Opinion
Civil Action No. 02-365
October 3, 2003 Report and Recomendation Adopted November 12, 2003
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons stated below, it is respectfully recommended that the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 21) be granted.
II. REPORT
BACKGROUND A. Procedural History and Scope of Court's Analysis
The Plaintiff Yusuf Sidique, M.D. ("the Plaintiff" or "Dr. Sidique") has brought this employment discrimination lawsuit against the University of Pittsburgh's Department of Dermatology and related Defendants. See generally Compl. (Doc. 1). Dr. Sidique alleges that the Defendants discriminated against him "on the basis of his Indian race, dark skin color and/or Indian national origin . . . by failing to select him . . . as a resident for the [University's] Department of Dermatology." See generally Pl.'s Br. in Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. (Doc. 31, hereinafter cited as "Pl.'s Opp'n Br.") at 3-4. He alleges violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act ("the PHRA"), 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 951, et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ("Section 1981"). See generally Pl.'s Opp'n Br. at 4.
The full list of Defendants includes: "University of Pittsburgh Department of Dermatology"; "University of Pittsburgh Medical Center Health Systems"; "University of Pittsburgh Physicians"; "University Health Center of Pittsburgh, Inc."; and Louis Falo, M.D., Ph.D. ("Dr. Falo"). See generally id. at ¶¶ 6-10. The distinction of identity between these various entities is immaterial for the purposes of the analyses below. Accordingly, the undersigned hereinafter will refer to the Defendants collectively as "the University" or "the Defendants."
In addition to his allegations regarding the residency position, Dr. Sidique's pleadings appear to claim discrimination based on his failure to receive payment for a research fellowship he performed within the University's Dermatology Department. Cf. generally Compl. at ¶ 26. The Plaintiff's opposition papers fail to address this claim, however, let alone refute the Defendants' arguments and evidence in support of summary judgment. Compare Defs.' Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. (Doc. 22, hereinafter cited as "Defs.' Br.") at 10-12 (stating detailed arguments challenging Plaintiff's failure to pay claim) with Pl.'s Opp'n Br. at 3-5 (offering no resistence to such arguments and identifying "adverse employment action" as Plaintiff's failure to secure residency position). Accordingly, the District Court should summarily grant the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment to the extent it addresses the failure to pay claim. Cf. generally, e.g., Herbst v. General Accident Ins. Co., 1999 WL 820194, at *1 n. 1 and at *11 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 1999) (dismissing claim as "abandoned" where plaintiff made no effort to contest defendant's entitlement to summary judgment).
The Defendants have moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Plaintiff has failed to identify sufficient evidence of pretext to refute the University's legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for declining to offer Dr. Sidique a residency position. See generally Defs.' Br. at 13-18. The undersigned agrees, and this deficiency is fatal to all of the Plaintiff's discrimination claims. Thus, the Defendants are entitled to summary judgment, and the District Court need not reach Defense counsel's alternative ground for dismissal. Cf. generally Defs.' Br. at 18-20 (asserting Plaintiff failed to timely file his PHRA claim).
The information below is culled from the Defendants' Statement of Material Facts ( see Doc. 20), the Plaintiff's Responses thereto ( see Doc. 32), and the documentary evidence of record. The undersigned has taken care to ensure that the facts referenced in this section are not materially disputed.
Dr. Sidique graduated from medical school in India in 1987. See generally Doc. 20 at ¶ 8. He worked as a physician in India from 1988 until 1991, when he moved to the United States. See id. After completing a residency program in internal medicine between the years 1993 and 1996, the Plaintiff practiced medicine in New York until 1999. See id. at ¶ 9.
While practicing in New York, and between the years 1996 and 1997, Dr. Sidique applied to approximately ten dermatology residency programs. See id. at ¶ 11. He was neither accepted nor invited to interview for any of said positions. See id. at ¶¶ 11-12.
In 1997, Dr. Sidique contacted Dr. Brian Jegasothy ("Dr. Jegasothy"), then the University's "Chair of the Dermatology Department," to seek a position within the Department. See id. at ¶ 17. Dr. Jegasothy advised the Plaintiff that, because of funding difficulties, the Dermatology Department did not have any paid positions available. See id. at ¶ 18.
