No. 03-06-00608-CR
Filed: December 5, 2007. DO NOT PUBLISH.
Appeal from the District Court of Williamson County, 26th Judicial District No. 00-008-K26, Honorable Billy Ray Stubblefield, Judge Presiding. Affirmed.
Before Chief Justice LAW, Justices WALDROP and ONION.
JOHN F. ONION, JR., Justice.
Appellant Carl Sikes appeals the order revoking his probation which was granted after his conviction for attempted indecency with a child by contact. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 15.01, 21.11 (West 2003).
POINT OF ERROR
Appellant does not expressly state his point of error. The crux of his "summary of argument" is that, despite the plea agreement in the original plea proceedings, the cumulation order then entered was an improper order in light of section 3.03(a) of the Texas Penal Code. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 11, 2000, a two-count indictment was returned charging that on or about September 18, 1999, appellant committed the offenses of indecency with a child by contact. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.11. On March 2, 2000, appellant entered into a plea agreement with the State. Waiving trial by jury, appellant entered a plea of guilty before the trial court to count one of the indictment and a plea of guilty to the lesser-included offense of attempted indecency with a child by contact as charged in count two of the indictment. As a part of the plea agreement approved by the trial court, appellant was sentenced to five years' imprisonment on count one. With regard to count two, the imposition of the sentence was suspended, see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12 § 23(a) (West Supp. 2007), and appellant was placed on "regular" probation for ten years. The judgment contained a cumulation order, as a part of the plea agreement, that appellant's probation would not begin until appellant had discharged his five year prison sentence imposed as a result of his conviction on count one. Before accepting the pleas of guilty or approving the plea agreement, the trial court carefully explained to appellant, a former police officer, the terms of the plea agreement including the cumulation order. Appellant, represented by counsel, assured the trial court that he fully understood each term of the plea agreement. On April 13, 2000, the formal judgment and sentence on count one was entered of record. On the same date, the formal judgment of probation with the cumulation order but without sentence was also entered of record. Appellant waived his right to appeal. The record reflects that appellant served his full five year prison sentence and was released in April 2005. Thereafter, appellant commenced his probationary term of ten years subject to certain conditions. On April 12, 2006, the State filed a motion to revoke probation alleging a number of violations of probationary conditions. On September 15, 2006, at the revocation hearing, appellant entered a plea of "true" to several of the allegations. The trial court continued the hearing and found additional alleged violations of conditions to be true. Appellant's ten-year probation was revoked, and he was sentenced to five years' imprisonment on count two. At the revocation hearing there was no objection nor was an issue raised about the plea agreement or the cumulation order. Appellant did give notice of appeal from the revocation of probation. DISCUSSION
Appellate review of an order revoking probation is limited to whether the trial court abused its discretion. See Jackson v. State, 645 S.W.2d 303, 305 (Tex.Crim.App. 1983); Caddell v. State, 605 S.W.2d 275, 277 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980); Edwards v. State, 54 S.W.3d 834, 835 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. ref'd); Joseph v. State, 3 S.W.3d 627, 640 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.). Appellant does not claim that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking probation nor does he attack the sentence imposed after revocation. Appellant was accorded a right to appeal from a conviction resulting in the granting of probation. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 23(b) (West Supp. 2007). Appellant waived that right. The failure to appeal from such conviction at the time probation is imposed waives the right to complain of any error in the underlying conviction on appeal from the revocation of probation. See Manuel v. State, 994 S.W.2d 658, 661 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999); Whetstone v. State, 786 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990); Corley v. State, 782 S.W.2d 859, 860 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990); Traylor v. State, 561 S.W.2d 492, 494 (Tex.Crim.App. 1978); Holiday v. State, 983 S.W.2d 326, 327 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. ref'd). Manuel extended this rule to the deferred adjudication context. 994 S.W.2d at 661. In his brief, appellant does not acknowledge the rule and does not discuss the recognized exceptions to the rule. In the earlier cases dealing with appeals from revocation of "regular" probation, there were exceptions to the general rule when the error was fundamental or there was a lack of jurisdiction so as to render the judgment void. See, e.g., Corley, 782 S.W.2d at 860 n. 2; Gonzales v. State, 723 S.W.2d 746, 747 n. 3 (Tex.Crim.App. 1987); Morgan v. State, 571 S.W.2d 333, 334-35 (Tex.Crim.App. 1978); Evans v. State, 690 S.W.2d 112, 115 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1985, pet. ref'd). Two exceptions to the general rule announced in Manuel and Whetstone have emerged: the void judgment exception and the habeas corpus exception. See Nix v. State, 65 S.W.3d 666, 667 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001); Jordan v. State, 54 S.W.3d 783, 785 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001); Few v. State, 136 S.W.3d 707, 711 