Opinion
Civil No. 02-1070 (JRT/FLN)
September 3, 2003
John E. Sperry, SPERRY LAW OFFICE, Eden Prairie, MN, for plaintiff
Michael Ryan, MURNANE, CONLIN, WHITE BRANDT, St. Paul, MN, for defendant
Stacy E. Cudd, MURNANE, CONLIN, WHITE BRANDT, St. Paul, MN, for defendant
Steven J. Kirsch, MURNANE, CONLIN, WHITE BRANDT, St. Paul, MN, for defendant
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Charles Sila ("Sila") is suing the defendant Sears, Roebuck and Company ("Sears") for negligence and gross negligence as a result of injuries he sustained while shopping at one of defendant's stores. This matter is now before the Court on Sears's motion for summary judgment. For the reasons discussed below, the Court denies the motion.
BACKGROUND
On May 11, 1996, Sila, then age 14, was shopping at a Sears store with his mother and brother. Sila approached an adjustable basketball hoop system, which was capable of being set at different heights. The hoop was set at approximately four to five feet from the floor. Sila placed his left hand on the backboard area and may have inadvertently pressed the backboard's adjustment system. The system's metal supporting structure moved down, severing the tip of Sila's left middle finger.
How this accident actually occurred is unclear from the record, and is naturally a matter of dispute between the parties.
Sila has sued for negligence and gross negligence, arguing that Sears failed to erect and maintain the hoop display in a reasonable and safe manner.
ANALYSIS
I. Standard of Review
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Summary judgment is not appropriate if the dispute about a material fact is genuine, that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. Summary judgment is to be granted only where the evidence is such that no reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
The moving party bears the burden of bringing forward sufficient evidence to establish that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The nonmoving party is entitled to the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts in the record. Vette Co. v. Aetna Casualty Surety Co., 612 F.2d 1076, 1077 (8th Cir. 1980). However, the nonmoving party may not merely rest upon allegations or denials in its pleadings, but it must set forth specific facts by affidavits or otherwise showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Forrest v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 285 F.3d 688, 691 (8th Cir. 2002).
II. Discussion
Sears claims that it is entitled to summary judgment because Sila cannot make out a prima facie case of negligence. Specifically, Sears contends that Sila's claims fail because he has not identified an expert on the subject of liability.
To prove his negligence claim, Sila must demonstrate: (1) a duty on the part of Sears; (2) breach of that duty; (3) that Sears's breach was the proximate cause of his injury; and (4) damages. Hudson v. Snyder Body, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 149, 157 (Minn. 1982); Block v. Target Stores, Inc., 458 N.W.2d 705, 711 (Minn.Ct.App. 1990). Sears concedes that as a storeowner, it has a duty to exercise reasonable care for the safety of its customers. See Jepson v. Country Club Market, Inc., 155 N.W.2d 279, 280 (Minn. 1967); Block, 458 N.W.2d at 157. A storekeeper is not an insurer of its customers' safety, but it must guard against consequences "that may be reasonably anticipated in the normal course of events." Block, 458 N.W.2d at 157. See Jepson, 155 N.W.2d at 280. More specifically, to ultimately prevail, Sila has the burden of proving either that Sears "caused the dangerous condition or that it knew, or should have known, that the condition existed." Ramirez v. Marketown Foods, No. C2-00-1736, 2001 WL 682732 at *2 (Minn.Ct.App. June 19, 2001) (quoting Messner v. Red Owl Stores, 57 N.W.2d 659, 662 (Minn. 1953)).
