Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County No. RIC475918, Robert D. Macomber, Judge. (Retired judge of the Riverside Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.)
James F. Lefebvre for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
Gaut, J.
1. Introduction
Sikh Temple of Riverside (Temple) initiated this proceeding to obtain a restraining order against defendant Shangara Singh (Shangara). Temple claims that Shangara disrupted a service at the Temple in July 2007 when he and two other members of the Temple approached the podium with a sword and pushed other members of the Temple off the podium. The Temple’s request for a restraining order was granted, to remain in force until August 7, 2010.
Shangara objects to the restraining order, arguing that he was not properly served with the restraining order prior to the hearing and that the restraining order prevented him from exercising his right to attend religious services.
The Temple did not submit a brief in response to the brief of Shangara.
2. Facts
On July 8, 2007, at approximately 2:00 p.m., services were being held in the Temple when Shangara and two others approached the podium and pushed the other members on the podium away, one of whom was knocked to the ground. Shangara and the other two were shouting and cursing, and one of them was wielding a large sword. On July 19, 2007, the Temple filed a request for a restraining order against Shangara. The Temple submitted declarations in support of its application from Kuldip Singh, Baljit Singh, Rur Singh, Amarjit Singh, and Lakhvir Singh.
The notice of hearing was set for August 2, 2007. Counsel for Shangara agreed to accept service on behalf of Shangara. The hearing date of August 2, 2007, was continued to August 7, 2007, and Shangara was present at that time, along with his attorney. The trial court granted the restraining order at the hearing on August 7 and ordered it to be effective until August 7, 2010.
Defendant raises a number of issues in opposing the restraining order.
3. Lack of Jurisdiction
Shangara claims that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because he was not served five days prior to the hearing as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 527.8. Counsel for Shangara, Mr. Lefebvre, agreed to accept service of process. The original petition was set for August 2, 2007, at which Shangara’s counsel was present but counsel for the Temple was not present nor was Shangara. The hearing was continued to August 7, 2007, at which Shangara and his counsel and counsel for the Temple were all present.
All statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
Counsel for Shangara agreed to accept service for his client based upon plaintiff’s telephone call to counsel for Shangara which gave him notice of the action and its contentions.
4. Workplace Violence
Shangara denies that the issues raised by the declarations in support of the injunction occurred at a workplace and therefore section 527.8 does not apply. Section 527.8 involves unlawful violence or threat of violence in the workplace. Shangara argues that the Temple is not a workplace but is where religious services are held. On the other hand, section 527.8, subdivision (d) defines an employee to include members of boards of directors of private, public and quasi-public corporations and independent contractors who perform services for the employer.
The declarations in support of the request for orders to stop harassment included a declaration from Kuldip Singh who asserts that he is the secretary of the Temple and was speaking to the congregation regarding general matters when Didar Goraya came from the audience, pulled a sword, walked toward him, and said he would use the sword if he had to chop off his head. Shangara and Hardial Grewal followed Goraya, pushing away everyone from the speaker.
Baljit Singh declared that he was the cashier of the Temple and was writing out receipts when the three men went to the front of the Temple and threatened anyone in their way. Amarjit Singh also witnessed the three men, including Shangara, take over the podium, threatening to cut off his legs if he called the police.
The testimony of witnesses at the Temple satisfied the provision of section 527.8 which applies to employees who suffer a “credible threat of violence from any individual that can reasonably be construed to be carried out . . . at the workplace, . . .” (§ 527.8, subd. (a).) The actions of defendant and the other two individuals referred to in the declarations of the Temple workers constituted a credible threat of violence to the workers at the Temple, including the secretary and the cashier, among others, as defined in section 527.8, subdivision (b)(2).
5. Order Restraining Shangara
Shangara asserts that the trial court erred when it determined who is or is not a member of the Sikh community and that the decision violates his religious freedom. To start with, Shangara has provided no evidence of who is a member of the Temple and who can use the property.
