This is not necessarily true where the agreement is neither immoral nor criminal in nature and the statute or ordinance subjects violators merely to a penalty without more. Sienkiewicz v. Smith, 97 Wash.2d 711, 649 P.2d 112, 115 (1982). In terms of remedies, if a contract is illegal or flows from an illegal act, a court will leave the parties as it finds them.
(footnote omitted) (emphasis added). See also Sienkiewicz v. Smith, 97 Wn.2d 711, 716, 649 P.2d 112 (1982), noting:
Secondly, a deed which runs afoul of subdivision regulations is perfectly valid despite the violation. In Sienkiewicz v. Smith, 97 Wn.2d 711, 649 P.2d 112 (1982), a trial court ruled that an earnest money contract was unenforceable since the conveyance it secured would violate a subdivision platting statute. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Washington disagreed:
For example, in Sienkiewicz v. Smith, the two parties had a purchase and sale agreement for multiple lots that required the buyer to tender the earnest money by a specific deadline. 97 Wn.2d 711, 712-13, 649 P.2d 112 (1982).
Golberg v. Sanglier, 96 Wn.2d 874, 879, 639 P.2d 1347, 647 P.2d 489 (1982); Hederman v. George, 35 Wn.2d 357, 361-62, 212 P.2d 841 (1949); Reed v. Johnson, 27 Wn. 42, 53-56, 67 P. 381 (1901).Sienkiewicz v. Smith, 97 Wn.2d 711, 716, 649 P.2d 112 (1982). This exception developed from the rule that courts should examine a statute's purpose and apply the statutory penalty before voiding a contract for a statutory violation.
The majority rule is that the failure of a subdivider to comply with subdivision regulations requiring the approval or recordation of plats prior to a conveyance does not render the conveyance void. See Cox v. Mountain Vistas, Inc., 102 Idaho 714, 639 P.2d 12 (1981); Marriott Fin. Serv. v. Capitol Funds, 288 N.C. 122, 217 S.E.2d 551 (1975); Sienkiewicz v. Smith, 97 Wn.2d 711, 649 P.2d 112 (1982) (en banc); and see generally Annotation, Failure of Vendor to Comply With Statute or Ordinance Requiring Approval or Recording of Plat Prior to Conveyance of Property as Rendering Sale Void or Voidable, 77 A.L.R.3d 1058 (1977). We, however, need not address this issue as no party to this appeal contends that the apparent violation prevented the purchasing homeowners from acquiring good title.
Essentially, the thrust of RCW 58.17.210 is "the protection of the public at large and innocent purchasers for value against violations of the platting statute". Sienkiewicz v. Smith, 97 Wn.2d 711, 715-16, 649 P.2d 112 (1982). The County contends allowing unregulated subdivisions to be constructed simply by transferring the lots to innocent purchasers subverts this purpose.
But the only case involving a contract deadline addressed conduct that occurred before the applicable deadline expired. See Sienkiewicz v. Smith, 97 Wn.2d 711, 717-18, 649 P.2d 112 (1982) (seller's agents induced the buyer to delay the purchase until after the performance deadline has passed). The other cited cases clearly are inapplicable.
An agreement violating a statute or municipal ordinance is generally void, but “this is not necessarily true where the agreement is neither immoral nor criminal in nature and the statute or ordinance subjects violators merely to a penalty without more.” Sienkiewicz v. Smith, 97 Wash.2d 711, 716, 649 P.2d 112 (1982). Recovery should not be denied if the promise sued upon is only remotely or collaterally related to the illegal transaction and not illegal in and of itself.
Specific performance is available where a buyer is ready, willing, and able to conclude an earnest money agreement but is prevented from doing so because "the other contracting party has by word or act indicated that he will not perform his duties under the contract." Kreger v. Hall, 70 Wn.2d 1002, 1009, 425 P.2d 638 (1967); see also Sienkiewicz v. Smith, 97 Wn.2d 711, 717, 649 P.2d 112 (1982) ("The trial court found that Mr. Sienkiewicz was ready, willing and able at all times to conclude the transactions. . . . Consequently, the trial court deemed specific performance was appropriate.