On January 17, 1998, Dr. Sidique wrote a letter to Dr. Jegasothy stating, among other things, the following:
I am a board certified [i]nternist currently practicing in the city of New York and [am] in pursuit of a career in [d]ermatology. I applied to many programs this year for the 1999 [residency] position[s] and was unsuccessful in obtaining an interview. I understand it is very difficult for me to receive training in [d]ermatology in this country as I am an Indian medical [school] graduate. I am terribly obsessed with wanting to be a [d]ermatologist and would go through any hardships [to attain this goal]
. . . .
I [wrote] to you more than a year ago and you . . . replied . . . that due to difficulty in funding there [were] no research positions in your department. At present[,] I am in a position where I can support myself and my family . . . [,] I am ready to leave my current job[,] and I would like to work in your department as a research fellow[,] unpaid[,] if you give me a chance. . . . I implore you to . . . open a way for me to reach my goal.See Dr. Sidique's Ltr. dated Jan. 17, 1998 (attached as Ex. B to Doc. 23).
The Plaintiff was offered, and he accepted, an unpaid research fellowship with the University's Dermatology Department, which he began in June 1999. See generally Doc. 20 at ¶¶ 23-24, 27; see also generally Compl. at ¶¶ 15, 18. While engaged in the fellowship, and in the fall of 2000, Dr. Sidique submitted an application seeking placement into one of the three residency positions then available in the University's Dermatology Department. See Doc. 20 at ¶ 46. Although the total number of applicants is in dispute, Plaintiff's counsel puts it at approximately three hundred. See Doc. 32 at ¶ 46.
Of these hundreds of applicants, a total of thirty-three were selected for interviews. See Doc. 20 at ¶¶ 51-52; see also Doc. 32 at ¶ 52. Dr. Sidique was one of those applicants and he, like the others, was interviewed by members of the Dermatology Department's "Selection Committee." See generally Doc. 20 at ¶ 53.
The Selection Committee consisted of nine physicians — Drs. Abernathy, Deng, Falo, Geskin, Kress, Obagi, Bridenstine, Kwong and Hendi. See id. After conducting their interviews, each of the Committee members ranked the individual applicants on a scale of "0" to "5." See generally id. at ¶ 55. Dr. Sidique received the following scores:
Plaintiff's counsel disputes that Dr. Sidique was interviewed by Dr. Geskin. See generally Doc. 32 at ¶ 53 (quoting Dr. Geskin's deposition testimony that she did not recall interviewing Plaintiff). As seen below, however, this dispute is immaterial for the purposes of summary judgment. See generally discussion infra.
Abernathy 3 Obagi 4 Deng 3 Bridenstine 4 Falo 0 Kwong 0 Geskin 0 Hendi 2 Kress 5See Doc. 20 at ¶ 56.
In ranking the applicants in terms of desirability, the Defendants combined the respective scores given to each candidate. See generally id. at ¶ 59. The scores of Drs. Bridenstine, Kwong, and Hendi were eliminated because these Committee members had not interviewed all of the candidates, and Dr. Geskin's scores were reduced by %50 because "she was a resident and the other . . . members were faculty." See id. at ¶¶ 59, 60; see also Doc. 32 at ¶¶ 59, 60. In light of these modifications, the Plaintiff's scores were as follows:
Abernathy 3 Deng 3 Falo 0 Geskin 0 Kress 5 Obagi 4 ____________ Total 15Cf. generally Doc. 20 at ¶ 61.
Of the thirty-three candidates interviewed, twenty-three received higher scores than the Plaintiff. See id. at ¶ 62. The Defendants' rankings were forwarded to the National Resident Matching Program ("the NRMP"), who then determined the three successful candidates. See generally Doc. 20 at ¶ 64. Based on the NRMP's "match," the successful applicants were Drs. Patton, Roper, and Rofagha, whose Selection Committee scores ranked second, third and fifth, respectively. See Doc. 20 at ¶ 68. Although Drs. Patton and Roper presumably do not fall within a protected class, Dr. Rofagha is of Iranian descent. See generally id. at ¶¶ 69-71.
