Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 03-2272 SECTION "K" (3)
March 31, 2004
ORDER
Before this Court is a Motion to Alter or Amend January 9, 2004 Order (Rec. Doc. No. 16) filed by plaintiff Siemens Building Technologies, Inc. ("Siemens"). After reviewing the pleadings, memoranda, and relevant law, the Court DENIES the motion as lacking in merit.
I. BACKGROUND
This matter arises out of a public construction dispute. Defendant Jefferson Parish advertised a public bid, Proposal No. 50-59291, for the Construction of the Jefferson Parish Administration Building ("Administration Building"). The bid submission deadline was May 16, 2002.
In March 2002, Jefferson Parish informed plaintiff Siemens that it intended to create a closed proprietary specification in favor of a Johnson Controls, Inc. ("JCI") Metasys Facility Management System ("Metasys System") Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning Control System ("HVAC"). Siemens informed Jefferson Parish that Siemens could save Jefferson Parish money by either purchasing the necessary equipment from JCI and then installing that equipment for Jefferson Parish, or by using Siemens equipment in the installation. The parties discussed whether Siemens should submit bids regarding its HVAC proposals, and Jefferson Parish indicated that it was receptive to saving money. After correspondence between Siemens and Jefferson Parish confirming this conversation, Siemens provided a bid for a HVAC to Towers Mechanical ("Towers"), an eventual Administration Building subcontractor. This bid to Towers included supply of the JCI proprietary equipment specified, the supply of the non-proprietary equipment, and totaled $377,850.000. A competing bid by JCI for the same services was $442,000.000. Towers incorporated Siemens' bid into its own bid to Brice Building Company, Inc. ("Brice"), the general contractor to whom Jefferson Parish ultimately awarded the Administration Building contract.
Prior to the bidding deadline of May 16, 2002, Jefferson Parish issued Addendum No. 3, which included bidding specifications that required bidders to furnish and install a JCI Metasys System HVAC. The cost of the system, and of the labor in installing it, was to be included in a bidder's price. Addendum No. 3 also provided that "[a] fixed cost for the devices labeled 'proprietary' will be furnished by JCI and published in a subsequent addendum." Then, only seventy-two hours before the bidding deadline, Jefferson Parish issued Addendum No. 5, which purported to create a closed proprietary specification in favor of JCI Metasys System. This addendum indicated a fixed price of $292,721.00 for the materials and proprietary labor that would be supplied by JCI. Addendum No. 5 also specified that the installation cost for the proprietary materials, and for the installation and supply of all non-proprietary materials, was not included in the lump sum to be given to JCI by the contractor.
Jefferson Parish and Brice entered into a contract for the construction of the Administration Building on July 10, 2002. This contract was based, in part, on the bid Towers made to Brice, which included Siemens' bid to provide and install both the JCI equipment and all non-proprietary equipment specified.
After the general contract between Jefferson Parish and Brice was executed, Siemens met with Jefferson Parish and Brice to demonstrate its system's ability to integrate with Jefferson Parish's existing JCI Metasys system. Siemens informed Jefferson Parish that using Siemens equipment would save Jefferson Parish an additional $100, 256.000. During this meeting, Jefferson Parish stated that, so long as the equipment used worked with their existing JCI system, it did not matter whether Siemens or JCI equipment was used. Siemens then made a post-bid request to substitute Siemens equipment for the JCI proprietary equipment specified.
According to the Complaint, after the equipment substitution meeting, JCI met with Jefferson Parish and convinced them not to use Siemens equipment in updating the HVAC system. Jefferson
Parish subsequently denied Siemens' post-bid request to substitute its alternative to the JCI equipment. During continuing discussions, Jefferson Parish only objected to Siemens' proposed substitution of the JCI equipment; Jefferson Parish did not object to Siemens performing the HVAC project with the JCI equipment specified.
