With no operative complaint, Plaintiff's motion for equitable and declaratory relief and a preliminary and permanent injunction is denied as moot. Silvas v. G.E. Money Bank, 449 Fed.Appx. 641, 645 (9th Cir. 2011); Performance Designed Prod. LLC v. Plantronics, Inc., No. 3:19-CV-00536-GPC-LL, 2019 WL 3082160, at *8 (S.D. Cal. July 15, 2019). III. ORDER

As such, there is no operative complaint in this case and plaintiff's motions for preliminary injunction are premature. See Andrews v. United States, No. 1:22-cv-01290 ADA CDB (PC), 2023 WL 4637100, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jul. 20, 2023); see also Silva v. G.E. Money Bank, 449 Fed.Appx. 641, 645 (9th Cir. 2011); Springfield v. Hudson, No. 2:22-cv-0328 DAD CKD P, 2023 WL 1767712, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2023) (“A motion for preliminary injunction is rendered moot by the dismissal of the complaint.”).

15, 2019) (motion for preliminary injunction rendered moot by dismissal of operative complaint with leave to amend); Silvas v. G.E. Money Bank, 449 Fed.Appx. 641, 645 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Because the operative complaint has been dismissed, we dismiss this interlocutory appeal [for preliminary injunctive relief] as moot.”).

Because no operative complaint is on file, plaintiff cannot demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of any claim, and his motion should be denied. See, e.g., Silvas v. G.E. Money Bank, 449 F. App'x 641, 645 (9th Cir. 2011) ("Because the operative complaint has been dismissed, we dismiss this interlocutory appeal [for preliminary injunctive relief] as moot."). Plaintiff's motion demonstrates that he seeks injunctive relief as to all of the defendants named in his now-dismissed complaint, but the complaint was dismissed because plaintiff improperly attempted to raise unrelated claims against unrelated defendants.

Because no operative complaint is on file, plaintiff cannot demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of any claim, and his motion must be denied. See, e.g., Silvas v. G.E. Money Bank, 449 F. App'x 641, 645 (9th Cir. 2011) ("Because the operative complaint has been dismissed, we dismiss this interlocutory appeal [for preliminary injunctive relief] as moot.").

With no operative complaint, Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction must be denied as moot. See, e.g. Red Eyed Jacks Sports Bar Inc. v. City of San Diego, No. 14-CV-0823-L RBB, 2014 WL 3015189, at *1 (S.D. Cal. July 3, 2014) (motion for preliminary injunction denied as moot in light of dismissal of operative complaint); Silvas v. G.E. Money Bank, 449 F. App'x 641, 645 (9th Cir. 2011) ("Because the operative complaint has been dismissed, we dismiss this interlocutory appeal [for preliminary injunctive relief] as moot.").

In addition to her failure to prove a likelihood of success on the merits, the Court finds that Ms. Wright is also barred from equitable relief by the doctrine of unclean hands. Silvas v. G.E. Money Bank, 449 F. App'x 641, 644 (9th Cir. 2011). In Silvas, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction to prevent foreclosure based on the doctrine of unclean hands, noting that the Plaintiff "wishes to continue to live in her house, but she has not offered to make any payments on her loan, she did not tender any payments when she sought rescission, nor is she able to repay the loan at this time."

Moreover, Plaintiff "did not make any showing of due diligence to discover the contents of h[is] loan documents." Silvas v. G.E. Money Bank, 449 F. App'x 641, 644 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Pedersen v. Greenpoint Mortg. Funding, Inc., 900 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1079 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (noting that a plaintiff seeking equitable tolling must allege "specific facts explaining the failure to learn the basis for the claim within the statutory period); Jacon v. Aurora Loan Servs., No. 10-1789 SC, 2010 WL 2673128, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 2, 2010) (cautioning that a plaintiff cannot rely on the same factual allegations to both show a violation of the federal statute and to toll the limitations period of that statute). The Court GRANTS Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's TILA claim without prejudice. Out of an abundance of caution, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend his TILA claim.

Her submission makes clear, however, that defendant's "no cause" eviction was issued on July 15, 2014. As such, plaintiff's claim appears to be time-barred. 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A); see also Silvas v. G.E. Money Bank, 449 Fed.Appx. 641, 644 (9th Cir. 2011) (statute of limitations barred FHA claim where it was based on a "one-time act" that occurred more than two years prior to the filing of the complaint and there was no indication the "claim should be equitably tolled") (citations omitted). Because she received immediate notice of the "no cause" eviction, the fact that plaintiff continues to suffer adverse emotional consequences from defendant's allegedly wrongful conduct is insufficient to toll her claim.

Plaintiffs obtained the loan on March 3, 2010, but did not bring their TILA claim until May 29, 2015, over four years too late. Although Plaintiffs allege that the statute of limitations should be tolled because Defendants did not provide the required disclosures, (Compl. ¶ 140), this conclusory statement relates only to the basis of a TILA claim, and does not present a valid reason to toll the statute of limitations. See Silvas v. G.E. Money Bank, 449 F. App'x 641, 644 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding that equitable tolling under TILA is not appropriate when a plaintiff fails to "make any showing of due diligence to discover the contents of [the] loan documents."). Plaintiffs' TILA claim will therefore be dismissed.