The NRMP administers a matching program that permits "both the applicants and residency program directors [to] submit . . . a list of those programs, or those applicants, in which they are most interested, ranked in order of preference. Once the [NRMP] has acquired all ranking information, a computer program is used to `match' applicants with residency programs in a manner intended to reflect the preferences of both parties." See generally Herron v. Allegheny Gen'l Hosp., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19847, *1 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 1996).
When the Plaintiff learned that he had not matched under the NRMP selection process, he thereafter met with Dr. Falo (who by then had replaced Dr. Jegasothy as Department Chair). See id. at ¶¶ 72-73. Dr. Falo offered the Plaintiff a non-tenured faculty position in the Dermatology Department as an instructor. See generally Doc. 32 at ¶ 75. The Plaintiff declined this offer, and he ceased performing his unpaid fellowship. See generally id. at ¶ 76.
In attempting to demonstrate pretext, the Plaintiff relies heavily on certain factual averments regarding Drs. Falo and Geskin. See generally Pl.'s Opp'n Br. As to Dr. Falo, the Plaintiff asserts that said physician "assured Dr. Sidique . . . he would [be] rank[ed] . . . `high' on the residency interview portion of the selection process." See generally id. at 1. In addition, the Plaintiff claims Dr. Falo "promised [him] that[,] if he was not selected through the . . . `match [program],'" the Dermatology Department would create a fourth residency position for him to occupy. See generally id. at 1-2.
As to Dr. Geskin, Plaintiff's counsel focuses on her alleged failure to interview Dr. Sidique. See generally Doc. 32 at ¶¶ 53, 56 (highlighting Dr. Sidique's failure to identify Dr. Geskin as one of his interviewers and Dr. Geskin's inability to recall whether she had interviewed Plaintiff).
ANALYSIS
Within the context of employment discrimination, a plaintiff may proceed either by presenting direct evidence of discrimination under Price Waterhouse, or by presenting "indirect evidence" under the familiar McDonnell Douglas framework. See generally Fallon v. Meissner, 2003 WL 1984696, *2 (3d Cir. Apr. 30, 2003) (citations omitted). In light of Dr. Sidique's failure to present "direct evidence" of discrimination, the parties agree that the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis applies. Compare Defs.' Br. at 8 ("[s]ince [the P]laintiff . . . does not have any direct evidence of . . . discrimination," he "must proceed with the indirect, or circumstantial evidence, method of proof") with Pl.'s Opp'n Br. at 4 (discussing "burden-shifting analysis" under McDonnell Douglas).
The standards and analyses identified below apply to all of the Plaintiff's discrimination claims, regardless of whether they are stated under Title VII, the PHRA or Section 1981. See generally, e.g.,Sherrod v. Philadelphia Gas Works, 2003 WL 230709, *3 (3d Cir. Jan. 14, 2003) (where burden-shifting analysis applies, "Title VII, PHRA and Section 1981 claims [are all] governed by McDonnell Douglas") (citations omitted).
For the purposes of summary judgment, Defense counsel assumes the Plaintiff can state his prima facie case. See generally Defs.' Br. at 13. Accordingly, the burden shifts to the Defendants to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for rejecting Dr. Sidique's application. See generally Sherrod, 2003 WL 230709 at *3 (citation and internal quotations omitted). The Defendants have articulated such a reason: Dr. Sidique was not chosen "because the Selection Committee determined that [there] were [numerous] candidates who were better suited to a residency than the [P]laintiff, and the successful candidates were among them." See generally Defs.' Br. at 13. Thus, the burden shifts back to the Plaintiff to demonstrate pretext. See generally Sherrod, 2003 WL 230709 at *3 (citation omitted).
In a recent decision, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit aptly summarized the pretext inquiry:
In order to show pretext, [the plaintiff] must point to some evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could either disbelieve [the employer's] articulated legitimate reason or believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of [the employer's] actions. . . .
To disbelieve the employer's proffered reason, the question is not whether the action was prudent, but whether [the plaintiff] has shown such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons . . . that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence. . . . Alternately, to show the discriminatory reason was more likely than not the motivating reason, a plaintiff can introduce evidence of the employer's past treatment of [him], or evidence of the employer's general policy and practice with respect to minority employees.See Martin v. Health Care Retirement Corp., 2003 WL 21186126, *2 (3d Cir. May 20, 2003) (numerous citations and internal quotations omitted).
