Opinion
No. 20A04-1008-CR-584
08-16-2011
PURL ROBERT SILK III, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE OF INDIANA, Appellee-Plaintiff.
APPELLANT PRO-SE : PURL ROBERT SILK III Westville, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE : GREGORY F. ZOELLER Attorney General of Indiana ANDREW R. FALK Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO-SE:
PURL ROBERT SILK III
Westville, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Attorney General of Indiana
ANDREW R. FALK
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
APPEAL FROM THE ELKHART SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable George W. Biddlecome, Judge
Cause No. 20D03-0107-CF-82
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BAKER , Judge
Appellant-petitioner Purl Robert Silk III appeals the denial of his petition to file a belated notice of appeal. Specifically, Silk argues that the trial court erred in refusing to admit affidavits into evidence and in denying the petition. Concluding that the affidavits were hearsay, and that Silk was not diligent in requesting permission to file a belated notice of appeal, we affirm the trial court's denial of Silk's petition.
FACTS
Silk was charged with murder in May 1995. In December 1995, he pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement with the State, which capped his sentence at forty-eight years. In January 1996, the trial court sentenced Silk to the forty-eight-year cap. In November 2000, Silk filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. In November 2002, Silk filed an amended pro se petition for post-conviction relief wherein he argued that 1) his guilty plea was not valid because it was induced by prior coerced confessions and by trial counsel's promises of leniency; 2) his confession was coereced by police misconduct; 3) the Indiana murder statute is unconstitutional; and 4) trial counsel was ineffective because he breached his duty to investigate, failed to act as a zealous and loyal advocate, coerced Silk into pleading guilty, and failed to challenge the constitutionality of the Indiana murder statute.
The post-conviction court denied Silk's petition, and Silk appealed pro se. This Court affirmed the denial, and the Indiana Supreme Court denied transfer. Appellant's App. p. 72. In March 2008, Silk filed a pro se motion for sentence modification, which the trial court denied. Specifically, the court explained that it was denying the modification because the "brutality of the attack on the defendant's victims militate[] against modification." Id. at 74. Silk has not included a copy of this motion or the order denying it in his Appendix. In February 2010, Silk filed a pro se petition for permission to file a belated notice of appeal, which the trial court denied in the following order:
2. At [Silk's] guilty plea hearing, the court specifically advised the defendant that by pleading guilty he was giving up the right to appeal his conviction. The court did not tell Defendant that he could not appeal his sentence.Id. at 24-28. The trial court denied Silk's motion and he appeals.
3. On January 25, 1995, Defendant was sentenced in accordance with the plea agreement to forty-eight (48) years incarceration at the Indiana Department of Correction.
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10. On November 9, 2004, the Indiana Supreme Court issued its opinion in Collins v. State, 817 N.E.2d 230 (Ind. 2004), in which the Court held that a challenge to a sentence imposed in an open plea must be raised by . . . a belated appeal pursuant to P-C.R. 2 if the time for appeal has expired. Collins, 817 N.E.2d at 233. Under P-C.R. 2, a defendant 1) must be without fault in the delay of filing a notice of appeal, and 2) must have been diligent in requesting permission to file a belated notice of appeal. . . .
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12. In the instant case, Defendant alleges that he was misadvised by trial counsel and the court that by signing a plea agreement he would be giving up all his rights to appeal. Defendant contends that, as a result, he did not timely appeal his sentence and is, therefore entitled to file a belated notice of appeal. It is true that at the time Petitioner entered his guilty plea, and when he was subsequently sentenced, he was not informed by the court of an affirmative right to appeal his sentence because Collins . . . had not yet been decided. He was not, however, expressly told he could not appeal his sentence, and was properly advised that his guilty plea effected a waiver of his right to appeal his conviction.