At a meeting between Jefferson Parish, Siemens, Towers, and Brice on September 18, 2002, Jefferson Parish informed Siemens that it did not matter where Siemens acquired the JCI equipment or who installed it. Jefferson Parish did not inform Siemens that it would not be permitted to perform the HVAC project. Siemens also alleges that Jefferson Parish remained silent during discussions when Siemens indicated its intention to provide the JCI equipment for the project.
Siemens purchased the JCI proprietary equipment required for Jefferson Parish's project. On February 3, 2002, Siemens prepared a written submittal for the work to be performed by Siemens which included the JCI equipment Siemens purchased for the project. Soon thereafter, by a letter dated February 26, 2003, Jefferson Parish's architect returned the Siemens submittal without engineering review, stating that the Siemens' proposal represented a variance from the Contract Specifications and was not in compliance with the requirements outlined in Addendum No. 5. This was Siemens' first notice that it would not be permitted to perform the portion of the project involving the JCI equipment.
On March 11, 2002, Siemens issued an invoice to Towers in the amount of $134,912.00; $121,901.20 of this amount was for the JCI proprietary materials. Towers then included this amount in its April pay request to Jefferson Parish architect. Jefferson Parish architect subsequently rejected the invoice for Siemens' purchase of the JCI equipment.
Siemens obtained counsel and informed Jefferson Parish that it had "illegally bid the project with respect to the HVAC Temperature Controls system in violation of the public bid law by improperly designating the JCI equipment as a proprietary closed specification." Jefferson Parish conceded that it had illegally bid the closed specification in violation of the public bid laws and indicated its intention to re-bid the HVAC Temperature Controls portion of the project in a proper manner. Thereafter, on May 14, 2003, Jefferson Parish adopted Resolution No. 98361, in which Jefferson Parish authorized Construction Change Directive No. 1. This Directive deleted from the public bid project the lump sum of $292,721.000 for the materials, equipment, and other proprietary work to be performed by JCI as described in Addendum No. 5. By deleting this portion of the project from the public bid, the proprietary portion of the project was no longer part of the public bid. Pursuant to La.Rev.Stat. 38:2290 et seq., the parish rebid the HVAC equipment under a closed specification for a JCI system. Siemens and JCI both bid on the HVAC controls. Jefferson Parish declined Siemens' bid and instead entered into a contract with JCI for the HVAC installation.
Siemens filed a Complaint (Rec. Doc. No. 1) in this Court on August 12, 2003. In its Complaint, Siemens alleges counts of detrimental reliance, unjust enrichment, abuse of right, and tort. On September 24, 2003, Jefferson Parish filed a Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. No. 5), which the Court heard on October 15, 2003, and granted on January 9, 2004. On January 27, 2004, Siemens filed the instant Motion to Alter or Amend January 9, 2004 Order (Rec. Doc. No. 16), which the Court took under submission on the papers on February 18, 2004.
II. LEGAL STANDARD ANALYSIS
Siemens moves the Court to alter or amend its January 9, 2004 ruling pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). Rule 59(e) affords district courts significant discretion when deciding whether to alter or amend its judgment. Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 174 (5th Cir. 1990). The Court possesses discretion to balance the need for finality against the need for justice by considering several factors. Id. The Court should consider, inter alia, the reasons for the moving party's default, the importance of the omitted evidence to the moving party's case, whether the evidence was available to the non-movant before she responded to the summary judgment motion, and the likelihood that the nonmoving party will suffer unfair prejudice if the case is reopened. Id. The need for justice generally favors a Rule 59(e) motion only when the moving party demonstrates a mistake of law or fact or presents newly discovered evidence that was previously unavailable. Donahue v. Occidental Chemical Corp., 2000 WL 143693, *1 (E.D. La. 2000); see also Stephens v. Witco. Corp., 1998 WL 426214, at *1 (E.D.L.A. July 24, 1998). The Court may also consider whether a new trial is required to "prevent manifest injustice." See Tauzier v. Dodge, 1998 WL 458184, at *1 (E.D.L.A. Aug. 4, 1998). A Rule 59(e) motion, however, cannot be used to relitigate issues with new arguments that could and should have been presented before the judgment was rendered. See Simon v. United States, 891 F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1990); Tauzier, 1998 WL 458184, at *1.