Here, the pretext inquiry also must be informed by the Third Circuit Court's longstanding recognition that decisions made by university faculties, both in the medical field and otherwise, are entitled to heightened deference:
We have cautioned courts on several occasions to avoid unnecessary intrusion into subjective promotion decisions in the . . . context of academic tenure. While such decisions are not insulated from judicial review for unlawful discrimination, it is clear that courts must be vigilant not to intrude into that determination, and should not substitute their judgment for that of the college with respect to the qualifications of faculty members for promotion and tenure. Determinations about such matters as teaching ability, research scholarship, and professional stature are subjective, and unless they can be shown to have been used as [a] mechanism to obscure discrimination, they must be left for evaluation by the professionals.Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 527 (3d Cir. 1992) (citations and internal quotations omitted, emphasis added), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 826 (1993); see also, e.g., Hankins v. Temple Univ., 829 F.2d 437, 443 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding, within context of alleged discriminatory termination of university fellowship, that "[u]niversity faculties . . . must havethe widest discretion in making judgments as to the academic performance of their students") (citation omitted, emphasis added);Molthan v. Temple Univ. of Commw. Sys. of Higher Educ., 778 F.2d 955, 962 (3d Cir. 1985) ("the evidence . . . must show more than a . . . disagreement about the scholarly merits of the candidate's academic work, the candidate's teaching abilities or the academic needs of the department or university") (citation and internal quotations omitted); Castillo v. American Bd. of Surgery, 221 F. Supp.2d 564, 571 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (holding, within context of physician's denial of medical board certification, that "courts defer to a professional association when it determines the competence of a member as long as the reasons for the decision are not arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory") (citation omitted). These "cautions against unwarranted invasion or intrusion into matters involving professional judgments about an employee's qualifications" must "inform the remainder of [the court's] analysis." See Ezold, 983 F.2d at 527.
Turning to the purported evidence of pretext, Plaintiff's counsel relies heavily on Dr. Falo's alleged statements to Dr. Sidique, during his unpaid fellowship, that he "was one of the `premier' candidates for a residency position" and that Dr. Falo "would rank him high in his residency interview." See generally Doc. 32 at ¶¶ 138, 140. Similarly, the Plaintiff alleges Dr. Falo promised him that, if he did not successfully "match" into one of the three available residency positions, the Department would create a fourth for him to occupy. See generally id. at ¶ 142. Dr. Falo failed to follow through on these alleged assurances, and Plaintiff's counsel cites the same as evidence of pretext. See generally Pl.'s Opp'n Br. at 8-9.
Even assuming the veracity of Dr. Sidique's allegations, there exists a theoretical "disconnect" between such purported evidence of pretext and the Plaintiff's claims of employment discrimination. Simply put, counsel has failed to demonstrate how Title VII (or any other law) may be read to bind Dr. Falo to his alleged promises to give Dr. Sidique preferred treatment or consideration. As the law makes abundantly clear, "Title VII . . . does not demand that an employer give preferential treatment to minorities." See Ezold, 983 F.3d at 531 (citations and internal quotations omitted). At best, Dr. Falo's duty to fulfill his purported promises of preferential treatment would flow from contract law, not employment discrimination, and the Plaintiff brings no such claim. Cf. generally Merritt Logan, Inc. v. Fleming Foods of Pa., Inc., 138 B.R. 15, 24 (E.D. Pa. 1992) ("[t]he Third Circuit follows the modern trend . . . requir[ing] a plaintiff to bring in one suit all claims for relief [he] may have [that] arise out of the same transaction").
