Kamholtz v. Stepp, 31 Ill. App.2d 357, 176 N.E.2d 388. The purpose of a summary judgment procedure is not to try an issue of fact but rather to determine if one exists. J.J. Brown Co., Inc. v. J.L. Simmons Co., Inc., 2 Ill. App.2d 132, 118 N.E.2d 781; Midwest Grocery Co. v. Danno, 29 Ill. App.2d 118, 172 N.E.2d 648; Simaitis v. Thrash, 25 Ill. App.2d 340, 166 N.E.2d 306. The right of the moving party should be free from doubt, determinable solely as a question of law. Bertlee Co., Inc. v. Illinois Publishing Printing Co., 320 Ill. App. 490, 52 N.E.2d 47; J.J. Brown Co., Inc. v. J.L. Simmons Co., Inc., 2 Ill. App.2d 132, 118 N.E.2d 781. The whole record must be considered. Kamholtz v. Stepp, 31 Ill. App.2d 357, 176 N.E.2d 388.

It is unnecessary for us to discuss these cases, because the instant record contains nothing from which it can be reasonably inferred that plaintiff, when approaching the intersection of Minerva Avenue, looked to determine the presence of any vehicles on Minerva Avenue, approaching or otherwise. Plaintiff relies heavily on Simaitis v. Thrash (1960), 25 Ill. App.2d 340, 166 N.E.2d 306. We are not persuaded that the facts in that case are comparable. There was evidence that plaintiff looked for other cars before entering the intersection.

Therefore, acquisition of certain information vis-a-vis a discovery deposition lends itself to the discovery of facts and better preparation for trial but it is not a substitute for the actual trial wherein that same information is put to use in the disposition of issues which remain subject to resolution. ( Simaitis v. Thrash (1960), 25 Ill. App.2d 340, 348, 166 N.E.2d 306.) However, the procedure urged by appellees and adopted by the trial court and the majority attempts to convert the discovery deposition in a medical malpractice case into the equivalent of testimony given at trial with which the trier of fact can determine the ultimate outcome of the case — and this all prior to the occurrence of the actual trial through the use of summary judgment.

In light of Robert Bauer's testimony that he saw the defendant's vehicle, the plaintiff had no duty to yell the warning that she did. • 3 Although the question of contributory negligence ordinarily and preeminently presents a question of fact, it may become a question of law when from the undisputed facts, all reasonable minds, in the exercise of fair and honest judgment, would be compelled to reach the conclusion that there was no contributory negligence. ( Simaitis v. Thrash (2d Dist. 1960), 25 Ill. App.2d 340, 350, 166 N.E.2d 305.) We are of the opinion that when all the evidence is considered in its aspect most favorable to the defendant together with all reasonable inferences, there is no evidence from which the plaintiff's negligence in failing to warn her son could reasonably be inferred. ( Smith v. Bishop (1965), 32 Ill.2d 380, 384, 205 N.E.2d 461.

Courts have disagreed over the theory of liability in cases of this nature. Some courts have said that the negligence of the driver will be imputed to the owner-passenger or the possessor-passenger if it can be shown that the owner or possessor has not abandoned control or the trip was for the mutual benefit of the driver and passenger. ( Simaitis v. Thrash (1960), 25 Ill. App.2d 340, 351, 166 N.E.2d 306, 311. See also Hession v. Liberty Asphalt Products, Inc. (1968), 93 Ill. App.2d 65, 74-75, 235 N.E.2d 17, 22; Lilegdon v. Hanuska (1967), 85 Ill. App.2d 262, 269, 229 N.E.2d 314, 318.

"It is well settled in Illinois that an owner of an automobile, while riding as a passenger in it, not only retains the power and right to control its operation, unless that right has been abandoned or contracted away, but has the duty to control the driver. ( Palmer v. Miller, 380 Ill. 256, 260; Simaitis v. Thrash, 25 Ill. App.2d 340, 351.) The owner is thus under a duty to control the operation of the owned vehicle and is chargeable with his own negligence, not the negligence of the driver, in the performance of that duty. ( Scott v. Valentine, 268 N.E.2d 485, 487; Staken v. Shanle, 23 Ill. App.2d 269, 279.

To warrant the granting of a motion for summary judgment based on discovery depositions, a fact or facts that would bar recovery as a matter of law must be admittedly so clear and unequivocal that such admissions are not open to dispute or different interpretations. Simaitis v. Thrash, 25 Ill. App.2d 340. In the instant case there are no discovery depositions or any other facts that would bar recovery as a matter of law except the contract and the affidavit of Samples.

• 3, 4 It was the opinion of the trial judge that there was not sufficient evidence in the record to raise the issue of agency and therefore the court refused to give defendant's tendered instructions No. 16 and No. 16A. Th court also refused to submit a special interrogatory concerning agency. Mr. Wonaitis testified that he was driving his wife to a bus stop and intending to return home. He was performing a service for her as she did not drive. The essential elements of agency are ownership and control. ( Lilegdon v. Hanuska (1967), 85 Ill. App.2d 262, 229 N.E.2d 314; Simaitis v. Thrash (1960), 25 Ill. App.2d 340, 166 N.E.2d 306.) There was no evidence that the decedent exercised ownership or control over the automobile. Mr. Wonaitis owned the car and Mrs. Wonaitis did not drive. Negligence could not be imputable on a joint-enterprise theory since the element of business enterprise is absent.

• 1, 2 It is well settled in Illinois that an owner of an automobile, while riding as a passenger in it, not only retains the power and right to control its operation, unless that right has been abandoned or contracted away, but has the duty to control the driver. ( Palmer v. Miller, 380 Ill. 256, 260; Simaitis v. Thrash, 25 Ill. App.2d 340, 351.) The owner is thus under a duty to control the operation of the owned vehicle and is chargeable with his own negligence, not the negligence of the driver, in the performance of that duty. ( Scott v. Valentine, 268 N.E.2d 485, 487; Staken v. Shanle, 23 Ill. App.2d 269, 279.

Does a sleeping owner of an automobile still possess a viable right of control over the driver? Whether that right of control has been abandoned ( Simaitis v. Thrash, 25 Ill. App.2d 340, 166 N.E.2d 306, 311), or whether he has "loaned" the car to Fisher ( Hartley v. Miller, supra,), or whether Fisher is now a bailee of the auto ( Virginia Ry. Power Co. v. Gorsuch, supra), to hold that Babington, while asleep, still possessed control of the automobile appears to us to tax credulity to the breaking point. There was no business enterprise, for it never existed; there was no control, for it had passed from Babington's exercisable possession.