Expert testimony is not always necessary to establish negligence. Roettger v. United Hospitals of St. Paul, Inc., 380 N.W.2d 856, 860 (Minn.Ct.App. 1986) "The test of whether expert testimony is required is whether the matter to be dealt with is so esoteric that jurors of common knowledge and experience cannot form a valid judgment as to whether the conduct of the parties was reasonable." Id. (citation and internal quotation omitted). Expert testimony is necessary to establish the applicable standard of care if "it would be speculative for the factfinder to decide the issue of negligence without having the benefit of expert testimony on the standard of care. . . ." Atwater Creamery Co. v. Western Mutual Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271, 279 (Minn. 1985); Seaton v. County of Scott, 404 N.W.2d 396, 400 (Minn.Ct.App. 1987). See also In re Trusteeship of Williams, 591 N.W.2d 743, 748 (Minn.Ct.App. 1999) ("Generally, expert testimony is required to establish the standard of care and breach of that standard, unless the conduct can be evaluated by a jury in the absence of expert testimony.") "Whether an expert opinion is necessary to assist the trier of fact in determining whether the standard has been met is at the discretion of the trial court." Seaton, 404 N.W.2d at 399. See Kolosky v. Underground Contractors of Perham, Inc., No. C8-96-813, 1997 WL 30839 at *1 (Minn.Ct.App. Jan. 28, 1997).
Although Sears concedes that it bore a duty of reasonable care toward Sila, it argues that Sila must provide expert testimony as to what is the specific standard of care is for displaying sporting goods in department stores. Sears notes that Sila has identified no expert to testify on this subject, or as to breach or causation. Based on the authorities cited above, the question now before the Court is whether a jury could decide the ultimate question of negligence without resorting to speculation, based upon its members' common knowledge and experience.
Sears presents no authority holding that expert testimony is required to prove a negligence case like this one, involving a storekeeper. Although many courts have held that expert testimony is necessary to establish a standard of care, these cases generally deal with the professions or other "esoteric" subjects. See Blatz v. Allina Health Sys., 622 N.W.2d 376, 387 (Minn.Ct.App. 2001) ("When a claim [of negligence] is predicated on conduct subject to a professional standard of care, expert evidence is generally required. . . ."). See also Knuth v. Emergency Care Consultants, P.A., 644 N.W.2d 106, 111 (Minn.Ct.App. 2002) (holding that expert testimony is required in medical malpractice case); Shea v. Esensten, 622 N.W.2d 130, 135 (Minn.Ct.App. 2001) ("A plaintiff must offer expert medical testimony both to state the standard of medical care . . . and to establish that the defendant physician in fact departed from that standard."); Admiral Merchants Motor Freight, Inc. v. O'Connor Hannan, 494 N.W.2d 261, 266 (Minn. 1992) (holding that expert evidence is required to establish the standard of care in an attorney malpractice case).
The authorities that Sears does cite fail to support its contention that expert testimony is required here. These cases involve areas that are far more technical or esoteric than the circumstances of the present case. See, e.g., Gross v. Victoria Station Farms, Inc., 578 N.W.2d 757, 762 (Minn. 1998) (holding that expert testimony was required in medical malpractice case); Atwater, 366 N.W.2d at 279 (holding that expert testimony was required to establish standard of care regarding professional judgment of insurance agents, "a field that few lay persons know well"); Radel v. Bloom Lake Farms, 553 N.W.2d 109, 111 (Minn.Ct.App. 1996) (holding that jurors could determine negligence in case regarding cattle broker industry after hearing expert testimony) ; Seaton, 404 N.W.2d at 399-400 (affirming district court's holding that expert testimony was needed to develop the standard of care for road and bridge design).
Sears claims that Radel required expert testimony, but that case's holding is not so clear. There, the appellate court reversed the trial court's grant of directed verdict, which was based on the plaintiff's failure to provide expert testimony from other cattle brokers on the standard of care in the broker industry. Radel v. Bloom Lake Farms, 553 N.W.2d 109, 111 (Minn.Ct.App. 1996). The court held that the matter was not too esoteric for the jurors to form their own conclusions about negligence, "based on their common knowledge and the testimony of the director of the Minnesota Dairy Herd Improvement Association, a professor of veterinary medicine at the University of Minnesota, a veterinarian, and an agricultural economist." Id. The court did not discuss the substance of those people's testimony, but they were presumably experts. The Radel court's holding thus seems to be that specific expert testimony from a cattle broker was not needed, but that the existing expert testimony was sufficient.