Plaintiff's counsel attempts to avoid these seemingly obvious conclusions by framing the issue in terms of Dr. Falo's credibility. See generally, e.g., Pl.'s Opp'n Br. at 8 ("Dr. Sidique can raise suspicions with respect to Dr. Falo's credibility and his justification for giving [him] a [score of] zero"). While credibility undoubtedly plays a part in the pretext analysis, such inquiry focuses on the credence "of the employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its [adverse employment] action." See Martin, 2003 WL 21186126 at *2 (citation and internal quotations omitted, emphasis added). Here, any disputes regarding Dr. Falo's credibility go more to his motivation in allegedly promising preferred treatment, not the University's decision to accept other residency candidates based on their higher scores. Under the circumstances, the Plaintiff's evidence is insufficient to support a reasonable inference of discrimination. See generally, e.g., King v. City of Phila., 2003 WL 1705967, *3 (3d Cir. Apr. 1, 2003) ("[i]ndirect evidence must be enough to support a reasonable inference that the reasons given for the employment decision are pretextual," and "[m]erely reciting that [race] was the reason for the decision does not make it so") (citation and internal quotations omitted, emphasis in original).
Although the District Court need not address the issue, a much more reasonable inference may be drawn from Dr. Falo's alleged promises, namely that he wished to ensure the Department's continued receipt of the Plaintiff's unpaid research assistance. Cf. generally, e.g., Doc. 32 at ¶ 138 ("Dr. Falo told [the Plaintiff] that he was one of the `premier' candidates for a residency position . . . and that he would like Dr. Sidique to continue working in the Department because . . . melanoma vaccine trials [were] coming up").
Somewhat relatedly, counsel's nearly exclusive reliance on Dr. Falo's statements further evinces the Plaintiff's failure to
meaningfully challenge the University's proffered legitimate reason for declining Dr. Sidique's residency application. As seen above, the Plaintiff's applicant score was derived from the opinions of no fewer than six Selection Committee members. See generally discussion supra. The Plaintiff does not identify any evidence calling into question the credibility of the remaining five Committee members, and his counsel has failed to show that his ultimately unavailing attack on a single member's score is sufficient to establish a reasonable inference of discrimination. See generally, e.g.,Castillo, 221 F. Supp.2d at 571 (agreeing with defendant that court should "defer to the decision of . . . six, independent oral examiners," and citing case law contemplating heightened deference to university faculties in making judgments regarding candidates' academic qualifications); Herron, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19847 at *29 ("[the] plaintiff can point to no evidence that any of the twelve orthopaedic surgeons sitting on the interview panel, much less the panel as a whole, acted with discriminatory animus when making resident selections") (emphasis added).
Dr. Sidique "has not presented any evidence that the [interviewers] made any discriminatory comments to him or otherwise demonstrated a discriminatory motive." See generally Castillo, 221 F. Supp.2d at 571. Nor has the Plaintiff "presented any evidence that there were any discrepancies in the administration of the [interviews] that would demonstrate . . . the Defendant[s'] finding . . . he was unqualified was a pretext for discrimination." See id. (citation omitted). There exists no basis to reasonably infer that the Selection Committee acted with discriminatory animus.
The court also notes that, even assuming Dr. Falo somehow was obligated to give Dr. Sidique a score of "5," the evidence shows the Plaintiff still would have been outranked by numerous applicants, including those that were ultimately successful. Cf. generally, e.g., Pl.'s Opp'n Br. at 13 (chart). The only way Plaintiff's counsel can bring Dr. Sidique's scores up to par is to also disregard the scores of Dr. Geskin. See id. (arguing that Dr. Geskin's scores should not be counted because she did not recall interviewing Plaintiff). As seen below, however, the University's allowing Dr. Geskin to score candidates she allegedly did not interview affected all applicants equally, and no discriminatory impact or animus may be inferred. See generally discussion infra.
Plaintiff's counsel also seeks to shift the court's inquiry from the University's articulated reason for not selecting Dr. Sidique to Dr. Falo's decision to give him a low interview score. See generally, e.g., Pl.'s Opp'n Br. at 9. Dr. Falo testified that his decision to give the Plaintiff a low score was, among other things, based on Dr. Sidique's "clear[indication] . . . he was interested in private practice and not [a]cademic [d]ermatology." See id. (quoting Dr. Falo's deposition testimony). In attempting to show pretext, counsel cites Dr. Sidique's sworn declaration that he "never told Dr. Falo . . . he was not interested in academic dermatology." See id. (citing Plaintiff's sworn declaration).