13. Although the fact that a trial court did not advise a defendant about his right to appeal a sentence can establish that the defendant was without fault in the filing of a tardy notice of appeal, a defendant must, nevertheless, establish his diligence. Whether the requisite diligence has been shown is a fact sensitive inquiry that varies from case to case. . . . In the current case, the court notes that Defendant has demonstrated familiarity with the legal system by filing his P. C.R. 1 petition for post conviction relief, an appeal of an adverse ruling on that petition, and a motion to modify his sentence. It is also notable that Collins . . . was decided in 2004, and the proper procedure for challenging sentences was made clear in Kling v. State, 837 N.E.2d 502 (Ind. 2005). Here, Defendant did not file his P-C.R. 2 VERIFIED PETITION FOR PERMISSION TO FILE A BELATED APPEAL until nearly five years later. Even under pre-Collins practice, Defendant cannot be said to have promptly challenged his sentence within a reasonable period of time. After the procedures for challenging a sentence imposed following an open plea were made clear in Kling, Defendant failed to promptly act to follow its dictates. . . .
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15. Defendant bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he was without fault in the delay of filing and was diligent in pursuing permission to file a belated motion to appeal. . . . Defendant has not met that burden.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION,
At the outset we note that a litigant who proceeds pro se is held to the same established rules of procedure that trained counsel is bound to follow. Hill v. State, 773 N.E.2d 336, 346 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). One of the risks that a defendant takes when he decides to proceed pro se is that he will not know how to accomplish all of the things that an attorney would know how to accomplish. Id. We now turn to the merits of Silk's appeal.
I. Affidavits
At the hearing on his petition, Silk asked the trial court to admit two affidavits into evidence. The affidavits were signed by prison law clerks from the Correctional Industrial Facility in Pendleton. Both clerks swore that they informed Silk in February 2010 that pursuant to Collins, he could challenge his sentence by obtaining permission to file a belated appeal. The State objected that the affidavits were inadmissible hearsay, and the trial court refused to admit them into evidence. Silk now argues that the trial court erred in excluding them.
A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the exclusion of evidence. Kimbrough v. State, 911 N.E.2d 621, 631 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Such a ruling will be disturbed on review only upon a showing of an abuse of that discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Id.
The State contends the affidavits are inadmissible hearsay because they are out-of-court statements offered to prove the truth of the matters asserted therein and not susceptible to cross-examination. We agree that the affidavits are hearsay, and the trial court did not err in excluding them from evidence. See Shumaker v. State, 523 N.E.2d 1381, 1382 (Ind. 1988) (holding that hearsay affidavit improperly admitted).
II. Denial of Petition
Silk also argues that the trial court erred in denying his petition to file a belated appeal. The decision whether to grant permission to file a belated appeal is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Moshenek v. State, 868 N.E.2d 419, 422 (Ind. 2007). We will affirm the trial court's ruling unless it was based on an error of law or a clearly erroneous factual determination. Id. at 424. The trial court is in a better position to weigh evidence, assess the credibility of witnesses, and draw inferences. Id.
Several years ago, in Collins, our Supreme Court resolved a conflict over whether challenges to a sentence imposed following an open plea must be brought in a direct appeal or in post-conviction proceedings pursuant to Post-Conviction Rule 1. Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the proper procedure is to file a direct appeal. Collins, 817 NE.2d at 233.
Collins noted that many trial courts had advised defendants that no direct appeal was available with respect to their sentences when they pleaded guilty. As such, the deadlines imposed by the appellate rules for filing a direct appeal had expired for many defendants. Collins held that an individual in such a situation could still look to Post-Conviction Rule 2, which permits an individual convicted after trial or guilty plea who fails to file a timely notice of appeal to petition for permission to file a belated notice of appeal. Id.
Here, Silk attempted to use the belated appeal procedure contemplated by P-C.R. 2. Although the rule permits an individual convicted after trial or a guilty plea who fails to file a timely notice of appeal to petition for permission to file a belated notice of appeal, receiving that permission requires the petitioner to make two showings by a preponderance of the evidence: 1) that the failure to file a timely notice of appeal is not the fault of the petitioner; and 2) that the petitioner has been diligent in requesting permission to file a belated notice of appeal. Id.
There are no set standards defining delay, and each case must be decided on its own facts. Baysinger v. State, 835 N.E.2d 223, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Factors affecting this determination include the defendant's level of awareness of his procedural remedy, age, education, familiarity with the legal system, whether he was informed of his appellate rights, and whether he committed an act or omission that contributed to the delay. Id.
