Sienkiewicz v. Smith

11 Citing cases

  1. Taie v. Ten Bridges LLC

    704 F. Supp. 3d 1147 (W.D. Wash. 2023)   Cited 1 times

    This is not necessarily true where the agreement is neither immoral nor criminal in nature and the statute or ordinance subjects violators merely to a penalty without more. Sienkiewicz v. Smith, 97 Wash.2d 711, 649 P.2d 112, 115 (1982). In terms of remedies, if a contract is illegal or flows from an illegal act, a court will leave the parties as it finds them.

  2. Davidson v. Hensen

    135 Wn. 2d 112 (Wash. 1998)   Cited 104 times
    Holding that a contract between a homeowner and an unlicensed contractor is not void ab initio and that it "has limited enforceability"

    (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). See also Sienkiewicz v. Smith, 97 Wn.2d 711, 716, 649 P.2d 112 (1982), noting:

  3. Seymour v. Evans

    608 So. 2d 1141 (Miss. 1992)   Cited 10 times
    In Seymour, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that a sale of land was not void, although the conveyance violated an ordinance requiring approval of a subdivision.

    Secondly, a deed which runs afoul of subdivision regulations is perfectly valid despite the violation. In Sienkiewicz v. Smith, 97 Wn.2d 711, 649 P.2d 112 (1982), a trial court ruled that an earnest money contract was unenforceable since the conveyance it secured would violate a subdivision platting statute. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Washington disagreed:

  4. Yan Hong Zeng v. Casimir-Shelton, LLC

    No. 59580-0-II (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2024)

    For example, in Sienkiewicz v. Smith, the two parties had a purchase and sale agreement for multiple lots that required the buyer to tender the earnest money by a specific deadline. 97 Wn.2d 711, 712-13, 649 P.2d 112 (1982).

  5. Evans v. Luster

    84 Wn. App. 447 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 9 times

    Golberg v. Sanglier, 96 Wn.2d 874, 879, 639 P.2d 1347, 647 P.2d 489 (1982); Hederman v. George, 35 Wn.2d 357, 361-62, 212 P.2d 841 (1949); Reed v. Johnson, 27 Wn. 42, 53-56, 67 P. 381 (1901).Sienkiewicz v. Smith, 97 Wn.2d 711, 716, 649 P.2d 112 (1982). This exception developed from the rule that courts should examine a statute's purpose and apply the statutory penalty before voiding a contract for a statutory violation.

  6. Hickory Point v. Anne Arundel County

    316 Md. 118 (Md. 1989)   Cited 28 times
    Holding that parties were entitled to a “limited declaration” on one issue raised in a declaratory judgment action but that the ripeness doctrine, which provides the court with “choice among the grounds for decision” and “an opportunity thus to decide in the narrowest compass,” made it improper to decide other issues that might not arise

    The majority rule is that the failure of a subdivider to comply with subdivision regulations requiring the approval or recordation of plats prior to a conveyance does not render the conveyance void. See Cox v. Mountain Vistas, Inc., 102 Idaho 714, 639 P.2d 12 (1981); Marriott Fin. Serv. v. Capitol Funds, 288 N.C. 122, 217 S.E.2d 551 (1975); Sienkiewicz v. Smith, 97 Wn.2d 711, 649 P.2d 112 (1982) (en banc); and see generally Annotation, Failure of Vendor to Comply With Statute or Ordinance Requiring Approval or Recording of Plat Prior to Conveyance of Property as Rendering Sale Void or Voidable, 77 A.L.R.3d 1058 (1977). We, however, need not address this issue as no party to this appeal contends that the apparent violation prevented the purchasing homeowners from acquiring good title.

  7. Crown Cascade, Inc. v. O'Neal

    100 Wn. 2d 256 (Wash. 1983)   Cited 25 times

    Essentially, the thrust of RCW 58.17.210 is "the protection of the public at large and innocent purchasers for value against violations of the platting statute". Sienkiewicz v. Smith, 97 Wn.2d 711, 715-16, 649 P.2d 112 (1982). The County contends allowing unregulated subdivisions to be constructed simply by transferring the lots to innocent purchasers subverts this purpose.

  8. CRJ Kim, Inc. v. JKI Invs., Inc.

    No. 48566-4-II (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2017)

    But the only case involving a contract deadline addressed conduct that occurred before the applicable deadline expired. See Sienkiewicz v. Smith, 97 Wn.2d 711, 717-18, 649 P.2d 112 (1982) (seller's agents induced the buyer to delay the purchase until after the performance deadline has passed). The other cited cases clearly are inapplicable.

  9. Chevalier v. Woempner

    172 Wn. App. 467 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012)   Cited 3 times
    In Chevalier, the Washington Court of Appeals explained that under a partnership statute similar to Michigan's, "it is irrelevant whether the parties intended to use the corporate form merely as a medium for representing their partnership because [the statute] provides that once an association has been formed under another statute, that association is not a partnership."

    An agreement violating a statute or municipal ordinance is generally void, but “this is not necessarily true where the agreement is neither immoral nor criminal in nature and the statute or ordinance subjects violators merely to a penalty without more.” Sienkiewicz v. Smith, 97 Wash.2d 711, 716, 649 P.2d 112 (1982). Recovery should not be denied if the promise sued upon is only remotely or collaterally related to the illegal transaction and not illegal in and of itself.

  10. Cutter v. McLaren

    143 Wn. App. 1008 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008)   Cited 1 times

    Specific performance is available where a buyer is ready, willing, and able to conclude an earnest money agreement but is prevented from doing so because "the other contracting party has by word or act indicated that he will not perform his duties under the contract." Kreger v. Hall, 70 Wn.2d 1002, 1009, 425 P.2d 638 (1967); see also Sienkiewicz v. Smith, 97 Wn.2d 711, 717, 649 P.2d 112 (1982) ("The trial court found that Mr. Sienkiewicz was ready, willing and able at all times to conclude the transactions. . . . Consequently, the trial court deemed specific performance was appropriate.