Even assuming Dr. Falo's nondiscriminatory reason, and not the University's, is the proper focus (a proposition the District Court should decline to endorse), the Plaintiff's evidence is unavailing. Dr. Sidique cannot discredit a proffered nondiscriminatory reason merely by showing it was based on "wrong or mistaken" beliefs, "since the factual dispute at issue is whether discriminatory animus motivated the employer, not whether the employer is wise, shrewd, prudent or competent." See Martin, 2003 WL 21186126 at *2 (citations and internal quotations omitted, emphasis added). The Plaintiff can demonstrate no pretext through his evidence regarding Dr. Falo.
The Plaintiff also attempts to establish pretext through Dr. Falo's rating of another Indian applicant, identified anonymously as "Dr. G." See generally Pl.'s Opp'n Br. at 9. This evidence fails for many of the same reasons stated above. See generally discussion supra (explaining that Plaintiff's evidence regarding Dr. Falo, alone, fails to address the University's proffered nondiscriminatory reason for employment decision, and finding that no evidence exists to reasonably infer discrimination in Selection Committee's decision-making process). Moreover, Dr. G's application presented a candidate with entirely different qualifications, educational background and experience. Cf. generally Defs.' Reply Br. (Doc. 35) at 8 (highlighting, with proper record citation, that "Dr. G has failed to provide any information as to his medical school performance, his board scores, his personal statement or the other criteria . . . Dr. Falo described as major factors in his rankings"). In light of the Third Circuit Court's longstanding "cautions against [the] unwarranted invasion or intrusion into matters involving [such] professional judgments," the Plaintiff's evidence regarding Dr. G constitutes little more than an unwarranted "second guessing of [the] assessment of the candidates and their qualifications." Cf. id. (citing Herron).
Next, the Plaintiff seeks to establish pretext through the Defendants' alleged violations of the University's internal procedures for selecting residency candidates. See generally Pl.'s Opp'n Br. at 11-16. As referenced above, one such alleged violation was the decision to allow Dr. Geskin to vote despite her not having interviewed all of the candidates. See id. at 12-13; see also generally discussion supra.
As the Defense counsel correctly notes, the Plaintiff's evidence of the alleged violations is questionable at best. See, e.g., Defs.' Reply Br. at 11 (quoting Dr. Geskin's testimony that she did not recall interviewing Plaintiff or any other candidate); id. at 12 (explaining that Plaintiff's complaints regarding one successful candidate's deferral into residency program were unfounded, as deferral was approved by Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education); and id. at 13 (highlighting evidence that, although keeping of residency selection meeting minutes was something that one Department official "would like to see," no such policy was in effect).
Even assuming the Plaintiff's evidence is sufficient to create an issue of material fact, none of the alleged policy violations support a finding of pretext. This is so because every policy identified, and the alleged violations thereof, affected each remaining applicant indiscriminately. As the Third Circuit Court has observed, "simply pointing to violations [of internal policy] is inadequate without evidence that [non-protected applicants] were treated differently by [the] Defendants with respect to [the] policies" than protected members. See Maull v. Division of State Police, 2002 WL 1480774, *4 (3d Cir. Jul. 9, 2002) (citations and internal quotations omitted). There is no basis for concluding that the alleged violations of internal policy prejudiced Dr. Sidique more than any of his fellow applicants. Nor does there exist any evidence allowing a reasonable inference that the alleged violations were used to mask discriminatory animus. Cf. generally Ezold, 983 F.2d at 527 (court should not intrude upon university's decision-making processes "unless they can be shown to have been used as [a] mechanism to obscure discrimination"). The Plaintiff's arguments regarding the alleged violations of internal policy are without merit.
Plaintiff counsel's remaining arguments regarding pretext are weak and may be quickly disposed of. Counsel first relies on a letter authored by Dr. Jegasothy on April 30, 1998, stating that Dr. Sidique would not be eligible for a residency position "[d]ue to [his] prior residency training . . . in [i]nternal [m]edicine." See generally Pl.'s Opp'n Br. at 16 (quoting letter). The Plaintiff denies having received the letter, which was dated before he began performing his unpaid fellowship. See id. Dr. Sidique complains that, had he received the letter, he would not have accepted the fellowship. See id. at 16-17.
