Opinion
A146622
11-15-2017
CHRISTOPHER SILVA, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. FRY'S ELECTRONICS, INC., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. MSC1500903)
Defendant Fry's Electronics, Inc. (Fry's) seeks review of an order denying its petition to compel arbitration of various claims asserted against it in this putative class action. The issue presented is whether an arbitration agreement signed by plaintiff Christopher Silva, which excludes "any matter within the jurisdiction of the Labor Commissioner," covers Silva's claims for (1) unlawful deductions from wages, (2) failure to pay overtime compensation, (3) illegal record keeping, (4) failure to pay compensation when due at time of separation of employment, and (5) unfair competition. Fry's argues that "any matter within the jurisdiction of the Labor Commissioner" means only claims already filed with the Labor Commissioner, as opposed to any claims that could be brought before the Labor Commissioner. We disagree with Fry's' interpretation and therefore affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Fry's employed Silva from 2007 to 2010. About one year into his employment, Silva signed an arbitration agreement (Arbitration Agreement) dated April 2, 2008. The relevant provision stated that Silva and Fry's "hereby agree that any and all disputes between Associate and Employer arising from or in any way related to Associate's employment by Employer, including but not limited to, claims for damages and violation of laws and regulations related to harassment, wrongful termination, or discrimination (excluding claims for workers' compensation, unemployment insurance, administrative claims with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission [EEOC] or any parallel state or local agency, and any matter within the jurisdiction of the Labor Commissioner) shall be determined and decided by final and binding arbitration pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act [FAA], or if inapplicable, the applicable state law." (Italics added.)
Fry's argues in its opening brief that the Arbitration Agreement is subject to the FAA, a point Silva appears to concede. We agree that the FAA governs. (See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams (2001) 532 U.S. 105, 109, 111-113 [FAA covers all employment contracts (excepting those of transportation workers) where the employment contract evidences a transaction involving interstate commerce].)
On May 19, 2015, Silva filed a class action complaint against Fry's, alleging claims for (1) unlawful deductions from wages (Lab. Code, §§ 221, 223), (2) failure to pay overtime compensation (Lab. Code, §§ 510, 558, 1194), (3) illegal record keeping (Lab. Code, §§ 226, 1174), (4) failure to pay compensation when due at time of separation of employment (Lab. Code, §§ 201-203), and (5) unfair competition (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.). Fry's moved to compel arbitration of Silva's individual claims and to dismiss his class claims.
The trial court ruled that none of the claims is covered by the arbitration obligation. According to the court, "[t]he language of the Arbitration Agreement is clear and explicit: any matter within the jurisdiction of the Labor Commissioner is not within the ambit of the Arbitration Agreement's mandatory arbitration provision." The court relied on Rebolledo v. Tilly's, Inc. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 900 (Rebolledo) to explain that all of Silva's claims fell under the jurisdiction of the Labor Commissioner because "the Labor Commissioner has jurisdiction to determine if there has been a violation of the Labor Code." In response to Fry's' argument that at least the fifth claim, alleging a Business and Professions Code violation, was subject to the mandatory arbitration provision, the court noted that "the [Business and Professions Code section] 17200 claim, as pled, is entirely dependent on Silva's proving a violation of the Labor Code."
Additionally, the trial court noted the Arbitration Agreement excluded only types of disputes, not particular claims. The court thus rejected Fry's' argument that Silva's claims were not exempt from arbitration because they were time-barred from being filed with the Labor Commissioner. Although the court declined to decide whether Silva's claims were indeed timely, it observed their timeliness was "irrelevant to the question presently before the Court: whether the dispute between Fry's and Silva must be arbitrated."
Concluding the Arbitration Agreement excluded all of Silva's claims, the trial court denied Fry's' petition. Accordingly, the court did not address Fry's' contention that Silva's putative class claims should be dismissed on the ground that the parties did not agree to arbitrate disputes brought on behalf of other employees. This timely appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review and Relevant Legal Principles
" 'A trial court must grant a petition to compel arbitration "if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists." [Citations.] There is, however, "no public policy in favor of forcing arbitration of issues the parties have not agreed to arbitrate." [Citation.] Thus, in ruling on a motion to compel arbitration, the court must first determine whether the parties actually agreed to arbitrate the dispute. [Citations.] General principles of California contract law guide the court in making this determination. [Citations.]' [Citation.]" (Rebolledo, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 912.)
