In our opinion respondents disregard the context in which the testator used the term. A number of cases have held that 'heirs' means children, but those cases did not concern language such as John A. Power used. See, Peet v. Commerce E.S.R. Co., 70 Tex. 522, 8 S.W. 203 (1888); Simmons v. O'Connor, 149 S.W.2d 1107 (Tex.Civ.App. 1941, writ ref.); Connor v. Biard, 232 S.W. 885 (Tex.Civ.App. 1921, writ ref.); West v. Glisson, 184 S.W. 1042 (Tex.Civ.App. 1916, writ ref.); Farrell v. Cogley, 146 S.W. 315 (Tex.Civ.App. 1912, writ ref.). Moreover, this case is not controlled by cases which have liberally construed the word 'heirs' to mean children in order to avoid the force of the rule in Shelley's case. Hassell v. Frey, 131 Tex. 578, 117 S.W.2d 413 (1938); Federal Land Bank of Houston v. Little, 130 Tex. 173, 107 S.W.2d 374 (1937); Calvery v. Calvery, 122 Tex. 204, 55 S.W.2d 527 (1932); Wallace v. First National Bank, 120 Tex. 92, 35 S.W.2d 1036 (1931); Hopkins v. Hopkins, 103 Tex. 15, 122 S.W. 15 (1909); Simonton v. White, 93 Tex. 50, 53 S.W. 339 (1899); Hancock v. Butler, 21 Tex. 804, 812 (1858); McMahan v. McMahan, 198 S.W. 354 (Tex.Civ.App. 1917, writ ref.).
We find that it is well settled in that state that only its courts have jurisdiction to determine title to Texas real estate. Simmons v. O'Connor, Tex. Civ. App., 149 S.W.2d 1107, 1110; Crossland v. Dunham, 135 Tex. 301, 140 S.W.2d 1095, 1096, 1097. The same situation we have here confronted the Court of Appeals of New York in Davis v. Tremain, 205 N.Y. 236, 238, 98 N.E. 383, 384.
But where other words or phrases are added, indicating a different meaning, a different meaning may be inferred. Irvine v. Newlin, 63 Miss. 192; Shook v. McConnell, Ohio Prob., 97 N.E.2d 111; Jones v. Lewis, 70 Ohio App. 17, 44 N.E.2d 735; Simmons v. O'Connor, Tex. Civ. App., 149 S.W.2d 1107. In the case of Irvine v. Newlin, supra, this Court said: "The proposition deducible from the authorities is that prima facie the word `heir' is to be taken in its technical sense, unless there is in the will a plain demonstration that the testator used it in a different sense, in which case effect will be given to his intention."
1932); In re Bills' Estate, 542 S.W.2d 943, 946 (Tex.Civ.App.-Texarkana 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (“The law is settled that the Arkansas judgment of probate is in rem but has no extra-territorial effect upon assets of the decedent's estate in Texas.”); Simmons v. O'Connor, 149 S.W.2d 1107, 1110 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1941, writ dism'd judgm't cor.) (“It is clear that only the Texas courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate titles to Texas lands, and that in such suits the laws of Texas must apply.”). Thus, the existence of real property in Texas gives Texas courts jurisdiction over an administration concerning that property.
De Tray v. Hardgrove, 52 S.W.2d 239, 240 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1932); In re Bills' Estate, 542 S.W.2d 943, 946 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("The law is settled that the Arkansas judgment of probate is in rem but has no extra-territorial effect upon assets of the decedent's estate in Texas."); Simmons v. O'Connor, 149 S.W.2d 1107, 1110 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1941, writ dism'd judgm't cor.) ("It is clear that only the Texas courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate titles to Texas lands, and that in such suits the laws of Texas must apply.").
The courts of this state are without power or jurisdiction to adjudicate title to land in another state. Holt v. Guerguin, 163 S.W. 10 (Tex. 1914); Carmichael v. Delta Drilling Co., 243 S.W.2d 458 (Tex.Civ.App. 1951, writ ref'd); Youree v. Pires, 5 S.W.2d 178 (Tex.Civ.App. 1928, writ ref'd); Estabrook v. Wise, 506 S.W.2d 248 (Tex.Civ.App.), vacated as moot, 519 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. 1974); Simmons v. O'Connor, 149 S.W.2d 1107 (Tex.Civ.App. 1941, writ dism'd, judgmt. cor.). It is true that under the law of Texas a court has the power by decree to compel a party over whom it has jurisdiction to execute a conveyance of real property situated in another state.
Simpson, supra, at 561; see Toledo Soc., supra. In testamentary situations, the doctrine is used to carry out the intent of the testator who directs that certain realty be sold or purchased. Boulware v. Sinclair Prairie Oil Co., 219 S.W.2d 536, 538 (Tex.Civ.App. — Beaumont 1949, writ ref'd); Simmons v. O'Connor, 149 S.W.2d 1107, 1113 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1941, writ dism'd judgmt cor.). See generally 1 H. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY Secs. 297-98 (3rd ed. 1939).
The Hunt County judgment did not, and could not, adjudicate the title, and the rights thereto, to the property located in the Philippines. That court did have jurisdiction over the persons there involved but did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter — the Philippine property. Toledo Soc. for Crippled Children et al. v. Hickok et al., 152 Tex. 578, 261 S.W.2d 692, 43 A.L.R.2d 553; Simmons v. O'Connor et al., 149 S.W.2d 1107 (Tex.Civ.App. judg. corr.); King v. Lowry, 80 S.W.2d 790 (Tex.Civ.App. writ ref.); De Vaughn v. Hutchinson, 165 U.S. 566, 17 S.Ct. 461, 41 L.Ed. 827; Singleton v. St. Louis Union Trust Co. et al., 191 S.W.2d 143 (Tex.Civ.App. n.r.e.). All of the property here involved is in the Philippines under the control of the Philippine courts with Philippines Commercial Industrial Bank being administrator of the C. N. Hodges estate and Avelina Magno being administrator of the Linnie J. Hodges estate.
Here, however, the testator, stated that his assets shall be divided amongst the heirs 'as follows'. Directly following that statement are five specifically named and located persons or institutions. Without this construction, the words 'as follows' are meaningless. If, as appellants unsuccessfully contended below, Dr. Schott used the term 'heirs' in its technical meaning, they would receive the residue of the estate and not the five named legatees. It is our opinion that the testator intended to dispose of all his estate, and that he used the term 'heirs' to mean the persons who received under his will, rather than as legal words of art to mean those persons who are heirs under the Texas statutes of descent and distribution. Bradshaw v. Parkman, Tex.Civ.App., 254 S.W.2d 865, 875; Erwin v. Steele, Tex.Civ.App., 228 S.W.2d 882; Simmons v. O'Connor, Tex.Civ.App., 149 S.W.2d 1107; 44 Tex.Jur., § 226. The judgment is affirmed.
" The same rule of law is announced in the following cases: Singleton v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., Tex.Civ.App., 191 S.W.2d 143; Simmons v. O'Connor, Tex.Civ.App., 149 S.W.2d 1107; and DeTray v. Hardgrove, Tex.Com.App., 52 S.W.2d 239. In the last case cited the Commission of Appeals stated that according to well established principles the legislature of one state has no power to confer jurisdiction over property situated in another state and such is particularly true with reference to real property.