Opinion
F078078
06-19-2020
PARMINDERJIT SIDHU, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. STEVE GORDON, as Director of DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES, etc., Defendant and Respondent.
Middlebrook & Associates, Richard O. Middlebrook and Patrick R. Bowers, for Plaintiff and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Chris A. Knudsen, Assistant Attorney General, Gabrielle H. Brumbach and Robert D. Petersen, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. BCV-17-102926)
OPINION
THE COURT APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Eric Bradshaw, Judge. Middlebrook & Associates, Richard O. Middlebrook and Patrick R. Bowers, for Plaintiff and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Chris A. Knudsen, Assistant Attorney General, Gabrielle H. Brumbach and Robert D. Petersen, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant and Respondent.
Before Peña, Acting P.J., Smith, J. and Meehan, J.
-ooOoo-
The Vehicle Code mandated suspension of the driver's license of appellant Parminderjit Sidhu in 2007 after he was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI) with a prior DUI during the previous 10 years, and barred its reinstatement unless and until he completed a driver education program. Another suspension was imposed in 2008 after Sidhu was again arrested for DUI, but failed to appear in court. In 2017, the court dismissed the 2008 charges of DUI and failure to appear. Subsequently, the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) informed Sidhu that his license remained suspended based on the 2007 conviction because he had not fulfilled the education requirement. Sidhu then requested reinstatement of his license and was denied for the same reason.
Sidhu filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the superior court, arguing that the court's action dismissing the 2008 charges meant no suspension remained, and the DMV should be ordered to issue his license. He appeals from the court's denial of that petition.
The DMV was required to enforce the terms of the suspension based on the 2007 conviction despite the dismissal of the 2008 charges, so the DMV's refusal to restore Sidhu's license was correct. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Sidhu violated Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (b), driving with blood-alcohol content (BAC) of 0.08 percent or more, on February 22, 1997, and was convicted on April 29, 1997. On March 27, 2006, he committed the same offense, and was convicted on May 7, 2007. Because he committed the second offense within 10 years after he committed the first, sections 13352, subdivision (a)(3), and 23540, mandated suspension of Sidhu's driver's license until he completed a DUI education program, and presented proof of completion. He never submitted this proof.
All further statutory references are to the Vehicle Code unless otherwise indicated.
On March 29, 2008, a highway patrol officer arrested Sidhu for DUI. A breath test indicated his BAC was 0.30 percent. The officer served Sidhu with a notice of suspension of his driver's license. Sidhu failed to appear in court after that arrest. This resulted in a suspension of his driver's license beginning August 4, 2008. On November 29, 2017, the superior court granted a motion by Sidhu to dismiss the 2008 charges of DUI and failure to appear on the ground that he was not afforded a speedy trial.
The DMV issued a suspension order to Sidhu on December 8, 2017. It stated: "Your driving privilege is suspended effective Dec 12, 2017 and shall not be reinstated ... until you provide this department with ... proof of completion of a driving-under-the-influence program licensed pursuant to section 11836 of the Health and Safety Code." (Unnecessary capitalization omitted.) As grounds for the suspension, the order cited Sidhu's DUI offense committed March 27, 2006 (i.e., the 2007 conviction), and the previous one committed February 22, 1997, less than 10 years prior. In a declaration filed in the court proceedings, a DMV witness stated that this order was "triggered" because the dismissal of the 2008 case, and the termination of the suspension associated with it, left the suspension based on the 2007 conviction as the only suspension remaining.
Sidhu states that he "sought his driver's license" on December 11, 2017, and that he was denied on the ground that he had not completed the required driver education program.
Sidhu filed his writ petition in the superior court on December 21, 2017. The sole argument made in support of it in his memorandum of points and authorities was that he was not obligated to complete a DUI driver education program because the court did not order him to do so when, in 2017, it dismissed the charges from 2008. The argument suggested that, by issuing the suspension order, the DMV had usurped the role of the courts. As authority for this argument, Sidhu quoted what appears to be an out-of-date version of section 13352.4, subdivision (a)(1), which dealt with the imposition of an education requirement by a court as a condition of probation. The quotation was irrelevant, because this case has nothing to do with conditions of probation, and the mandates of the statute in question, section 13352, apply upon conviction by the statute's express terms, not upon a court's decision to impose them.
Sidhu's points and authorities did not refer to the suspension and education requirement mandated by the 2007 conviction at all, even though the suspension order was based on that conviction explicitly. In his reply brief, he argued that there was no suspension (or education requirement) in effect, because the dismissal of the 2008 charges could not trigger a suspension. Again, he ignored the suspension and education requirement based on the 2007 conviction.
The writ petition was heard and denied in the superior court on June 13, 2018. At the hearing, counsel for Sidhu sought to introduce a new argument to the effect that the suspension that began in 2008 was really based not on the 2008 failure to appear, but on the 2007 DUI conviction; and because he had been suspended for nine years, there was no time left for him to serve on the suspension and he did not have to complete any education program. Sidhu's counsel offered no law or evidence in support of this new argument.
The duration of the suspension is not at issue in this appeal. And the DMV's suspension order of December 8, 2017, sets forth a termination date of the later of December 1, 2017, or when the program is completed, indicating that the department considered the time condition of the suspension to have been already satisfied.
No written statement of the court's reasoning appears in the appellate record. At the end of the hearing, however, the court simply pointed out that Sidhu had a DUI that required him to complete an education program before his license suspension could be lifted, and he had not completed a program.
DISCUSSION
The argument in Sidhu's opening brief on appeal is identical or virtually identical to the argument in his opening brief in the trial court, and the argument in his reply brief on appeal repeats verbatim that in his opening brief on appeal. That is, he again relies on an irrelevant and outdated version of section 13352.4, subdivision (a)(1), involving conditions of probation. He also suggests again that the current suspension could only be based on the 2008 failure to appear, which, having been dismissed, could not support a suspension or an education requirement, and the court accordingly did not impose them when it dismissed the 2008 charges in 2017; so the DMV usurped the court's function when it informed him in 2017 that his license was and would remain suspended until he satisfied the education requirement.
We agree with the trial court that the issue is simply that Sidhu's 2007 conviction meant he was required to satisfy the education condition set forth in section 13352, subdivision (a)(3), and it is undisputed that he has not done so. Denying the petition on this basis, the trial court did not commit any error of law and did not rely on any factual findings unsupported by substantial evidence, so there are no grounds for reversing its denial of the writ. (Morris v. Harper (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 52, 58-59; Caloca v. County of San Diego (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1209, 1217.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to respondent DMV.