Opinion
CASE NO. 3:02-CV-61
September 4, 2003
Timothy Borne Garrigan, Stuckey, Garrigan and Castetter, Nacogdoches, TX, for Plaintiffs
Darren Keith Coleman, Boon, Shaver Echols Coleman, PLLC, Longview, TX, for Defendants
Robert Scott Davis, Flowers, Davis, LLP, Tyler, TX for Defendants
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Charlie Simmons and Charlotte Handley, on their own behalf and as next friends for their children Dustin Handley and Angelica Handley, have brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that certain City of Paris police officers and a Lamar County Deputy Sheriff conducted an unreasonable search of their home under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Defendant City of Paris Police Officers Bill McFadden, Shane Stone, Leigh Foreman, Tommy Moore, DeWayne Kyle, Rhonda Gustin, Matt Birch (collectively "the Paris Defendants") have filed a motion for summary judgment based upon qualified immunity arguing that the officers' entry into Plaintiffs' home was an honest mistake not rising to the level of a Constitutional violation (Docket No. 38). Defendant Lamar County Deputy Sheriff Chris Brooks "(Brooks") has also filed a motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity (Docket No. 41). Having considered the parties' written submissions and the summary judgment record, Defendants' summary judgment motions are GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
When referring to Brooks and the Paris Defendants collectively, the Court will refer to them as Defendants.
BACKGROUND AND CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
This case involves Defendants' attempt to execute a search warrant at suspected drug dealer Nicky Highnight's residence in Paris, Texas on the evening of June 29, 2002. Highnight lives at 400 14th Street, while Plaintiffs live at 410 14 th Street. Shane Stone ("Stone") prepared an affidavit requesting a search warrant for 400 14th Street. In executing the warrant, Defendants' entered Plaintiffs' home at 410 14th Street instead. Plaintiffs claim that Defendants' entry into their home violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
In their motion, Defendants argue that their entry into Plaintiffs' home was an "honest mistake" primarily stemming from a miscommunication concerning where the entry team vehicle was to park. The driver of the vehicle, Matt Birch "(Birch"), understood that he was to park the vehicle one house north of Highnight's residence, while the other officers including the entry team leader, Bill McFadden ("McFadden"), understood that Birch would park the vehicle one house south. Thus, when McFadden exited the vehicle and saw people on the porch of what he believed to be 400 14th Street, he and the rest of the entry team approached quickly and then entered the house.
In response, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants acted unreasonably in executing the warrant because they had previously conducted surveillance of Highnight's home and were therefore familiar with that location. Further, Plaintiffs assert that Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity because they proceeded to enter their home after they were aware it was the wrong house.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment shall be rendered when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). "An issue is genuine if the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Owsley v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 187 F.3d 521, 523 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1020 (2000). Although all evidence and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, the non-moving party may not rely on unsubstantiated assertions or speculation, but must respond by setting forth specific facts indicating a genuine issue for trial. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962); Rushing v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 185 F.3d 496, 505 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1160 (2000).
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
As stated above, Defendants contend that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the basis of "qualified immunity." "Qualified immunity" shields governmental officials performing discretionary functions from liability "unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Babb v. Dorman, 33 F.3d 472, 477 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). The doctrine is generally available to governmental officials, such as Defendants here, sued under section 1983 in their individual capacity. Johnston v. City of Houston, 14 F.3d 1056,1959 (5th Cir. 1994). A plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating the inapplicability of the qualified immunity defense. McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 323 (5th Cir. 2002).
In considering an assertion of qualified immunity contained in a motion for summary judgment, the threshold inquiry is whether the facts alleged, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right. Saucier v. Katz, 553 U.S. 194, 201 (2001); Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991). If the plaintiff alleges the deprivation of a constitutional right, the court must then determine whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. Saucier, 553 U.S. at 201. To determine whether a right was clearly established, the court must consider whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation confronted. Id. at 202.