" ' "Ordinarily, we review a denial of a petition to compel arbitration for abuse of discretion. [Citation.] However, where the trial court's denial of a petition to arbitrate presents a pure question of law, we review the order de novo. [Citation.]" [Citations.]' [Citation.] In this case . . . the trial court's ruling was based on its legal interpretation of the arbitration agreements. Accordingly, our review is de novo." (Rebolledo, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 912.)
There is a "strong public policy in favor of arbitration as a speedy and relatively inexpensive means of dispute resolution. [Citations.]" (Ericksen et al. v. 100 Oak Street (1983) 35 Cal.3d 312, 322; see also Rebolledo, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 912; Serpa v. California Surety Investigations, Inc. (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 695, 701.) "This case requires the court to balance the general policy favoring arbitration against ordinary principles of contract, which require that agreements be interpreted to reflect the intent of the parties." (Victoria v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 734, 738 (Victoria).)
Our aim in deciding whether a dispute must be arbitrated is "to ensure that commercial arbitration agreements, like other contracts, ' "are enforced according to their terms," ' [citation], and according to the intentions of the parties, [citation]. [Citation.]" (First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan (1995) 514 U.S. 938, 947.) "In line with these principles, courts must place arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts[.]" (AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U.S. 333, 339, citation omitted.)
"The basic goal of contract interpretation is to give effect to the parties' mutual intent at the time of contracting. [Citations.] When a contract is reduced to writing, the parties' intention is determined from the writing alone, if possible. [Citation.] 'The words of a contract are to be understood in their ordinary and popular sense.' [Citations.] [¶] . . . [¶] California recognizes the objective theory of contracts [citation], under which '[i]t is the objective intent, as evidenced by the words of the contract, rather than the subjective intent of one of the parties, that controls interpretation' [citation]. The parties' undisclosed intent or understanding is irrelevant to contract interpretation. [Citations.]" (Founding Members of the Newport Beach Country Club v. Newport Beach Country Club, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 944, 955-956.)
"In cases of uncertainty . . . the language of a contract should be interpreted most strongly against the party who caused the uncertainty to exist." (Civ. Code, § 1654; see Victoria, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 745.) On the other hand, public policy compels us, within reason, to interpret ambiguous language in favor of arbitration when deciding the enforceability and scope of arbitration agreements. (Pearson Dental Supplies, Inc. v. Superior Court (2010) 48 Cal.4th 665, 682 (Pearson) ["[w]hen an arbitration provision is ambiguous, we will interpret that provision, if reasonable, in a manner that renders it lawful"]; Moses H. Cone Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp. (1983) 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (Moses) ["any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration"].) "This court must apply these basic principles to determine whether [Silva's] causes of action fall within the scope of the arbitration clause." (Victoria, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 739.)
B. Jurisdiction of the Labor Commissioner
" 'The Labor Code generally gives the [Labor Commissioner] the authority to enforce the provisions of the Labor Code and all state labor laws the enforcement of which is not specifically vested in any other officer, board, or commission. ([Lab. Code,] §§ 21, 79, 82, 95.)' " (Rebolledo, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at pp. 915-916, citing Noble v. Draper (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1, 12-13 (Noble); see Lab. Code, § 95, subd. (a).) "When an employee's claim falls 'within the jurisdiction' of the commissioner, the employee has the option of filing [it] before the commissioner or in superior court. [Citation.] The employee has two forums for bringing such claims. Moreover, parties can agree to arbitrate statutory wage claims regardless of the chosen forum. [Citations.]" (Rebolledo, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 917.)
Labor Code section 98 describes the remedial procedures available to the Labor Commissioner, including to "provide for a hearing in any action to recover wages, penalties, and other demands for compensation," and to "provide for a hearing to recover civil penalties due pursuant to [Labor Code] Section 558 against any employer or other person acting on behalf of an employer." (Lab. Code, § 98, subd. (a).) Labor Code section 98.3, subdivision (b), also permits the Labor Commissioner to prosecute actions including those "for the collection of wages and other moneys payable to employees . . . arising out of an employment relationship."
