This rule is in accord with cases in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Texas Mortgage Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 470 F.2d 497 (5th Cir. 1972); Crommelin v. Fain, 403 So.2d 177 (Ala. 1981); Carbine v. Meyer, 126 Cal.App.2d 386, 272 P.2d 849 (1954); Morrison v. Clark, 89 Me. 103, 35 A. 1034 (1896); Burnham v. Baltimore Gas Electric Co., 217 Md. 507, 144 A.2d 80 (1958); Silverman v. Betti, 222 Mass. 142, 109 N.E. 947 (1915); Benjamin v. American Telephone Telegraph Co., 196 Mass. 454, 82 N.E. 681 (1907); Palmer v. Palmer, 150 N.Y. 139, 44 N.E. 966 (1896); Ecenbarger v. Lesoine, 438 A.2d 969 (Pa.Super. 1981). The reason for the rule announced in the cited cases derives from the fact that while a cotenant has a right, on a partition, to a share of the common estate, he has no right to demand any particular part thereof.

Knowledge by the plaintiff that his mother from time to time for the last twenty years sold small quantities of gravel, the proceeds of which were used for her own purposes or for the payment of taxes without objection from him, did not require a finding that he had authorized her as his agent to contract with the defendants for the removal within ten years of the gravel and loam contained in thirty acres at the rate of $400 an acre, a transaction in which the mother did not purport to represent anyone except herself and which the plaintiff did not ratify. He sought, practically as soon as he learned of it, an injunction and damages. Weld v. Oliver, 21 Pick. 559. Benjamin v. American Telephone Telegraph Co. 196 Mass. 454. Silverman v. Betti, 222 Mass. 142. Clapp v. Atwood, 300 Mass. 540. 25 Harv. L. Rev. 741. One cotenant cannot be bound by the unauthorized acts of another cotenant.

In answer to the first question, it is settled that a grant by one tenant in common which is not of an undivided share but which purports to bind the entire title in the land or in some specified portion of the land, whatever effect it may have against the grantor or his share by estoppel or otherwise, is void or voidable when confronted with the title of a cotenant who has not joined in or ratified the grant. Brown v. Bailey, 1 Met. 254, 257. DeWitt v. Harvey, 4 Gray, 486, 491. Tainter v. Cole, 120 Mass. 162, 164. Barnes v. Boardman, 157 Mass. 479, 480. This rule was applied to grants of easements in Clark v. Parker, 106 Mass. 554, 557, Baker v. Willard, 171 Mass. 220, 226, Hazen v. Mathews, 184 Mass. 388, 393, Benjamin v. American Telephone Telegraph Co. 196 Mass. 454, and Silverman v. Betti, 222 Mass. 142, 145. There is nothing in the nature of the easement here attempted or in the fact that in the case of a beach like this rights substantially similar to such an easement might have been created by a conveyance of an undivided interest in the fee which takes this case out of the rule. Nor is there in the evidence anything which shows error of law in the judge's finding that the use of the beach by the respondents' immediate predecessor in title was permissive only and not the result of ratification of the easement by the tenants in common who did not join in the grant, even if we assume that ratification could be accomplished without a deed. It follows that the alleged easement never became an encumbrance upon the title of the nongranting tenants in common, and that they and their successors are entitled to registration free from such easement.

Robt. Moorman and Lyles Lyles, for appellant, cite: No restriction placed on character of instrumentalitiesto be used in logging: 221 Fed. 402; Deedwill be construed against grantor: 13 Cyc. 609; 2 Strob. 156; 12 Mill, 198. Cotenant has right to grant right ofway: 70 S.C. 531; 35 S.C. 146; Purchaser protected indealing with one cotenant held out by others as the owner: 84 S.C. 426; 67 S.C. 43; Estoppel; 57 S.C. 279; 72 S.C. 69; 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., Sec. 804. Mr. Halcott P. Green, for respondent, cites: Operationof railroad and skidder not permitted unless expressly contractedfor: 99 S.C. 158; Negotiations merged in subsequentcontracts: 69 S.C. 93; 24 S.C. 124; Right to partitiontimber: 81 S.C. 492; 2 Strob. Eq. 145; 84 S.C. 505; Tenant in common without consent of cotenants cannotgrant right of way: Ann. Cas. 1918c, 90; 222 Mass. 142; 69 S.C. 176; 33 S.C. 175; 106 Am. St. Rep. 750; 49 Am. St. Rep. 741; Measure of damages: 112 S.C. 2; Ann. Cas. 1918 B, 580; 204 Fed. 166; To what extent newcontract operates as discharge: 3 Page Conts. 2076, Sec. 1340; 51 Fed. 113; 63 N.E. 67; 94 Fed. 385; 155 U.S. 303; 9 Cyc. 595e; 102 S.C. 130. July 25, 1922.

The judgment should also declare explicitly that the 1979 and 1984 deeds are null and void. To avoid any possible question concerning the efficacy of a deed creating an easement, executed by only one of two or more individuals holding undivided partial interests in a servient estate (see Adam v. Briggs Iron Co., 7 Cush. 361, 366-370 [1851]; Clark v. Parker, 106 Mass. 554, 557 [1871]; Silverman v. Betti, 222 Mass. 142, 145-146 [1915]; Clapp v. Atwood, 300 Mass. 540, 542 [1938]), it is advisable also to amend the judgment to call for the confirmatory deed or deeds to take the form of a conveyance by both parties to the wife in fee, subject to the easement reserved for the life of the husband. The judgment is to be amended as indicated in part 5 of this opinion and, as so amended, is affirmed.