The second prong of the analysis asks whether a reasonable police officer could have believed, albeit mistakenly, that the conduct at issue was lawful. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205-06; Revill v. City of Palestine, 213 F. Supp.2d 691, 696 (E.D. Tex. 2002). Put differently, the "question is whether any officer in the defendant's position, measured objectively, would have clearly understood that he was under an affirmative duty to have refrained from such conduct." Adams v. Metiva, 31 F.3d 375, 386 (6th Cir. 1994); see also Johnson v. City of Houston, 14 F.3d 1055, 1059 (5th Cir. 1994) ("If reasonable public officials could differ on the lawfulness of the defendant's actions, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity."). Qualified immunity gives ample room for mistaken judgments and protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202 (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).
Generally, whether a reasonable officer could have believed that his actions were lawful is a matter of law for the courts to decide. Goodson, 202 F.3d at 736. However, where "`a genuine dispute as to the material and operative facts of this case exists, . . . [s]ummary judgment is inappropriate unless plaintiff's version of the violations does not implicate clearly established law." Id. at 739 (quoting Johnston, 14 F.3d at 1061); see also Snyder v. Trepagnier, 142 F.3d 791, 799-800 (5th Cir. 1998) (in an excessive force case, finding that "important factual questions remained for trial and that "the jury needed to determine what sequence of events occurred"); Hart v. O'Brien, 127 F.3d 424, 432 n,2 (5th Cir. 1997) ("[W]e will not consider disputed facts infs determining whether the officers had, or reasonably believed that they had, probable cause to search Hart's home or arrest her."); Lampkin, 7 F.3d at 435 ("Rule 56 still has vitality in qualified immunity cases if the underlying historical facts in dispute that are material to the resolution of the questions whether the defendants actions in an objectively reasonable manner in view of the existing law and facts available to them."). Do Plaintiffs Allege the Violation of a Clearly Established Constitutional Right?
Here, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants conducted an unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Fourth Amendment protects the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures . . ." U.S. CONST. IV. At the time of this incident, it was a basic principle of Fourth Amendment law that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively or per se unreasonable. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). However, when officers mistakenly execute a warrant on the wrong residence, the Fourth Amendment is violated only if the officers failed to make an objectively reasonable effort to accurately identify the place to be searched. Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 88 (1987).
The Court concludes that as to the initial entry of Plaintiffs' house, the officers' mistake was objectively reasonable as a matter of law. The evidence shows that the officers obtained a "no-knock" warrant to search an "off-white/beige colored single family dwelling known municipally as 400 N.W. 14th Street, Paris, Lamar County, Texas" based on information that Highnight was dealing methamphetamine from his house. The officers were aware that Highnight had a reputation for violence and that he possessed weapons that could pierce the bullet proof vests the officers were wearing. The raid took place at night and there is evidence that the lighting at this location was poor. Defendants' proffered explanation for the mistake is that there was miscommunication as to where the entry vehicle would park and that when McFadden exited the vehicle and immediately observed people on the porch of what he believed to be Highnight's residence, he feared that they would alert Highnight. McFadden, followed by the other officers, ran to the house shouting "stop, police" and eventually he and the rest of the team entered the house.
Plaintiffs' primary basis for arguing that the officers initial entry was unlawful is that many of the officers were familiar with the target address and that they could have read the addresses on the front of the houses. While in hindsight it is perhaps true that the officers should have observed the addresses more carefully, the Supreme Court has recognized the "need to allow some latitude for honest mistakes that are made by officers in the dangerous and difficult process of making arrests and executing search warrants." Garrison, 480 U.S. at 87. The evidence shows that McFadden believed he was looking at Highnight's residence when he saw the people on the porch and decided to approach and enter the residence. All of the other officers, except Leigh C. Foreman ("Foreman") and Brooks, also believed that they were approaching Highnight's residence. Foreman suspected that they were approaching the wrong house, but he believed that the officers had observed the Highnights on the porch. Brooks believed that McFadden had seen Highnight at 410 14th Street and proceeded to follow him. In sum, the officers initial entry into the Plaintiffs' home was reasonable in light of the tense and rapidly evolving circumstances they faced on June 29, 2002. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to show that the officers initial entry into the house violated a clearly established right.
