilege applied.
"A statement is not actionable if it is substantially true." Simpkins v. Snow, 139 N.H. 735, 770, 661 A.2d 772, 776 (1995). To determine whether a statement is defamatory, a court must read the statement "in the context of the publication taken as a whole."
"Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement." Simpkins v. Snow, 139 N.H. 735, 737, 661 A.2d 772, 774 (1995) (quotation omitted); see N.H. R. Ev. 801(c). "Hearsay is inadmissible unless it falls within one of the exceptions provided in the rules of evidence."
“A statement is not actionable if it is substantially true.” Simpkins v. Snow, 139 N.H. 735, 740 (1995). A qualified privilege exists, however, “if the facts, although untrue, were published on a lawful occasion, in good faith, for a justifiable purpose, and with a belief, founded on reasonable grounds of its truth,' provided that the statements are not made with actual malice.”
Importantly, however, "[a] statement is not actionable if it is substantially true." Simpkins v. Snow, 139 N.H. 735, 740 (1995). Moreover, under New Hampshire law, a conditional privilege exists "if the facts, although untrue, were published on a lawful occasion, in good faith, for a justifiable purpose, and with a belief, founded on reasonable grounds of its truth, provided that the statements are not made with actual malice."
Independent Mech. Contractors, Inc. v. Gordon T. Burke Sons, Inc., 138 N.H. 110, 118 (1993) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977); R. MCNAMARA, 8 NEW HAMPSHIRE PRACTICE, PERSONAL INJURY, TORT AND INSURANCE PRACTICE § 2 (1988)). A statement is defamatory if it "tends to lower the plaintiff in the esteem of any substantial and respectable group of people," Nash v. Keene Publ'g Corp. 127 N.H. 214, 219 (1985) (citing Duchesnaye v. Munro Enters., Inc., 125 N.H. 244, 252 (1984)), and this determination is a question of law for the court, Duchesnaye, 125 N.H. at 252-53 (citing Thomson v. Cash, 119 N.H. 371, 373 (1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 614 (1977); W. PROSSER, TORTS § 111, at 747-48 (4th ed. 1971)). However, neither a statement of fact that is substantially true,see Simpkins v. Snow, 139 N.H. 735, 740 (1995) (citation omitted), nor a statement of opinion, see Nash, 127 N.H. at 219 (citations omitted), is actionable as defamation. The first allegedly defamatory statement that Moss identifies, Grabill's claim that he had received a complaint about Moss "through `the State of New Hampshire'" (Compl. ¶ 20), is not actionable because: (1) it is not defamatory; and (2) it is substantially true. "It is axiomatic that `[w]ords alleged to be defamatory must be read in the context of the publication taken as a whole.'"
The district court went on to hold that the statement about the complaint through the State was also substantially true. "A statement is not actionable [defamation] if it is substantially true." Simpkins v. Snow, 139 N.H. 735, 661 A.2d 772, 776 (1995). The district court interpreted the complaint as not disputing that two other complaints had been made against Moss.
As the district court noted, under New Hampshire law "[a] statement is not actionable if it is substantially true." Simpkins v. Snow, 139 N.H. 735, 740, 661 A.2d 772 (1995). Moreover, under the fair report privilege, "'the publication of defamatory matter concerning another in a report of an official . . . proceeding . . . that deals with a matter of public concern [is privileged] if the report is accurate and complete or a fair abridgement of the occurrence reported.'"
Moss v. CampPemigewassett, Inc., 312 F.3d 503, 509 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing Duchesnaye v. Munro Enters., Inc., 480 A.2d 123, 125 (N.H. 1984)). “A statement is not actionable [defamation] if it is substantially true.” Moss, 312 F.3d at 509 (citing Simpkins v.Snow, 661 A.2d 772, 776 (N.H. 1995)). Defamation claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.
"A statement is not actionable [defamation] if it is substantially true." Moss, 312 F.3d at 509 (citing Simpkins v. Snow, 139 N.H. 735, 661 A.2d 772, 776 (1995)).