Silverman v. State of N.Y

6 Citing cases

  1. Fischer v. MMRR Construction Corp.

    204 A.D.2d 681 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994)   Cited 2 times

    This prior order was affirmed by this Court (see, Chemical Bank v. MMRR Constr. Corp., 169 A.D.2d 699). The general rule is that: "when land is taken for public use, the damages awarded are to take the place of the land in respect to all the rights and interests which were dependent upon and incident to it" (Utter v. Richmond, 112 N.Y. 610, 613, quoted in Daniel v. Soben Equities Corp., 23 A.D.2d 228, 230; see also, Copp v. Sands Point Marina, 17 N.Y.2d 291). After title to property has been taken by the sovereign in a condemnation proceeding, "the law substitutes the condemnation award for the security previously provided by the mortgage" (Copp v. Sands Point Marina, supra, at 293, citing Muldoon v. Mid-Bronx Holding Corp., 287 N.Y. 277; see also, Matter of Dorodea S. Bldg. Co. v. State of New York, 171 A.D.2d 866; Levine v. State of New York, 106 A.D.2d 709; Silverman v. State of New York, 48 A.D.2d 413; Matter of Silverman v. Lefkowitz, 41 A.D.2d 442; Holman v. Newton, 275 App. Div. 513; Matter of Lafayette Natl. Bank, 254 App. Div. 207; 51 N.Y. Jur 2d, Eminent Domain, § 140). The order now appealed from, as well as the dictum contained in the prior decision and order of the Supreme Court quoted above, are perfectly consistent with this general principle.

  2. Matter of County of Rockland

    172 A.D.2d 607 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991)   Cited 1 times

    Moreover, we note that in any event, the parties stipulated prior to commencement of the valuation trial that the proceeds of the condemnation award would be used in part to satisfy the unpaid taxes due upon the condemnee's parcel. Further, we find no reason in law or equity why interest should not be awarded to the condemnor upon the portion of the condemnation award to which the equitable lien attached (see, Matter of City of New York [Brookfield Refrig. Corp. Zoloto], 58 N.Y.2d 532; Becker v. Huss Co., 43 N.Y.2d 527, 542-543; Irving Trust Co. v. Hughes, supra; see also, Silverman v. State of New York, 48 A.D.2d 413). In this regard, we note that the condemnee was compensated for any delay in receiving its condemnation award by the interest on the portion of the award to which it was entitled.

  3. Rosemont v. Maywood-Proviso St. Bank

    149 Ill. App. 3d 1087 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)   Cited 9 times
    Assuming enforceability

    However, several outside jurisdictions which have considered the issue have held that the mortgagor is relieved of a contractual duty to render a prepayment penalty to a mortgagee when the terms of the parties' agreement do not explicitly provide that such payment shall be made in the event the mortgagor is forced to sell its property. Landohio Corp. v. Northwestern Mutual Life Mortgage Realty Investors (N.D. Ohio 1976), 431 F. Supp. 475; Associated Schools, Inc. v. Dade County (Fla. App. 1968), 209 So.2d 489; Jala Corp. v. Berkley Savings Loan Association (1969), 104 N.J. Super. 394, 250 A.2d 150; Silverman v. State of New York (1975), 48 A.D.2d 413, 370 N.Y.S.2d 234; see also In re Brooklyn Bridge Southwest Urban Renewal Project (1965), 46 Misc.2d 558, 260 N.Y.S.2d 229. • 1 In construing specific provisions of a mortgage agreement and promissory note, the court's primary objective is to give effect to the intent of the parties. ( Wheeling Trust Savings Bank v. Citizens National Bank (1986), 142 Ill. App.3d 333, 491 N.E.2d 866.)

  4. Matter of 124 Ferry St. Realty v. Lefkowitz

    70 A.D.2d 1025 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979)

    The authorization specified December 1, 1968 as the beginning date for a rental fee and it appears that actually the petitioner paid some amounts directly to the State for rentals, but as of October 15, 1971, the sum of $27,000 represented the accrued rentals. On October 15, 1971 the State made an additional advance payment of $59,350 from which it deducted the sum of $27,000 to be retained "without interest" for the rental fees. Subsequently, this court, on May 31, 1973, affirmed a judgment directing the Comptroller of the State of New York to pay the withheld sum of $27,000 to the mortgagees (Matter of Silverman v. Lefkowitz, 41 A.D.2d 442). On June 12, 1975 this court affirmed a Court of Claims award of $506,184 as the total damages payable for the appropriation (124 Ferry St. Realty Corp. v. State of New York, 48 A.D.2d 959), and on July 2, 1975 this court finally determined a limited appeal by the mortgagees from the Court of Claims award in satisfaction of their lien (Silverman v. State of New York, 48 A.D.2d 413). The Department of Audit and Control and/or the Comptroller has deducted from the petitioner's final award not only the authorized rental fee of $27,000, but also seeks to deduct interest on the monthly rental fee of $1,800 on and after the first day of each and every month of accrual for an additional deduction of $10,237.50. The further deduction of $2,882.

  5. 54-30 43rd St., LLC v. State

    38 Misc. 3d 1224 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 2012)   Cited 2 times

    The bank-mortgagee seeks “that amount necessary to pay all amounts owed to Mortgagee under the Loan Documents for non-default and default interest, the negative tax escrow balance, prepayment consideration, late charges and fees and costs, and to satisfy Mortgagee's first priority lien” ( see p. 3, ¶ a of the Bank's Response dated August 20, 2012). As for prepayment of the mortgage brought about by the appropriation, such is not a voluntary prepayment, a distinction made by the Third Department in Silverman v. State of New York (48 A.D.2d 413 [3d Dept 1975] ), and accordingly, the bank is not entitled to any amount for prepayment.SeeEDPL § 702(A)(2), which provides that the condemnor shall reimburse the condemnee for any penalty incurred for pre-payment of the existing mortgage.

  6. Northwestern Ins v. Uniondale

    11 Misc. 3d 980 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006)   Cited 29 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Analyzing various clauses from other cases that make clear that "[t]he premium or its equivalent becomes due upon default and acceleration, or may become due upon exercise of an option."

    The court concludes that the latter-quoted clause is intended to prevent evasion of the premium required for prepayment simply on grounds that a default and acceleration have occurred, or that the prepayment is involuntary. Those instances where a prepayment is considered involuntary, e.g., a sale in condemnation, are not at issue here ( see Silverman v. State of New York, 48 AD2d 413, 414 [3d Dept 1975]). The function indicated by the language used, particularly the word "evasion" which means "to escape or avoid, especially by cunning or trickery" (Word-Perfect dictionary), is to prevent avoidance of the premium by an intentional default.