Opinion
Civil Action No. 04-4168.
June 15, 2005
ORDER
AND NOW, this 15th day of June, 2005, upon consideration of the pleadings, and for the reasons set forth below, it is hereby ORDERED that:
1. By August 1, 2005, the Respondents are to file a supplemental Response to Petitioner's habeas petition, specifically addressing each of the four claims raised and arguing procedural default and/or the merits of each, as applicable.
2. By August 1, 2005, the Clerk of Courts of Lancaster County must file with the Clerk of this Court copies of all records, including transcripts of Notes of Testimony at Arraignment, Trial, Sentencing, Suppression Hearings, Post Conviction Hearings, Petitions, Pleadings, Opinions and Briefs of State Court proceedings in the matter of Commonwealth v. Robert Simmons, Jr., Court of Common Pleas Lancaster County, No. 2511-2000.
MEMORANDUM
Presently before this Court is a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus filed, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, by a state prisoner. Petitioner is currently incarcerated at State Correctional Institution ["SCI"] Fayette in LaBelle, Pennsylvania, where he is serving a life sentence for first-degree murder. For the reasons which follow, I reject the Respondent's argument that the instant habeas petition is time-barred, and order them to address the merits of Petitioner's habeas claims.
BACKGROUND
The facts in this discussion have been taken from Mr. Simmons' habeas petition and the Commonwealth's answer with appendix.
In a February 4, 2005 Order, I requested the state court records from the Lancaster County Clerk of Courts. By letter dated February 14, 2005, the Lancaster County Clerk of Courts represented that Mr. Simmons' state court records are not available "because the file is currently on appeal in Superior Court." Both Petitioner and the Commonwealth have stated that Mr. Simmons has no pending state court action. I again order the Lancaster County Clerk of Courts to promptly provide copies of all of Petitioner's state court records
On March 26, 2001, Mr. Simmons pled guilty to murder in the first-degree for a negotiated sentence of life imprisonment. Respondent District Attorney of Lancaster County's Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [Docket Entry No. 9]: Exhibit "A" (April 29, 2002 PCRA Court Order) at p. 1 ¶ (a).
Hereinafter "Commonwealth's Response."
The facts underlying Petitioner's murder conviction were set forth by the PCRA Court as follows:
"On March 26, 2001 Defendant entered a counselled [sic] guilty plea to murder in the first degree pursuant to a plea agreement for a sentence of life imprisonment. Defendant was charged with criminal homicide on April 28, 2000 in the death of his girlfriend, Felicia Ezell, age 33, who was in her third trimester of pregnancy, when she was stabbed several times in the chest, falling out a window from the third floor of their apartment. The Commonwealth had filed notice of intent to seek the death penalty on July 11, 2000. Trial was scheduled for March 28, 2001 and continued at Defendant's court-appointed counsel's request to April 23, 2001 with jury selection to begin on March 26, 2001.
The trial court accepted Defendant's guilty plea after an extensive on the record explanation of his legal rights as well as a written guilty plea colloquy together with Defendant's acknowledgment of post-sentence procedures following a guilty plea. Based on all of these factors, Defendant's plea was determined to be willingly, knowingly and intelligently entered.
Following sentencing Defendant wrote to the trial judge that the element of premeditation was not present in the killing, that he did not rape the victim, was dissatisfied with his court-appointed counsel and requested that his plea and sentence be vacated. Defendant was notified that his letter would be treated as a motion to withdraw his plea. Thereafter, Defendant wrote another letter to the trial judge dated April 6, 2001 expressing satisfaction with his sentence, `accepting responsibility for my actions' and asking `to keep my guilty plea as it stands.' The trial court, on April 10, 2001, then entered an order to the effect that since Defendant was no longer contesting his guilty plea it would consider Defendant's request as moot."Commonwealth's Response: Exhibit "B" (May 6, 2003 Superior Court Opinion) at pp. 1-2.
On June 22, 2001, Petitioner filed a pro se petition under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act ["PCRA"], alleging that his guilty plea had been "unlawfully induced by threat of the death penalty." Id. at p. 2.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9541 et seq.
The PCRA Court appointed counsel to represent Petitioner. An evidentiary hearing was held on December 18, 2001. After the evidentiary hearing, Counsel filed a no-merit letter, based upon his review of the record, including the transcripts of Petitioner's sentencing and PCRA hearings. Id.
By Order dated April 29, 2002, the PCRA Court denied Mr. Simmons' motion for PCRA relief, concluding that Petitioner's "guilty plea was not unlawfully induced or coerced but entered with full knowledge of the consequences." Commonwealth's Response: Exhibit "A" (April 29, 2002 PCRA Court Order) at pp. 1-2.
PCRA Counsel filed a timely appeal on Petitioner's behalf, and then sought to withdraw from further representation. Commonwealth's Response: Exhibit "B" (May 6, 2003 Superior Court Opinion) at p. 1.
On PCRA appeal, Petitioner presented one issue:
"The court below erred in denying post-conviction relief where the guilty plea was unlawfully induced, the inducement caused Appellant [Petitioner] to plead guilty and where Appellant is innocent of the crime charged."Id. at p. 5.
In a May 6, 2003 Opinion, the Superior Court affirmed the denial of PCRA relief. The Superior Court concluded: (1) Petitioner entered into the guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily; (2) Petitioner's alleged motivation for entering a guilty plea, to avoid the death penalty, did not invalidate an otherwise knowing and voluntary plea; (3) Petitioner was competent at the time of his plea, despite his allegations that he was "confused," "delirious," and "scared;" and (4) Petitioner, who had admitted he played a role in the death of his girlfriend by stabbing her, was not actually innocent. Id. at pp. 5-10.