The administrative hearing procedure authorized by Labor Code section 98 et seq. is " ' "commonly known as the 'Berman' hearing procedure after the name of its [legislative] sponsor." ' " (Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1109, 1128.)
"Certain employment matters cannot be considered by the Labor Commissioner. The commissioner has the duty to determine if the employee's claim falls within his or her jurisdiction before proceeding forward. . . . Some examples of employment matters that do not fall within the jurisdiction of the Labor Commissioner are (1) claims involving bankruptcies or probate; (2) claims involving mechanics, loggers, or miners; (3) preferred wage claims in assignment for the benefit of creditors; (4) discrimination and retaliation complaints under sections 98.6, 132a, 432.2, 6310-6312; or (5) matters where criminal or civil citations are issued such as for child labor law violations, unlicensed contractors, payday violations, welfare benefits, etc. [Citation.]" (Rebolledo, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 915, citations omitted.)
C. The Trial Court Properly Concluded the Arbitration Agreement Expressly Excludes Silva's Claims
"In ruling on a motion to compel arbitration, we need only determine whether the parties actually agreed to arbitrate this particular kind of dispute." (Rebolledo, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 918.) Silva and Fry's do not dispute the enforceability of the Arbitration Agreement, but they disagree on its interpretation. Accordingly, we examine solely whether Silva's claims are exempt from the arbitration obligation.
1. Rebolledo Controls
We agree with the trial court that Rebolledo is directly on point. There, interpreting language nearly identical to the language here, the appellate court affirmed the denial of a petition to compel arbitration of the employee's putative class action claims. (Rebolledo, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at pp. 905-908.) The court concluded the parties' agreement expressly excluded " 'matters governed by' and 'matter[s] within the jurisdiction' of the California Labor Commissioner." (Id. at p. 908.) All claims alleged in the complaint, including not only Labor Code violations but also violations of the unfair competition law (UCL) (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200), were found to fall within the jurisdiction of the Labor Commissioner. (Rebolledo, supra, at p. 916.)
Analogous to the Arbitration Agreement between Silva and Fry's, the language at issue in Rebolledo stated, " 'In the event mediation does not resolve the parties' dispute, Employee and [Employer] agree to submit all disputes arising from employment (excepting workers' compensation claims, unemployment insurance[,] and matters governed by the California Labor Commissioner), including but not limited to breach of contract, wrongful termination, violation of public policy, discrimination, and harassment to binding arbitration . . . .' " (Rebolledo, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 907, italics added.) A later paragraph reiterated these exceptions but replaced the phrase "matters governed by the California Labor Commissioner" with " 'any matter within the jurisdiction of the California Labor Commissioner.' " (Id. at p. 908.) The appellate court noted that "[i]n drafting the agreement, Employer treated the two phrases as being interchangeable." (Ibid.)
We reject the attempt by Fry's to distinguish Rebolledo. Fry's argues the exclusions from the arbitration obligation in Rebolledo were "much more expansive than the carve-out in the instant case" because the arbitration agreement there used the phrase "matters governed by" the Labor Commissioner in addition to the phrase "matter[s] within the jurisdiction of." Fry's contends that Rebolledo's holding was based on the "governed by" language instead of the "within the jurisdiction of" language common to the Arbitration Agreement here. We find no support for that position.
Noting the "Employer treated the two phrases as being interchangeable," the Rebolledo court itself did not attach weight to any distinction between "governed by" and "within the jurisdiction of." (Rebolledo, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 908.) We interpret those words, in their "ordinary and popular sense" (Civ. Code, § 1644), to have not only the same meaning, but also the meaning Silva offers: that whether a claim is "governed by" or "within the jurisdiction of" the Labor Commissioner does not depend on whether an employee has already filed it with the Labor Commissioner.
