Summary
In Simms v. Killiam, 34 N.C. 252, the Court, through Chief Justice Ruffin, said: "It was argued at the bar that the policy of the act was to protect owners of real estate from being deprived of it without written evidence, under their own hands, and that a promise to pay money for land is not within the mischief.
Summary of this case from Love v. AtkinsonOpinion
(August Term, 1851.)
A contracted to purchase from B. a tract of land at a stipulated price, and gave his written obligation to that effect. Afterwards C., by parol, agreed to purchase A.'s interest in the contract, and A., by endorsement on his obligation, directed B. to convey to C. Held, that the contract between A. and C. was void by the statute of frauds, and, of course, no action could be sustained on it.
APPEAL from Settle, J., at HAYWOOD Spring Term, 1851.
Assumpsit, in which the plaintiff sought to recover the sum of $200, part of the price which the intestate promised to pay the plaintiff for his interest in a tract of land. On the general issue the facts were these: The plaintiff contracted with one Wikle for the purchase of the land at $600, and paid him $210 and took his obligation to convey to him the payment of the residue of the purchase money. Afterwards Jones, the defendant's intestate, contracted orally with the plaintiff for the purchase of his interest in the land at $800, whereof he promised the plaintiff to pay $590 to Wikle in full of the balance due him, (253) and to pay the plaintiff the remaining $210. Thereupon the plaintiff signed a written memorandum on Wikle's obligation that Jones was authorized to take a deed from Wikle in his own name, and delivered the paper to Jones, who afterwards paid the purchase money to Wikle and got a deed from him, and also paid the plaintiff the sum of $10 in part of the $210, but died without making any further payment. The defendant insisted that the action would not lie because the agreement was not in writing, and the presiding judge was of that opinion and nonsuited the plaintiff, and he appealed.
J. W. Woodfin for plaintiff.
N.W. Woodfin for defendant.
The Court concurs in the opinion of his Honor, which is in accordance with the case of Rice v. Carter, 33 N.C. 298. The contract concerns the sale of an interest in land, and by the statute of frauds a party to it cannot be charged therewith unless it be in writing and signed by the party thus sought to be charged. It was argued at the bar that the policy of the act was to protect owners of real estate from being deprived of it without written evidence under their own hand, and that a promise to pay money for land is not within the mischief. But the danger seems as great that a purchase at an exorbitant price may by perjury be imposed on one who did not contract for it, as that by similar means a feigned contract of sale should be established against the owner of land. Hence the act in terms avoids entirely every contract of which the sale of land is the subject, in respect of a party — that is, either party who does not charge himself by his signature to it after it has been reduced to writing.
PER CURIAM. Affirmed.
Cited: Wade v. New Bern, 77 N.C. 462; Holmes v. Holmes, 86 N.C. 208; Little v. McCarter, 89 N.C. 236; Love v. Atkinson, 131 N.C. 546; Hall v. Misenheimer, 137 N.C. 186-188; Brown v. Hobbs, 154 N.C. 549.
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