Reconsideration of an entered judgment is an extraordinary remedy which should only be used sparingly. See 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2810.1 (2d ed. 1995). The motion "may not be used to re-litigate old matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment." Id. 11 [Motions] based on recycled arguments only [serve] to waste the resources of the court," and are not the proper vehicle to "[rehash] old arguments or [advance] legal theories that could have been presented earlier." Krim v. PCORDER.COM. Inc., 121 F.R.D. 329, 331 (W.D.Tex. 2002). These motions should serve the narrow purpose of "permitt[ing] a party to correct manifest errors of law, or fact, or to present newly discovered evidence." Id.
The Court's January 9, 2004 Order dismissed Siemen's claims against Jefferson Parish pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Under Rule 12(b)(6), the district court must take the factual allegations of the complaint as true and resolve any ambiguities or doubts regarding the sufficiency of the claim in favor of the plaintiff. Fernandez-Monies v. Allied Pilots Ass'n., 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993). The complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of her claim that would entitle her to relief. Fernandez-Montes, 987 F.2d at 284, 285; Leffall v. Dallas Independent School District, 28 F.3d 521, 524 (5th Cir. 1994).
Plaintiff Siemens moves to alter or amend the Court's January 9, 2004 Order based on the following three arguments: (1) new evidence has come to light which deprives Siemens of any rights under the LPWA; (2) this Court failed to distinguish controlling state case law; and, (3) this Court overlooked the plain language of Louisiana Revised Statute 38:2242. The Court finds each of Siemens contentions to be devoid of merit and accordingly denies plaintiff's motion.
Siemens' first argument in support of its motion suggests that new evidence has arisen which resulted in defendant Jefferson Parish taking a position that "deprives Siemens of any rights it otherwise might have under the LPWA." Specifically, plaintiff claims that Jefferson Parish has instructed Siemens to "arrange for the removal" of the HVAC equipment Siemens installed in the Administration Building. Siemens reasons that, as a result of Jefferson Parish's equipment removal request, the Louisiana Public Works Act ("LPWA") and its well-established exclusivity rule no longer apply to the instant claims. In support of this peculiar argument, Siemens cites Slagle-Johnson Lumber Co., Inc. v. Landis Const. Co., Inc. for the proposition that the exclusive remedies of the LPWA only extend to persons who furnish public work materials or supplies which are incorporated in the permanent structure or consumed in construction. 379 So.2d 479, 482-83 (La. 1979) (" Slagle-Johnson I"), on rehearing, 379 So.2d 484 (" Slagle-Johnson II"). The HVAC equipment at issue here, Siemens contends, no longer qualifies as materials incorporated into the permanent structure because Jefferson Parish is mandating that the equipment be removed. Thus, Siemens concludes, the LP WA does not apply to the instant claims. The Court disagrees. In denying LPWA applicability, Siemens misinterprets both the letter and spirit of the Louisiana Public Works Act as well as the aforementioned Louisiana Supreme Court case plaintiff cites in support of its position.
La.R.S. 38:2242 establishes the category of claimants who are entitled to recovery under the LPWA:
"Claimant", as used in this Chapter, means any person to whom money is due pursuant to a contract with a contractor or subcontractor for doing work, performing labor, or furnishing materials or supplies for the construction, alteration, or repair of any public works . . .