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2004, no pet.). The void judgment exception applies in "rare situations" in which the trial court had no power to render the judgment. Nix, 65 S.W.3d 667; Few, 136 S.W.3d at 711. A judgment of conviction is void when (1) the charging instrument did not satisfy the constitutional requisites of a charging instrument; (2) the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the offense; (3) there was no evidence to support the conviction; or (4) counsel was not appointed for an indigent defendant who had not waived the right to counsel. Nix, 65 S.W.2d at 668. The Court of Criminal Appeals has stated: "while we hesitate to call this an exclusive list, it is very nearly so." Id. Like the void judgment exception, the habeas corpus exception has been narrowly drawn. Few, 136 S.W.3d at 711. Pursuant to this exception, an appellate court must consider the merits of issues that were raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus before probation was revoked, if the issues are cognizable by a writ of habeas corpus, and if the defendant attempted to litigate the issues at the revocation hearing. Nix, 65 S.W.3d at 669-70; Few, 136 S.W.3d at 711. Of course, under this exception, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus must have been timely filed. Nix, 65 S.W.3d at 670 (citing Jordan v. State, 54 S.W.3d 783 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001)). No habeas corpus petition was filed in the instant case, so that exception is not applicable here. In his brief, appellant does not designate his claim as within the void judgment exception. He does assert that section 3.03(a) is a statutorily mandated statute requiring "sentences" to run concurrently under certain conditions and that he is entitled to its benefits. Appellant urges that the cumulation order entered as a part of the plea agreement was improper and voided the judgment and sentence in the instance case. See LaPorte v. State, 840 S.W.2d 412, 415 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992). LaPorte is distinguishable, but we shall consider whether section 3.03(a) entitles appellant to the relief he claims. The primary statute now dealing with cumulative sentencing is article 42.08 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.08 (West 2006). It generally authorizes a trial court, in its discretion, to either cumulate the sentences or allow them to run concurrently. Article 42.08 has been broadly interpreted to apply to "convictions," not just sentences. See Pettigrew v. State, 48 S.W.3d 769, 772 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001). Under Pettigrew, the trial court's cumulation or stacking order in the instant case appears proper, even though only one sentence was imposed at that time. Appellant does not mention article 42.08 but relies upon section 3.03(a) for his claim that the "sentences" should have run concurrently. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 3.03(a) (West Supp. 2006). Section 3.03(a) is a statutory limitation on article 42.08. LaPorte, 840 S.W.2d at 415. Even if section 3.03(a) were applicable, as appellant claims, there are statutory exceptions to section 3.03(a). Appellant successfully exempts himself from the exception in section 3.03(b)(2)(A), See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 3.03(b)(2)(A) (West Supp. 20007), by citing Parfait v. State, 120 S.W.3d 318, 350 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003), in which the court of criminal appeals held that the exception is inapplicable to certain attempted offenses. Appellant does not mention when section 3.03(b)(2)(B) comes into play as an exception to the concurrent "sentences" requirement of section 3.03(a). This exception permits consecutive sentencing when a plea agreement, as here, is involved. A careful reading of section 3.03(b)(2)(B) shows that it is applicable when the defendant is merely charged with more than one offense under sections 21.11, 22.011, 22.021, 25.02, or 43.25 of the penal code. The key word is charged, not convicted. Here, appellant was charged by indictment with two counts of indecency with a child under the age of seventeen years under section 21.11. Appellant's guilty pleas were in accordance with the plea agreement. Even if it could be argued, as appellant does, that section 3.03(a) would normally require concurrent sentences, appellant's case clearly falls within the exception set forth in section 3.03(b)(2)(B). The trial court did not err in permitting the cumulation order to be included in the plea agreement. We conclude that appellant's collateral attack raised on appeal from the revocation of probation is without merit and presents no error. Because there is no error, we need not discuss waiver of error or the doctrine of invited error. Whether error or not, an accused is not allowed to complain on appeal about a trial action that he procured or brought upon himself at trial from which he incurred a benefit. The plea agreement that appellant entered freely and voluntarily, and about which he was carefully admonished, was most favorable to appellant, who was facing charges that could have resulted in two twenty-year sentences, and it cannot be said that the plea agreement exceeded the maximum penalty provided by law for the offenses charged, even with the cumulation order. From a practical standpoint, it was immaterial whether the order was a cumulation order or a concurrent order. Appellant was still within his ten-year probation period when he violated his probationary conditions, so it matters not whether the probationary period commenced at the same time the earlier prison sentence was pronounced or did not begin until that prison sentence had been discharged. Thus, even if we agreed with appellant that the cumulation order was void, the remedy would be reformation of the judgment to delete the cumulation order. The order revoking probation is affirmed.