Opinion
A89A0222.
DECIDED MARCH 16, 1989.
Dispossessory action. DeKalb State Court. Before Judge Purdom.
Benjamin P. Erlitz, for appellant. McCalla, Raymer, Padrick, Cobb Nichols, Carol V. Clark, R. Therrese Perrotta, for appellee.
On August 5, 1988, appellee-landlord filed a dispossessory action, seeking not only possession of the premises but also past due rent. On August 9, 1988, service was made by tacking and mailing. See OCGA § 44-7-51 (a). On August 15, 1988, appellant-tenant mailed his answer to the clerk's office. On August 17, 1988, appellant's answer was received no default judgment had yet been entered, appellant filed a "Motion To Set Aside Judgment." On September 8, 1988, the trial court denied appellant's "motion to set aside judgment or to open default . . . ." Appellant brings this direct appeal from the denial of his motion.
Since no default judgment has ever been entered, it is clear that appellant's motion can only be construed as a motion to open default. "The law distinguishes between a default, which involves an interlocutory matter, and a default judgment, which represents final judicial action and the vesting of rights. [Cits.]" Attridge v. Maines, 174 Ga. App. 472, 473 ( 330 S.E.2d 409) (1985). Appellant has not complied with the interlocutory appeal provisions of OCGA § 5-6-34 (b). Compare A. G. Spanos Dev. v. Caras, 170 Ga. App. 243 ( 316 S.E.2d 793) (1984). Accordingly, this court has no jurisdiction and the appeal from the denial of appellant's motion to open default is dismissed.
Appeal dismissed. McMurray, P. J., and Beasley, J., concur.