Whether or not expert testimony was actually required in Radel, however, its holding supports a conclusion that expert testimony is not needed here. If Radel held that the cattle broker industry was within the common knowledge of jurors and no expert testimony at all was needed, then, a fortiori, the facts of this simpler case are more within the knowledge of a typical jury. If, however, Radel held that some expert testimony was needed to explain the cattle broker industry, the Court believes that the standard of care for displaying sporting goods is more within a jury's common experience than the standard of care for the cattle broker industry.
Furthermore, Minnesota courts have found that expert testimony was not needed in cases with facts far more "esoteric" than those here, involving the display of sporting goods. For example, in Kolosky v. Underground Contractors, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that expert testimony was not needed to establish the standard of care for a contractor's digging of a trench, laying PVC pipe, and refilling the trench. Kolosky, 1997 WL 30839 at **1-2. The court noted that although the contractor "utilized its knowledge and special heavy equipment when digging the trench," the case itself did not involve especially technical issues. Id. at *2. Moreover, the court found that the jury "was familiar with road construction crews digging trenches and using backhoes and jackhammers." Id. Likewise, in Blatz v. Allina Health Systems, the court held that the question of whether paramedics were negligent in locating a house in response to an emergency call was within the jury's knowledge and experience, and did not require expert testimony. Blatz, 622 N.W.2d at 388.
The other cases that Sears cites do not apply to the present circumstances. For example, Sears seeks support from the factually similar case of Block v. Target Stores. In that case, plaintiff sued after being injured while testing a skateboard in a Target store. Block, 458 N.W.2d at 707. The district court dismissed plaintiff's case after excluding his expert's testimony. Id. at 711. The court of appeals held that the expert should not have been excluded, because the testimony fit the requirements for expert evidence. Id. The court further held that the expert's testimony created a factual issue for the jury and that dismissal was inappropriate. Id. Nowhere in Block, however, did the Minnesota court hold that expert testimony is necessary to demonstrate negligence; it merely held that expert testimony in that case was wrongly excluded. Block thus offers no support to Sears.
Sears is likewise wrong to claim support from Abbett v. County of St. Louis, 474 N.W.2d 431 (Minn.Ct.App. 1991). Sears claims that this case supports its proposition that expert testimony is necessary to prove negligence, but Abbett makes no such holding. That case simply held that the plaintiff must introduce some evidence to support his allegations that defendant's negligence proximately caused his damages. Id. at 434. There, however, the only evidence supporting the plaintiff's theory was an expert's testimony. Id. The Minnesota court affirmed a directed verdict for the plaintiff, finding that even with the expert's testimony, the jury could only speculate about causation. Id. Nowhere in Abbett does the court suggest that the plaintiff could not have prevailed with other, non-expert evidence.
Finally, Sears's citation to Erpelding v. Skipperliner Indus., Inc., No. 99-16, 2002 WL 31014823 (D. Minn. Sept. 5, 2002), is similarly unavailing. In that case, the Court excluded expert testimony that an automatic dishwasher started the fire that caused the damage at issue in that case, because the testimony did not meet the standards set forth in Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). Id. at *4. This expert testimony, however, was "the only evidence implicating the dishwasher as the source of the fire." Id. In the absence of this testimony, the plaintiffs provided no evidence at all to support their claim, and the defendant was entitled to summary judgment. See id. The court's holding was thus based solely on the absence of any evidence; it did not hold that expert testimony was required to prove plaintiff's case.
"[W]hether expert testimony is required depends on the nature of the questions to be decided by the trier of fact and on whether technical or specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact." Blatz, 622 N.W.2d at 387. In this case, even if Sears used its specialized knowledge when setting up the basketball display, the Court finds that the standard of care for displaying sporting goods is "within an area of common knowledge," and that a jury could answer them on its own without resorting to speculation. See id. Thus, expert testimony is not required in this case. The Court determines that Sila has demonstrated a prima facie case of negligence, and has raised genuine issues of material fact as to whether Sears breached its duty of reasonable care and whether that breach caused Sila's injury and damages. Accordingly, Sears's motion for summary judgment will be denied.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, all the records, files, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant's motion for summary judgment [Docket No. 9] is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that because the Court has denied defendant's motion for summary judgment, plaintiff's motion for an order denying defendant's summary judgment [Docket No. 12] is MOOT.