La.R.S. 38:2242. In short, plaintiff Siemens qualifies as an LPWA claimant because plaintiff is a subcontractor due money pursuant to a contract with another subcontractor for doing work on and furnishing materials to a public work. See January 9, 2004 Order (Rec. Doc. No. 12). Siemens supplied and installed HVAC equipment in the Jefferson Parish Administration Building pursuant to plaintiffs contract with sub-contractor Towers Mechanical. Furthermore, Siemens subsequently billed Towers Mechanical for the HVAC installation and filed this suit as a result of nonpayment on that bill. Thus, as held by this Court in its January 9, 2004 Order, a literal interpretation of the LPWA indicates that plaintiff Siemens clearly qualifies as a claimant under that statute. Siemens' characterization of Jefferson Parish's removal request as "new evidence" which precludes LPWA applicability is a farce. Defendant Jefferson Parish's removal request is not "new evidence" at all and it is irrelevant to the issue of whether Siemens qualifies as a LPWA claimant. It is uncontested that plaintiff has physically installed the HVAC equipment into the Jefferson Parish Administration Building. Indeed, in its Complaint, Siemens stated that "much of the equipment Siemens had purchased had already been installed." Complaint (Rec. Doc. 1), ¶ 53. Thus, Siemens has furnished materials that have been incorporated into a public work, thereby triggering the exclusive protections of the LPWA. Nevertheless, Siemens denies that the LPWA applies here. However, plaintiff has failed to cite a single applicable legal authority supporting the proposition that physically installed public work materials proposed to be subsequently removed are somehow outside the ambit of the LPWA. Rather, Siemens has taken to mistakenly relying on the pre-rehearing language of Slagle-Johnson I.
In Slagle-Johnson I, the Louisiana Supreme Court considered whether the LPWA, La.Rev.Stat. 38:2241 et seq, provides a privilege for persons who furnish materials for the construction of public works if the materials are consumed in construction but not incorporated into the permanent structure. In the court's initial ruling, Justice Tate upheld the lower courts' denial of LPWA protection, observing that the statute was "essentially designed to protect only the contractor and subcontractor and their respective creditors for constructing a work of fixed and permanent value to be surrendered to the owner for whom the work is done." Slagle-Johnson I, 379 So.2d at 483. Siemens relies upon this language and holding in its motion to alter or amend. On rehearing, however, the Slagle-Johnson II court reversed its previous ruling and those of the lower courts. Writing for the majority, Justice Dennis, who had dissented from Justice Tate's initial opinion, stated the following:
[U]nder the literal wording of the statute a privilege is granted whenever materials are furnished for the construction of a public work, regardless of whether they are consumed or incorporated in the edifice. We conclude, however, that the statute implies a requirement of consumption or incorporation of the materials furnished for construction of the public work before a privilege shall attach . . . The words of the Public Works statute cannot be reasonably interpreted as conditioning a materialman's lien upon the incorporation of each item supplied into the completed structure. By adding the requirement of "actual incorporation" to the statute this Court has not merely adopted a strict construction of the law; it has engaged in unwarranted legislation which altered the statute beyond the scope of its original meaning . . . Neither the policy nor the language of the legislature suggests an intention to afford protection only to materialmen whose materials end up being physically incorporated in the building.Id. at 485-86. Indeed, on rehearing, the Slagle-Johnson II court held that the LPWA applied despite the fact that the disputed materials were not physically incorporated into the permanent structure. Thus, Siemens' reliance on Slagle-Johnson I is conspicuously misplaced.
Likewise, Siemens claims that this Court failed to distinguish controlling state case law and overlooked the plain language of Louisiana Revised Statute 38:2242 are clearly without merit. Siemens' criticism of the Court's January 9, 2004 Order is based entirely on recycled arguments which only serve to waste the resources of the court. The cases cited by Siemens in support of the instant motion were previously presented to the Court in plaintiff's Reply Memorandum filed on October 24, 2003, and considered by the Court prior to rendering its January 9, 2004 ruling. Siemens' Rule 59(e) motion is not the proper vehicle to rehash old arguments or advance legal theories that could have been (and were) presented earlier. See Krim, 121 F.R.D. at 331. Siemens has failed to demonstrate a mistake of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence that was previously unavailable. See Donahue, 2000 WL 143693, at *1, Stephens, 1998 WL 426214, at* 1. Neither has plaintiff shown that the Court's January 9, 2004 Order must be altered or amended to "prevent manifest injustice." See Tauzier, 1998 WL 458184, at *1. Thus, the Court finds that Siemens has not met its burden under Rule 59(e). Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff's Motion to Alter or Amend January 9, 2004 Order (Rec. Doc. No. 16) is hereby DENIED.