The trial court did not determine who was or who was not a member of the Temple. It simply ordered Shangara to stay at least 100 yards from the Temple. That order did not require a determination of who owns the Temple or who is a member of the Temple.
The authorities referred to by Shangara have no application to this case. Shangara cites to Korean Philadelphia Presbyterian Church v. California Presbytery (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1069, where the issue was who had ownership and operation of the church and whether the pastor should be terminated. There is no such issue here. In Metropolitan Philip v. Steiger (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 923, the dispute was between two factions in a church to determine which group owned the parish property. The trial court found that the dispute over which faction was entitled to the property was an ecclesiastical matter in which the court could not meddle. Neither of the cases cited by Shangara have any relevance to this case.
Counsel for Shangara also refers to In Re Metropolitan Baptist Church of Richmond, Inc. (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 850 in support of Shangara’s position. That case involved a church that decided to dissolve and to liquidate its assets. The court concluded that whether or not civil or property rights were involved, the courts should accept jurisdiction, even where ecclesiastical questions may be indirectly involved. Shangara’s quote from Metropolitan is not relevant and actually incorrect, as evidenced by the following quote from the Metropolitan case at page 860: “‘As long as civil or property rights are involved, the courts will entertain jurisdiction of controversies in religious bodies although some ecclesiastical matters are incidentally involved.’”
The cases cited by Shangara on this issue are irrelevant. They all involve issues as to who owns the Temple. The case here does not involve any issue pertaining to finances or ownership. Shangara apparently does not even claim that the order preventing him from approaching the Temple has any monetary effect. Even if Shangara claims an ownership interest, and he has not made such a claim, his conduct sustained the basis for the trial court’s order.
6. No Meeting of the Board of Directors to Expel Shangara From the Temple
Shangara admits that the by-laws of the Temple allow expulsion of one of its members, but such an expulsion is inappropriate because the by-laws of the Temple require the board of directors to meet to consider the expulsion and no such meeting occurred. Shangara contends that the by-laws require a resolution adopted by the Temple after a vote by 75 percent of those present. Counsel has not provided a copy of the by-laws and we are unable to verify their contents.
Even if Shangara’s reference to the by-laws was accurate, the by-laws are irrelevant. The decision to restrict Shangara’s access to the Temple was made by the superior court based upon its review of the evidence submitted by the relevant parties. That decision had nothing to do with the by-laws of the Temple, but is a decision based upon the court’s analysis of the law and the evidence. Further, the trial court did not order the expulsion of Shangara from the Temple. The order merely limited his access to the building.
Shangara complains that the congregation did not vote for his expulsion and that violates the Sikh religious dogma and the by-laws. That objection does not apply. The decision to limit Shangara’s contact with the Temple was based upon the trial court’s analysis of Shangara’s actions, not upon a vote of the members of the Temple.
Shangara relies upon the case of Church of Christ in Hollywood v. Superior Court (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1244. In that case the trial court denied the church’s request for a restraining order to prevent an expelled member from disruptive conduct on church property. Upon review, the Court of Appeal reversed that decision and granted a temporary restraining order. The court concluded that “the Church and the congregation would continue to suffer from [the respondents] outbursts and disruptive behavior. This is not a dispute over free speech. The Church has expelled a member who was harassing the congregation and disrupting religious services. With each passing day, the Church risks losing more members. And the Church should not have to conduct services or meetings in secret just to avoid the interference of an expelled congregant. Without a restraining order, the Church and its members would suffer irreparable harm.” (Id. at p. 1257.)
While the conduct of Shangara was not the same as the defendant in the Church of Christ case, the trial court properly concluded that the effect of defendant’s actions would result in the same interference with the Temple. The trial court’s conclusion was proper given the evidence of the conduct of Shangara.
7. Disposition
The trial court’s stay-away order is affirmed.
We concur: Hollenhorst Acting P. J., King J.