Further confirmation of the Rebolledo court's equating "governed by" with "within the jurisdiction of" is found in its aligning of the "2001 Agreement" and the "2004 Agreement," the two arbitration contracts at issue in that case. (Rebolledo, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at pp. 921-922 ["The 2004 Agreement repeated the same arbitration obligation, albeit with less detail"].) While the 2001 Agreement contained both phrases, the 2004 Agreement only used "within the jurisdiction of." (Id. at pp. 907-909.) Nevertheless, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's ruling that "both agreements 'expressly exclude[d] "any matter within the jurisdiction of the California Labor Commissioner." ' The [trial] court determined this provision was broadly written to include any statutory wage claim not actually filed with the Labor Commissioner, as long as the claim theoretically could have fallen within the Labor Commissioner's authority." (Id. at p. 913.) In fact, the appellate court quoted the trial court in noting that "[t]he Labor Commissioner's jurisdiction is not limited to claims filed by a [l]itigant." (Id. at p. 911.)
Since we are not aware of any other case that directly addresses the issue here, we analyze the reasoning in Rebolledo and then apply its ruling to the facts.
In Rebolledo, similar to the instant case, the issue was "simply a matter of contract interpretation." (Rebolledo, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 916.) Rejecting the employer's assertion that "within the jurisdiction" meant only claims actually filed with the Labor Commissioner, rather than all claims that could be filed with the Labor Commissioner, the Rebolledo court concluded "a matter within the jurisdiction need not be actually brought before the Labor Commissioner." (Id. at p. 920.) The court reasoned that "the ordinary meaning of the phrases at issue clearly relates to defining the nature of a claim, not where it is adjudicated. Indeed, to adopt Employer's interpretation we would have to ignore the portion of the agreement defining the exempted claims as 'matters governed' by the Labor Commissioner because this terminology does not suggest a particular forum of litigation, only a type of subject matter." (Id. at p. 917.) The court pointed out that "[i]f Employer intended to exclude only statutory wage claims brought in one forum over another it could have narrowly drafted and defined the phrases" to indicate that intention. (Id. at p. 918.)
The Rebolledo court also found no merit to the employer's argument that the trial court's interpretation of the language was unreasonable because it created a contradiction within the agreement. (Rebolledo, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 920.) The employer there emphasized that "the parties expressly agreed to arbitrate discrimination and wrongful termination claims, yet these types of claims could also qualify as Labor Code violations, falling within the Labor Commissioner's jurisdiction and exempted from arbitration." (Ibid.) The employer thus asserted " 'the only consistent and sensible interpretation of the [agreement] is to permit [the employee] to seek administrative relief for claims actually initiated to the Labor Commissioner, not excluding from the agreement any claim that could be brought before the Labor Commissioner.' " (Ibid.) Following general principles of contract interpretation, the court observed that "any inconsistency would be of Employer's own making as the drafter of the agreement[,] and it is not a reason to stray from the usual and ordinary meaning of the language stated in the agreement. More importantly, when there are conflicting clauses the more specific clause controls the more general." (Ibid.)
2. The Arbitration Agreement Unambiguously Excludes All Claims of the Type That Could Be Brought Before the Labor Commissioner
Fry's maintains that "when the clause at issue here is read in context, one can readily see that it was intended to exclude matters actually brought before the Labor Commissioner." But the ordinary meaning of the mandatory arbitration provision excludes "any matter within the jurisdiction of the Labor Commissioner" with no caveats regarding the forum in which the claim is filed. The language is unambiguous. To adopt the interpretation Fry's proposes, "[w]e would have to rewrite the agreement to expressly limit the exclusion to claims actually filed in a particular forum. This we cannot do." (Rebolledo, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 918.)
If Fry's' intention was in fact to exclude only claims brought in one forum over another, it could have, as the drafter, added the necessary language to the Arbitration Agreement. Fry's "could have narrowly drafted and defined the phrase[ ] . . . 'matter[ ] within the jurisdiction' to mean 'claims actually filed with the commissioner' or 'claims being litigated in a Berman hearing.' Alternatively, Employer could have clarified employee was agreeing to arbitrate 'statutory wage claims not brought before the Labor Commissioner.' " (Rebolledo, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 918.) Whatever meaning Fry's claims it intended to reflect in the Arbitration Agreement is irrelevant since "[t]he terms of a contract are determined by objective rather than by subjective criteria. The question is what the parties' objective manifestations of agreement or objective expressions of intent would lead a reasonable person to believe. [Citations.]" (Winograd v. American Broadcasting Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 624, 632.)
