Opinion
FBTFA094030416
02-29-2016
Stephen Siegel v. Sharon Siegel
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Filed March 1, 2016
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ORDER, POSTJUDGMENT (#196.00) AMENDED ON FEBRUARY 2, 2016 (#203.00), AND PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR COUNSEL FEES POSTJUDGMENT (#197.00)
Gerard I. Adelman, J.
Before the court is the plaintiff's postjudgment motion for order (#196.00), filed on October 13, 2015, his amended motion for order (#203.00), filed on February 2, 2016, and his motion for counsel fees (#197.00), filed on October 26, 2015. The court heard these motions on February 3, 2016. Given the fact that the plaintiff had filed the amended motion for order the day prior to the hearing, counsel for both parties were given time to file briefs, and did so in a timely manner.
During this hearing, a motion in limine was ruled on from the bench. (#204.00.)
The issue in dispute was quite limited and revolved around an agreement to mediate filed with, and approved by the court on March 12, 2015. (#195.00.) There is no dispute that the parties entered into an agreement to mediate and not an agreement for binding arbitration. Counsel for the parties were quite frank in their admission that everyone would have preferred a binding arbitration agreement, but there were issues related to support to be decided that prohibited such a method of resolution. As an alternative, the parties crafted an agreement that attempted to mimic the binding arbitration procedures without calling it binding arbitration. They called it an " agreement to mediate, " containing detailed provisions for how the process of resolving their disputes would be handled.
General Statutes § 46b-66(c) provides in relevant part: " The provisions of chapter 909 shall be applicable to any agreement to arbitrate in an action for dissolution of marriage under this chapter, provided (1) an arbitration pursuant to such agreement may proceed only after the court has made a thorough inquiry and is satisfied that, (A) each party entered into such agreement voluntarily and without coercion, and (B) such agreement is fair and equitable under the circumstances; and (2) such agreement and an arbitration pursuant to such agreement shall not include issues related to child support, visitation and custody ." (Emphasis added.)
The parties followed their proscribed procedure and their mediator issued both interim and final recommendations. The defendant did not accept the recommendations and the plaintiff claims that because there has been at least partial reliance on an interim recommendation by the parties, the defendant is now foreclosed from disputing those recommendations, namely under the theory of equitable estoppel. The defendant, on the other hand, relies on the mediation agreement itself, which permits either party to contest the work of mediator, albeit with some possible financial consequences, including counsel fees.
The plaintiff lays out his argument for equitable estoppel in his amended motion for order, citing to the two-pronged test that our Supreme Court set forth: " Equitable estoppel is the effect of the voluntary conduct of a party whereby he is absolutely precluded, both at law and equity, from asserting rights which might perhaps otherwise existed . . . as against another person, who has in good faith relied upon such conduct and had been led thereby to change his position for the worse." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bozzi v. Bozzi, 177 Conn. 232, 241, 413 A.2d 834 (1979).
He cites an interim agreement reached by the parties and memorialized in a letter from the mediator to the parties dated June 16, 2015. (Plaintiff's exhibit #1.) The letter states that the parties " appear[ed]" to have agreed on a formula for determining how the plaintiff's income would " be calculated for alimony purposes." The language is not definitive because as the letter explains the accountant had not finished " running calculations." See, e.g., Glazer v. Dress Barn, Inc., 274 Conn. 33, 51, 873 A.2d 929 (2005) (an agreement must be definite, and contain all essential terms to constitute an enforceable contract); Fowler v. Weiss, 15 Conn.App. 690, 692-93, 546 A.2d 321 (1988) (when there is the possibility of future negotiations, these are preliminary negotiations rather than a binding and enforceable contract). The mediator further writes that a " Stipulation" will be entered once the final numbers are agreed upon. See id.; In & Out, LLC v. Baweja, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-02-0466301-S, (March 18, 2005, Lopez, J.) (finding that no valid contract exists when parties must still agree upon certain terms). In other words, the parties had an agreement in principle only as of June 16, 2015. Nothing had been finalized. Nothing had been signed.
In his amended motion, the plaintiff refers to a formula that was " agreed upon by the parties, " documented by the mediator in a letter dated June 16, 2015, and ultimately incorporated into the mediator's final orders. (Emphasis in original.) Money was placed in escrow and paid out apparently in reliance upon some type of agreement as is evidenced by another letter from the mediator to plaintiff's counsel dated July 27, 2015 (Plaintiff's exhibit #2), which was accompanied by a check used to pay federal taxes.