Plaintiffs argue that McFadden's proffered explanation for the entry is inconsistent with a report he prepared shortly after the raid and that this inconsistency suggests that the entry was unreasonable. McFadden's report states that:
As we pulled up in front of the residence I heard someone say that it was one house up. I then went to the next house and entered through the open door. As I went into the house I knew right away that it was not the correct house.
This statement appears consistent with McFadden's testimony that he thought he was observing Highnight's residence. Plaintiffs contention that McFadden "concocted" a story that the entry vehicle parked in the wrong place is speculative and does not amount to summary judgment evidence.
Plaintiffs argue that Birch heard someone say "wrong house" as they approached the residence. However, Birch actually testified that he was not sure when this statement was made and that it could have been made after the officers entered Plaintiffs' house. Plaintiffs also contend that Stone was aware that the officers were approaching the wrong house but followed the crowd. Having reviewed Stone's testimony, the Court concludes that when Stone heard other officers say that someone was on the porch, he looked at 400 14th St. initially, but because other officers were more familiar with the Highnight's residence, he proceeded to follow those officers to 410 14th St. Stone testified that as he approached 410 14th St., he believed he was approaching 400 14th St. This testimony is insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the officers acted unreasonably in initially entering the house.
Plaintiffs assert that Foreman and Brooks reliance on exigent circumstances, i.e. their belief they were pursuing the Highnights, was unreasonable and inconsistent with the explanations of the other officers. Foreman and Brooks' belief that they were pursuing the Highnights was based on McFadden's mistaken belief that he was observing 400 14th St. As the Court has concluded that McFadden's initial mistake was reasonable, the Court need not address the issue of exigent circumstances. Nonetheless, under these circumstances, the Court does find that the officers' belief that they were pursuing the Highnights was reasonable. Pray v. Sandusky, 49 F.3d 1154, 1158 (6th Cir. 1995) (a warrantless search of a home may be upheld if it was based on probable cause and exigent circumstances).
Plaintiffs also assert that the search was unreasonable because the affidavit refers to a motor vehicle instead of a residence. Having reviewed the affidavit, the Court concludes that the reference to the motor vehicle was a typographical error and that the affidavit was prepared for the search of a residence. For example, the affidavit states, "There is in Lamar County, Texas a motor vehicle described and located as follows: An off-white/beige colored single family dwelling known municipally as 400 N.W. 14th Street, Paris, Lamar County, Texas." The Court concludes that such an error does not demonstrate unreasonableness on the part of the officers in executing the warrant on Plaintiffs' residence. See United States v. Muller, 902 F.2d 336, 341-42 (5th Cir. 1990) (negligence or innocent mistake are insufficient to undermine the validity of a search warrant).
However, the officers' conduct upon entering the house is a different matter. Another clearly established Fourth Amendment principle is that officers may not remain at a premises without the occupant's consent if there is no probable cause justifying their presence. See Garrison, 480 U.S. at 87 (officers were required to discontinue search erroneously included within scope of warrant); Tierney v. Davidson, 133 F.3d 189, 197-99 (2nd Cir. 1998) ("A warrantless search must be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation."); Liston, 120 F.3d 965, 978 (9th Cir. 1997) ("the reasonableness of the detentions does not turn on the total amount of time involved but on when a reasonable officer would have known that a serious error had occurred and that the search should be terminated."); Baker, 50 F.3d 1186, 1192 (3rd Cir. 1995) ("the court must examine the reasonableness of the detention, particularly whether the police were diligent in accomplishing the purpose of the stop as rapidly as possible"); Pray, 49 F.3d at 1159 ("any search that or seizure that took place after knew or reasonably should have known they were in the wrong residence would no longer be protected by qualified immunity."); Turner v. Sheriff of Marion County, 94 F. Supp.2d 966, 983 (S.D. Ind. 2000) ("Even if the initial entry into a residence results from an objectively reasonable mistake, the Fourth Amendment requires officers to retreat as soon as they discover or reasonably should discover their mistake."). Again, the touchstone of the inquiry is whether the officers acted reasonably once they discovered or reasonably should have discovered that they were in the wrong residence. Pray, 49 F.3d at 1160.