Arguing that its provision should be interpreted in context, Fry's claims the parties' intent to exclude only matters actually filed with the Labor Commissioner is "readily apparent" when read as "parallel to the other excepted categories, which are each types of claims that arguably are not properly the subject of a private arbitration agreement." Indeed, neither workers' compensation claims nor unemployment insurance claims can ever be arbitrated because the Workers' Compensation Act and the Unemployment Insurance Code, respectively, provide for exclusive administrative remedies for those types of claims. (Rebolledo, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 919.) But the mandatory arbitration provision also excludes "administrative claims with the [EEOC] or any parallel state or local agency," which are not barred from arbitration as a matter of law. (See E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House (2002) 534 U.S. 279, 297-298 [holding the EEOC may obtain remedies in court for an employee who agreed to arbitrate discrimination claims].)
Reasonably interpreted, the phrase "administrative claims with" the EEOC could refer to claims already filed with the EEOC, but the Arbitration Agreement then changes the phrasing for the final exclusion: "any matter within the jurisdiction of" the Labor Commissioner. (Italics added.) As discussed above, if Fry's, as the drafter, intended to exclude only claims already filed with the Labor Commissioner, it could have drawn that parallel by phrasing the final exclusion using identical language.
Nor are we persuaded by Fry's' argument that the trial court's interpretation violates the principle that "a contract will be interpreted to avoid internal inconsistencies." (See Davlar Corp. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1121, 1125, citation omitted; see Civ. Code, § 1653.) Here again echoing Rebolledo, Fry's argues that since claims for wrongful termination or discrimination could include claims for violations of the Labor Code but also are expressly included in the Arbitration Agreement, a reading of the mandatory arbitration provision as excepting all matters that could be brought before the Labor Commissioner would render the entire Arbitration Agreement contradictory. Although Civil Code section 1652 states "[r]epugnancy in a contract must be reconciled, if possible, by such an interpretation as will give some effect to the repugnant clauses," that principle is still limited to reasonable interpretation and "subordinate to the general intent and purpose of the whole contract." (Civ. Code, § 1652.)
As the Rebolledo court wrote, "Wrongful termination and discrimination claims do not just fall under the Labor Code. These claims may also be brought under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act [citation] and are arbitrable. [Citation.] Federal statutory discrimination claims . . . are also subject to arbitration. [Citation.] The parties could generally agree to arbitrate wrongful termination and discrimination claims, and also specifically exempt from arbitration Labor Code violations." (Rebolledo, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at pp. 920-921.)
Fry's correctly points out that we are bound to resolve "any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues . . . in favor of arbitration, [including] the construction of the contract language itself" (Moses, supra, 460 U.S. at pp. 24-25), but that principle does not alter our analysis. "The strong policy in favor of arbitration may not be used to permit a party to enforce provisions of an arbitration agreement that, as here, either do not exist or were so poorly drafted that another party cannot be presumed to have agreed to them. [Citation.]" (Thompson v. Toll Dublin, LLC (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1360, 1370.)
Finally, we reject Fry's' several attempts to suggest our decision about the scope of the issues covered in the Arbitration Agreement is governed by cases that hold arbitration agreements should be construed in a way that renders them enforceable. (See Pearson, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 682 ["in a manner that renders it lawful"]; Roman v. Superior Court (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1473 ["in a manner that renders it legal rather than void"].) Silva does not argue, and the trial court did not rule, that any portion of the Arbitration Agreement at issue here is unenforceable.
While there is some force to Fry's' argument that the trial court's interpretation of the Arbitration Agreement would "exclude[ ] the most common claims asserted against employers from arbitration," the ordinary and popular meaning of the clear language in the provision controls. In our view, the language plainly provides that all claims that could be filed with the Labor Commissioner are excluded from the arbitration obligation.
3. All of Silva's Claims Could Be Brought Before the Labor Commissioner
We agree with the trial court's conclusion that all of Silva's claims, including four claims pursuant to the Labor Code as well as the UCL claim, are excluded from the arbitration obligation, since they are within the categories of claims that can be filed with the Labor Commissioner.