There are some assumptions in the plaintiff's argument that are not supported by the evidence presented at the hearing. First, and perhaps most importantly, there is no evidence of a written agreement by the parties on the issue. See, e.g., Electrical Wholesalers, Inc. v. M.J.B. Corp., 99 Conn.App. 294, 302-03, 912 A.2d 1117 (2007) (writing is the most probative evidence to show a meeting of the minds); Cohen v. Tziolis, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-11-6020149-S, (February 9, 2012, Owens, J.T.R.) (same). There is reference to what appears to have been an agreement, but that is immediately followed by language indicating a general understanding that would have to be finalized after the accountant completed his analysis. The June 16 letter (Exhibit #1) is not definitive in anyway and is typical of an interim report that a mediator might file to document what progress has been made and what remains to be done. In & Out, LLC v. Baweja, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-02-0466301-S.
The plaintiff also refers to the agreement that was incorporated by the mediator's " final Orders." (Plaintiff's exhibit #3.) That document is the mediator's recommendation for resolution of the dispute. Although he titled it an order, because this was not a binding arbitration no 'order' was possible. See Newbig v. Newbig, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-07-5002573-S, (November 23, 2009, Silbert, J.) (while a mediator encourages a meeting of the minds between parties, an arbitrator makes a binding decision). In any event, regardless of what it was titled, it was not signed by the parties as an agreement.
Plaintiffs also argues that money was paid into and taken from escrow so there must have been an agreement. The defendant counters that there was no quid pro quo for the money as it was a debt already owed. The truth of that position can only be determined by an evidentiary hearing, and not by the mere assertion of an argument. E.g., Woodward v. Woodward, 44 Conn.App. 99, 104, 686 A.2d 1010 (1997) (allowing evidentiary hearing to resolve disputed issue of fact).
In his post-hearing brief, the plaintiff raises the further equitable claim of the doctrine of induced error. Even applying the decisions to which the plaintiff cites, " [a]ctions that are induced by a party ordinarily cannot be grounds for error . . . A [party] can present a claim of relief from induced error only upon a showing that the error violated his constitutional rights." Dougan v. Dougan, 114 Conn.App. 379, 390, 970 A.2d 131 (2009), aff'd, 301 Conn. 361, 21 A.3d 791 (2011); Sachs v. Sachs, 60 Conn.App. 337, 345, 759 A.2d 510 (2000). In both Dougan and Sachs, the court rejected the application of the induced error doctrine because no constitutional violation was claimed. No such claim was made in the present case, and therefore the induced doctrine is inapplicable.
Ultimately, the plaintiff advances various theories to support his contention that the defendant is bound to the mediator's recommendations. The court disagrees. " It is well established that when an agreement of the parties [is] ordered incorporated by reference into [a marital] dissolution decree . . . [a] judgment rendered in accordance with such a stipulation of the parties is to be regarded and construed as a contract." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Barber v. Barber, 114 Conn.App. 164, 168, 968 A.2d 981, cert. denied, 292 Conn. 915, 973 A.2d 661 (2009). " The intent of the parties as expressed in a contract is determined from the language used interpreted in the light of the situation of the parties and the circumstances connected with the transaction . . . [T]he intent of the parties is to be ascertained by a fair and reasonable construction of the written words and . . . the language used must be accorded its common, natural, and ordinary meaning and usage where it can be sensibly applied to the subject matter of the contract . . . Where the language of the contract is clear and unambiguous, the contract is to be given effect according to its terms. A court will not torture words to import ambiguity where the ordinary meaning leaves no room for ambiguity . . . Similarly, any ambiguity in a contract must emanate from the language used in the contract rather than from one party's subjective perception of the terms . . . [T]he mere fact that the parties advance different interpretations of the language in question does not necessitate a conclusion that the language is ambiguous." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Honulik v. Greenwich, 293 Conn. 698, 710-11, 980 A.2d 880 (2009).
The clear language and intent of the parties in their was to mediate and not enter into binding arbitration. Their agreement to mediate spoke of recommendations that the mediator would make, and set out a procedure for acceptance or rejection of those recommendations, and evidently leaving room for future negotiations, rather than binding the parties to the mediator's recommendations. The court was asked to approve an agreement to mediate. The court approved that agreement and it became an order of the court. It would appear that the parties each followed their agreement to mediate and they each participated fully in the process. The fact that the recommendations were not acceptable to one party does not invalidate the agreement. Quite the opposite is true. They anticipated that there might not be agreement with the mediator's recommendations and provided for that in their procedures. There is no reason for the court not to honor the agreement they memorialized and was entered as an order at their mutual request.
The court hereby ORDERS:
1. Plaintiff's motion for order (#196.00) and amended motion for order (#203.00) are denied;
2. Plaintiff's motion for legal fees (#197.00) is deferred;
3. The parties are to contact case flow to select a hearing date to resolve the underlying issues, trial management standing orders to be observed; and
4. The parties are to file with the court no later than twenty (20) working days following the filing of this order a joint list of the outstanding issues the court is being asked to resolve.