How this evidence is supposed to demonstrate pretext remains beyond the court's comprehension. Dr. Sidique never was denied eligibility for a residency position based on the reason(s) identified in Dr. Jegasothy's letter. To the contrary, he was permitted to apply for a residency and was "beaten out" by higher scoring candidates. The letter has nothing whatever to do with the Defendants' proffered nondiscriminatory reason for declining Dr. Sidique's application, and the correspondence lends no support to the Plaintiff's claim of pretext.
Plaintiff's counsel next attacks Dr. Falo's decision to give successful candidate Dr. Patton a rating of five. See generally id. at 17-18 (arguing that Dr. Patton was less qualified than Plaintiff). As seen above, this court will not indulge in such second guessing regarding the assessment of the various candidates and their qualifications. See generally discussion supra at n. 9. As Defense counsel correctly notes, moreover, "[t]here was a line of [higher-ranked] candidates . . . ahead of the [P]laintiff," see Defs.' Reply Br., and questioning the motivations of a single Selection Committee member regarding a single successful candidate does not satisfy Dr. Sidique's burden on pretext. See id.; compare also Pl.'s Opp'n Br. at 17 (noting that Dr. Patton was married to Dr. Falo's assistant) with Robinson v. City of Pgh., 120 F.3d 1286, 1306 n. 21 (3d Cir. 1997) (affirming district court's ruling that evidence of "nepotism and favoritism" did "not give rise to a reasonable inference of discrimination").
Finally, Plaintiff's counsel cites the University's "recent reversal of policy . . . to now require photographs of [residency] applicants." See Pl.'s Opp'n Br. at 18. As Defense counsel notes, however, the submission of photographs is part of a process administered by the Electronic Residency Application Service. See Defs.' Reply Br. at 15 (citations to record evidence included). The University did not set such requirements, and they cannot be imputed to the Defendants. See id. Even assuming they could be, such purported evidence of pretext is far too specious to satisfy the Plaintiff's burden on summary judgment.
In conclusion, it is fair to say that the Plaintiff's case reflects the unfolding of a regrettable situation. In his quest to become a board-certified dermatologist, Dr. Sidique agreed to work in the University's Dermatology Department, without pay, in the hope that it would open the door to a residency in a highly competitive medical field. His efforts did not go completely unrewarded, as he was able to succeed, where he previously had failed, in securing an interview for a dermatology residency. At the end of the day, however, the University chose other candidates, and the Plaintiff understandably is disappointed that his unpaid labor did not yield the result he desired.
While Dr. Sidique's story may be regrettable, he has failed to demonstrate it is one of employment discrimination. The Plaintiff has identified no evidence to support a reasonable inference of discriminatory animus on the part of the University. For all of these reasons, the Defendants are entitled to the entry of summary judgment. CONCLUSION
The Plaintiff's claims are further undermined by the remarkable degree of ethnic diversity reflected in the ranks of the University's Dermatology Department. The Defendants' evidence reveals a veritable "United Nations" of medical professionals. See generally Defs.' Br. at 17 (summarizing nationalities of current and former dermatologists, including those born in India (two), Iran (two), Sri Lanka, Colombia, Taiwan, Latvia, Syria, Croatia, two Asian Americans and one African American). Such diversity extended not only to the faculty at large, but to the Committee charged with selecting residency candidates. Compare id. with discussion supra (identifying members of Selection Committee, including Drs. Hendi (born in Iran), Deng (Taiwan), Geskin (Latvia), Obagi (Syria) and Kwong (Asian American)). And while Plaintiff's counsel is correct that this evidence cannot "conclusively demonstrate . . . [the employer's] actions were not discriminatorily motivated," see generally Pl.'s Opp'n Br. at 21, it is "not wholly irrelevant" and serves to further emphasize the weaknesses otherwise reflected in the Plaintiff's case.
Opposing counsel are commended for their exemplary legal briefing, as well as their effective marshaling of the facts to best support their clients' positions.
The Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 21) should be granted.
In accordance with the Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Rule 72.1.4(B) of the Local Rules for Magistrates, objections to this report and recommendation are due by October 20, 2003. Responses to objections are due by October 30, 2003.