We reject Fry's' contention that the Labor Commissioner lacks jurisdiction over Silva's claims because Silva already chose to file suit and because the claims are time-barred. Fry's argues that since the claims cannot now be filed with the Labor Commissioner, they are not within the jurisdiction of the Labor Commissioner. Although we need not address whether Silva's claims are timely, we observe that neither their alleged untimeliness nor their being filed in court affects whether the claims are of the type that fall within the jurisdiction of the Labor Commissioner.
The plain language of the Arbitration Agreement specifies only the subject matter of the types of claims that are excluded from arbitration, not their timeliness or the forum in which they are brought. "The phrases at issue served to define the type of exempted employment claims as including disputes an employee could have brought before the Labor Commissioner. The parties intended for employment disputes falling outside the scope of that definition to be arbitrated. We reject [Fry's'] strained interpretation that the language served to exclude wage claims based on the forum selected by the employee, i.e., excluding wage claims actually brought before the Labor Commissioner." (Rebolledo, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 917.)
Fry's also briefly argues that all UCL claims can never be filed with the Labor Commissioner as a matter of law because they are not in the Labor Code and are equitable in nature, but we find no authority to support that proposition.
We do not read Noble, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at page 16, upon which Fry's relies, to hold that UCL claims are outside the jurisdiction of the Labor Commissioner. The employees in Noble filed claims for unpaid wages with the Labor Commissioner and, subsequently, filed a separate civil action alleging various tort causes of action, including fraud, negligent misrepresentation, false advertising, and unfair business practices that predated their employment relationship. (Id. at pp. 6-7.) Their employer argued res judicata prevented the employees from pursuing their claims in a civil action because they had already chosen an administrative forum before the Labor Commissioner. (Id. at pp. 7-8.) The court disagreed, concluding the Labor Commissioner did not have jurisdiction to decide the employees' tort and UCL claims. (Id. at p. 17.)
The holding in Noble is distinguishable, however, because the UCL claims there were "derivative" of the alleged fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and false advertising. (Noble, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 10.) Unlike here, where the UCL cause of action alleges violations of the Labor Code, the tort and UCL claims in Noble "all ar[ose] from defendants allegedly inducing plaintiffs to enter an employment contract" which predated the employment relationship and therefore were outside of the jurisdiction of the Labor Commissioner. (See id. at pp. 12, 16.) The trial court, also rejecting Noble as instructive here, noted that "Fry's provides no directly applicable authority holding that the Labor Commissioner could not entertain a [Business and Professions Code section] 17200 claim that is entirely dependent on proving violations of the Labor Code."
We see no basis to distinguish Rebolledo, where all of the employee's claims, including a UCL claim based on Labor Code violations, were exempted from the arbitration obligation. (Rebolledo, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at pp. 915-916.) While, as Fry's points out, the Rebolledo court did not hold that a UCL claim is "within the jurisdiction of the Labor Commissioner, it noted that, "[b]y defining the type of excluded claims as being limited to 'matters governed by' or 'within the jurisdiction' of the commissioner, the parties intended to exclude employment claims alleging violations of the Labor Code or other state labor law. ([Lab. Code] Former § 21; §§ 79, 82, 95.)" (Rebolledo, at p. 917.) Reasoning that "[c]learly [Employee] sought enforcement of various Labor Code provisions and labor laws in her lawsuit," the court declined to order any of the employee's claims to arbitration. (Id. at p. 916.)
In this particular case, the UCL claim is derivative of alleged Labor Code violations that occurred during the parties' employment relationship. The substance of the UCL claim therefore falls within the exclusion. The Labor Commissioner has the authority to "provide for a hearing in any action to recover wages, penalties, and other demands for compensation" (Lab. Code, § 98, subd. (a)), and Silva's UCL claim, for which he seeks "equitable relief . . . including restitution of wages wrongfully withheld or labor taken without proper compensation," appears to fall within that authority as a demand for compensation. We do not think that someone signing the arbitration provision, giving it its ordinary meaning, would draw the distinction between substance and remedy that Fry's urges here.
All of Silva's claims, including the statutory wage claims and the UCL claim, are the type of claims that could be brought before the Labor Commissioner because they allege violations of the Labor Code. They are therefore excluded from the mandatory arbitration provision of the Arbitration Agreement.
III. DISPOSITION
Affirmed.
/s/_________
Streeter, J. We concur: /s/_________
Ruvolo, P.J. /s/_________
Rivera, J.