Moreover, reputation testimony must be based on more than “mere personal opinion, fleeting encounters, or rumor.” Rogers v. State, 511 So.2d 526, 530 (Fla.1987); see also Rigterink v. State, 66 So.3d 866, 895 (Fla.2011) (holding that a witness' testimony presented in terms of his “own opinion and generalized personal experiences” was not a proper way to establish reputation evidence in Florida); Simon v. State, 38 So.3d 793, 795 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (setting forth the predicate that must be laid to admit testimony of a victim's reputation for violence), quashed on other grounds, 160 So.3d 898, 2015 WL 128294, 40 Fla. L. Weekly S13 (Fla. Jan. 7, 2015). Gallo's claim on this ground in his rule 3.850 motion was legally insufficient because he did not specify what these five individual witnesses would have testified.
The defendant, Nelsenn Simon, appealed from a conviction and sentence for second degree murder raising, among other issues, that the trial court gave a fundamentally erroneous jury instruction on the lesser included offense of manslaughter because it included the same intent element of the greater offense of second degree murder. His conviction was affirmed based on this court's opinion in Singh v. State, 36 So.3d 848 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). Simon v. State, 38 So.3d 793, 795 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). In Singh, where the defendant was prosecuted for first degree murder and convicted of the lesser included offense of second degree murder, we held that the trial court did not fundamentally err in giving the standard jury instruction on manslaughter, which required a jury finding that the defendant “intentionally caused the death” of the victim or that the death of the victim “was caused by the culpable negligence” of the defendant.
Ruiz v. State, 743 So.2d 1, 4 (Fla.1999) (quoting United States v. Garza, 608 F.2d 659, 662 (5th Cir.1979)). While litigants are provided wide latitude to present their respective cases, see Franqui v. State, 804 So.2d 1185, 1195 (Fla.2001), with control of such comments left to the discretion of the trial court, see Simon v. State, 38 So.3d 793, 796 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010), the parties “must ‘confine their argument to the facts and evidence presented to the jury and all logical deductions from the facts and evidence.’ ” Hosang v. State, 984 So.2d 671, 672 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (quoting Knoizen v. Bruegger, 713 So.2d 1071, 1072 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)).