For example, in Sholes v. State, 878 N.E.2d 1232 (Ind. 2008), Sholes pleaded guilty to three counts of murder and one count of attempted murder in 1997. He was sentenced to life in prison without parole. Id. One year later, in 1998, Sholes filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the trial court denied. This Court affirmed the denial in an unpublished memorandum decision. Id. In 2000, this Court granted Sholes's motion to file a successive petition for post-conviction relief, which was subsequently dismissed because of the defendant's failure to prosecute it. In May 2005, Sholes sought appointment of counsel to bring this belated appeal, and in 2006, the trial court granted him permission to file a belated notice of appeal under P-C.R. 2. In that appeal, Sholes requested that each of his sentences be vacated and that the case be remanded for a new sentencing hearing. On cross appeal, the State argued that the trial court erred in granting Sholes's petition because Sholes failed to establish diligence in pursuing his request for a belated appeal.
The Indiana Supreme Court noted that the trial court implicitly found Sholes was without fault in the delay because the sentencing court failed to expressly inform him that he could appeal the exercise of sentencing discretion. Id. at 1236. However, the Court further pointed out that although a trial court's failure to advise a defendant about this right can establish that he was without fault in the delay, a defendant must still establish diligence. Id.
In this regard, our Supreme Court noted that Sholes's 1998 petition for post-conviction relief did not challenge the trial court's discretion in sentencing him. Rather, his post-conviction claims consisted of ineffective assistance of counsel and the involuntariness of his guilty plea. Neither of these claims challenged the trial court's discretion in determining the term of years of Sholes's sentences.
In 2000, Sholes sought and eventually received permission to file a successive petition for post-conviction relief. Sholes claimed that he raised sentencing issues in his ninety-nine claim petition; however, that proceeding was subsequently dismissed due to Sholes's lack of diligence in prosecuting the claim. Our Supreme Court concluded that Sholes's claimed assertion of a sentencing issue in a proceeding dismissed due to his lack of prosecution did not satisfy the diligence requirement for bringing a belated appeal to challenge his term-of-years sentence.
Thus, for more than eight years from the date of Sholes's sentences in 1997 until 2006 when he sought permission to file his belated appeal, he failed to challenge his term-of-years sentence. Our Supreme Court concluded that Sholes failed to demonstrate that he was diligent in requesting permission to file a belated notice of appeal and that the trial court erred in granting his motion for permission to file a belated appeal of his sentence. Id. at 1237. Accordingly, the Court dismissed Sholes's appeal. Id.
Similarly, in Witt v. State, 867 N.E.2d 1279, (Ind. 2007), Witt pleaded guilty to murder and robbery and agreed to a sentence of life without parole in 1996. Witt was advised at the time of his sentencing that he could not appeal his sentence. During the following nine and one-half years, Witt did not seek direct or collateral review of his convictions or sentence. In May 2006, Witt filed a petition for permission to file a belated notice of appeal pursuant to P-C.R. 2, which the trial court granted.
On appeal, this Court noted that the fact that the trial court had advised Witt that he could not file a direct appeal for review of his sentence satisfied the first requirement of P-C. R. 2. Id. at 1282. Specifically, we found that Witt was not at fault for failing to pursue what he was told would be improper appellate procedure. Id. However, as to the second requirement, this Court concluded that there was nothing in the record of the proceedings suggesting that Witt had attempted to challenge his sentence until nine and one-half years after it was entered when he filed the petition at issue in this case. Id. Accordingly, as in Sholes, we concluded that Witt had failed to demonstrate that he was diligent in requesting permission to file a belated notice of appeal. Id.
Here, Silk was sentenced to forty-eight years in 1995. In 2008, Silk filed a pro se motion to modify his sentence. Two years later, Silk filed a pro se petition for permission to file a belated appeal. Thus, for more than thirteen years from the date of his sentence in 1995 until 2008 when he sought a sentence modification and 2010 when he sought permission to file a belated appeal, Silk failed to challenge his sentence. As did our Supreme Court in Sholes and Witt, we conclude that Silk failed to demonstrate he was diligent in requesting permission to file a belated notice of appeal. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Silk's petition.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. MAY, J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.