Petitioner sought allowance of appeal in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. It is undisputed that allocatur was denied on June 25, 2004. Commonwealth's Response at p. 2; Revised Habeas Petition [Docket Entry No. 3] at pp. 6-7.
The Commonwealth contends that Petitioner did not file a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. Commonwealth's Response at p. 2. Petitioner does not suggest that he did.
On July 26, 2004, Mr. Simmons signed and dated his original habeas petition; it was filed in the Western District of Pennsylvania on July 29, 2004. Original Habeas Petition [CA No. 04-1121 in the Western District of Pennsylvania].
For the purposes of this discussion, under the prison mailbox rule, I will accept the earlier date, July 26, 2004, as the date of filing. See Burns v. Morton, 134 F.3d 109, 113 (3d Cir. 1998).
Mr. Simmons' habeas petition was transferred to this district; he filed a revised habeas petition, on a current habeas form, on December 7, 2004. Revised Habeas Petition [Docket Entry No. 3].
As grounds for habeas relief, Petitioner presents the following issue:
1. "Plea of guilty entered because attorney had family upset with talk of the death penalty. Insufficent evidence to support First or Second degree."
2. "Coersion. Trial counsel coerced petitioner to take plea of guilty knowing that First Degree was improper charge, but rather involuntary manslaughter. Petitioner and victim were under the influence of controlled substance[,] mutually engaged into physical altercation."
3. "Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. Trial counsel failed and refused to present any effort to raise any possible, lesser included offense, or ground mitigating the offense of the first degree."
4. "Denial of appellate right. Appellate counsel in failing to preserve and raise lack of malice or premeditation denied petitioner right of appeal where such issues could have lessened the degree of the offense."Revised Habeas Petition at pp. 9-10.
On April 11, 2005, the Respondents answered Mr. Simmons' habeas petition, arguing that it should be dismissed for untimeliness, or in the alternative, it should be dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies. Commonwealth's Response at pp. 3-7.
DISCUSSION
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ["AEDPA" or the "Act"], signed into law on April 24, 1996, significantly amended the laws governing habeas corpus petitions.
One of the amended provisions, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), imposes a one-year statute of limitations on state prisoners who seek federal habeas relief. A habeas petition must be filed within one year from the date on which the petitioner's judgment of conviction becomes final. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).
The date on which the petitioner's conviction becomes final is typically the start date for the limitations period. However, the statute permits the limitation period to run from four different points in time, depending on which occurs latest. In addition to the date on which the petitioner's conviction becomes final, the start date can also run from: (1) "the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action"; (2) "the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review"; or (3) "the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence." See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D).
There is nothing in the pleadings before me to suggest that the start date for the statute of limitations period should be permitted to run from a point later than the date on which Mr. Simmons' conviction became final.
In the instant case, Mr. Simmons' state conviction became final on May 10, 2001, when the time for filing a direct appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court expired. Petitioner's habeas statute of limitations began on May 10, 2001, and absent any tolling, would have expired one year later.
While Petitioner pled guilty on March 26, 2001, he sought to withdraw his guilty plea on March 27, 2001. After Petitioner wrote to the trial court on April 6, 2001, "expressing satisfaction with his sentence," the trial court, by Order dated April 10, 2001, "entered an order to the effect that since Defendant was no longer contesting his guilty plea it would consider Defendant's request as moot." Commonwealth's Response: Exhibit "B" (May 6, 2003 Superior Court Opinion) at p. 2.
I believe it appropriate to use the April 10, 2001 date as the beginning of the thirty day period in which Petitioner could file a timely direct appeal to the Superior Court. However, even if the earlier date, March 26, 2001, is used (thus making Petitioner's conviction final on April 26, 2001), as discussed in the text, the instant habeas petition is still timely.
The AEDPA amendments include a tolling provision for "the time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending." See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).
Petitioner's habeas statute of limitations began on May 10, 2001, and continued to run until June 22, 2001, when Petitioner filed a petition for collateral relief in the PCRA forum. As of June 22, 2001, approximately one and one-half months (43 days) of Petitioner's one year statutory period had expired.
The statute of limitations period was tolled during the entire time period that Mr. Simmons' PCRA petition was pending, from June 22, 2001 through June 25, 2004, when the parties represent that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allocatur review. See Schwartz v. Meyers, 204 F.3d 417, 421 (3d Cir. 2000) (for § 2244's tolling provisions, "pending" includes the time for seeking discretionary review, whether or not discretionary review is sought.)
On June 26, 2004, the remainder of Petitioner's statutory period, approximately ten and one-half months (322 days) began to run. The instant habeas petition, filed on July 26, 2004, falls well within the remaining statutory habeas period. It is, therefore, timely under § 2244(d).
The Respondents have requested leave to file a supplemental response, if the instant habeas petition is not "dismissed on procedural grounds." Commonwealth's Response at p. 7 n. 3. I grant this request, and direct the Respondents to argue, as to each of the four claims raised, whether the claim is procedurally defaulted or should be addressed on the merits.
To the extent that the Respondents intend to argue failure to exhaust state remedies, they are to explain why they believe any further PCRA petition filed by Mr. Simmons would not be time-barred under PCRA's one year statute of limitations.
In light of the fact that both parties have represented that Petitioner does not have a pending state action, the Clerk of Courts for Lancaster County shall promptly forward to this Court a copy of all of Petitioner's state court records.