Six officers entered Plaintiffs' home: McFadden, Stone, Foreman, Brooks, DeWayne Kyle ("Kyle"), and Tommy Moore ("Moore"). McFadden, who was the entry team leader and the first one into Plaintiffs' home, testified that when he entered, he told those individuals (Charlie Simmons and Charlotte Handley) in the living room to get on the floor. They complied quickly and when McFadden took his eyes off these individuals, he immediately realized that he was not in the right house because the floor plan was flip-flopped and he recognized the individuals in the front room were not the Highnights. When asked whether he then announced to the officers that they were in the wrong house, McFadden testified:
I sit there and talked to Mr. Simmons, who was telling me, "This is the wrong house."
I kneeled down. I said, "I know."
Ms. Handley started inquiring about her children.
I said, "I can see them from here. They're fine."
Talked to them for just a second, and then told everybody or you know, by that time, Foreman is saying, "Wrong house."
And I'm like, "Yeah, wrong house."
We then left there and went next door.
Foreman testified that when he entered, he stopped a few feet inside the front room, said this is the wrong house, and turned around and left. Brooks testified that he knew he was in the wrong house, but did not tell the other officers that they were in the wrong house. Stone, Kyle and Brooks admit they proceeded through the front room of the house into the kitchen area where they encountered Angelica and Dustin Handley.
Charlie Simmons testified that as soon as he got on the floor he told the officers that they had the wrong house and was told to "stay down and shut up." He also testified that more than two officers entered his house and that he saw two officers go into his daughter's bedroom, the kitchen and his bedroom. Charlotte Handley testified that one officer went into her bedroom and that the officers were in her house for five to six minutes. Angelica Handley testified that two officers entered her room and that she heard people walking through the house. She also testified that the officers were in her room for a few minutes before they left. Dustin Handley testified that one or two officers came into Angelica's room and told he and his sister to get down.
Angelica's room and the kitchen appear to be interconnected and divided by a blanket.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the Court concludes that there are material questions of fact concerning whether the officers acted reasonably when they discovered or should have discovered that they were in the wrong house. Although McFadden, Foreman and Brooks all appear to have been aware that they were in the wrong house almost immediately upon entering it, they themselves failed, except perhaps Foreman, to retreat immediately and they failed to direct the other officers to retreat. Instead, at least two and perhaps three officers proceeded through the front room into at least a portion of the house. While the officers testified that they were in the house at most a minute and a half, Charlotte Handley testified that they were in the house from five to six minutes. The Court recognizes that officers' actions are not to be judged with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight. Nonetheless, the Court concludes that the evidence in the summary judgment record raises triable issues of fact for a jury. See Pray, 49 F.3d at 1160; Smith v. City of Detroit, 238 F. Supp.2d 896, 901-02 (S.D. Mich. 2003); see also Johnson, 7 F.3d at 435 (holding that summary judgment was inappropriate because there was "no coherent view of what happened in the first place" and that "objective reasonableness must be based on a version of the facts most favorable to the plaintiff").
Could a Reasonable Officer Have Believed That the Conduct at Issue Here Was Lawful?
Even though the Court has concluded that there are fact issues concerning the reasonableness of the officers' actions once they entered the house, the Court must now address whether reasonable officers could have mistakenly believed that such conduct was lawful. As noted above, it is clearly established that once officers know or reasonably should know that they are in the wrong residence, they should terminate the search immediately. In light of the officers' testimony and the disputed facts discussed above, whether the officers had an objectively reasonable basis for believing their actions were lawful cannot be resolved at the summary judgment stage. Instead, these issues must be resolved by the trier of fact before such a determination may be made. Of course, it is possible that "a very different picture may result [at trial] than the one painted by the summary judgment record because [Plaintiffs] must prove the issues that this opinion assumes in [their] favor, and the jury can choose to credit certain facts over others . . ." Goodson, 202 F.3d at 740. Nonetheless, on this record, the Court finds that judgment as a matter of law is inappropriate.
Because the Court has concluded that the officers' initial entry was objectively reasonable, the Court need not address the initial entry under this prong of the analysis.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motions are GRANTED as to Defendants initial entry into Plaintiffs' house, but DENIED at to the officers' actions thereafter.
So ORDERED and SIGNED