Opinion
NO. CIV. S-09-1090 LKK/DAD.
July 6, 2010
ORDER
I. BACKGROUND
On April 21, 2009, plaintiffs Sanjesh Singh ("Mr. Singh") and Mr. Singh's mother, Basant Sidhu ("Sidhu"), filed a complaint against three sheriff deputies, Garcia, Autry, and Collins ("sheriff deputy defendants"), Mr. Singh's former wife, Stacey Singh ("Ms. Singh"), and Ms. Singh's uncle, Sundar Bains ("Bains"). Plaintiffs alleged that the sheriff deputy defendants conducted an illegal search of their residence. Compl. ¶ 13. Plaintiffs brought claims arising out of this illegal search against the sheriff deputy defendants under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and under state law.
Plaintiffs also alleged that Ms. Singh and Mr. Bains made a false report to the sheriff's department and brought a claim against both for "aiding and abetting" the allegedly illegal search conducted by the sheriff deputy defendants.
On June 30, 2009, the court issued a status (pretrial scheduling) order in this case. The order stated that, "No further joinder of parties or amendments to pleadings is permitted except with leave of court, good cause having been shown. See Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1992)." Status (Pretrial Scheduling) Order, Dkt. No. 22, at 2. Discovery closed on June 1, 2010. Id. at 5.
On May 20, 2010, plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to file a first amended complaint. Dkt. No. 39. Plaintiffs sought to add three theories of liability against the sheriff deputy defendants under Section 1983. The court determined that plaintiffs' proposed amendment was futile, and their motion was denied.
On June 9, 2010, plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgement. Pl.'s MSJ, Dkt. No. 44. The motion argued that, inter alia, based on the sheriff deputy defendants' testimony that "there was no valid emergency/exigent circumstances allowing for the entry and search of plaintiffs' residence." Id. at 3. The motion further states that because defendants' answer "does not assert an affirmative defense of exigent circumstances as a valid and applicable exception to the warrant requirement" the issue is waived. Id.
On June 14, 2010, the sheriff deputy defendants filed a motion to modify the scheduling order for leave to amend their answer. Def.'s Mot. to Amend, Dkt. No. 54. The motion states that these defendants' "never intended to raise the defense of exigent circumstances . . . and no warrant was required based on the emergency doctrine." Id. at 1-2. Rather, these defendants argue that they have always maintained that the emergency exception to the warrant requirement applies to the search at issue in this case. Id. at 2. Accordingly, they seek to amend their answer to contain the defense of the emergency exception to the warrant requirement. These defendants also have presented evidence that plaintiffs have been aware of this defense as late as November 18, 2009.
Because the motion for leave to amend the answer is brought only by the sheriff deputy defendants, the Singh and Bains answer is not discussed. Thus, all references are to the sheriff deputy defendants documents.
II. STANDARD ON A MOTION TO AMEND PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)
The Federal Rules provide that leave to amend pleadings "shall be freely given when justice so requires Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). As the Ninth Circuit has explained, however, "demonstrating that justice requires amendment becomes progressively more difficult . . . as litigation proceeds toward trial." Byrd v. Guess, 137 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, U.S. ___, 119 S.Ct. 405 (1998), abrogated, on other grounds, Moreland v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dept., 159 F.3d 365 (9th Cir. 1998). Thus, subsequent to a scheduling order prohibiting further amendment, the moving party must demonstrate "good cause." Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 608 (9th Cir. 1992). Once a final pretrial order has been entered, "modifications are allowed `only to prevent manifest injustice.'" Byrd, 137 F.2d at 1331-32 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(e)).
Although the standard becomes progressively more stringent as the litigation proceeds, the Circuit has explained that the same four factors are pertinent to resolution of a motion to amend: (1) the degree of prejudice or surprise to the non-moving party if the order is modified; (2) the ability of the non-moving party to cure any prejudice; (3) the impact of the modification on the orderly and efficient conduct of the case; and (4) any degree of willfulness or bad faith on the part of the party seeking the modification. See Byrd, 137 F.3d at 1132 (citing United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Circle, 652 F.2d 882, 887 (9th Cir. 1981)). The burden is on the moving party to show that consideration of these factors warrants amendment. See id.
Prejudice to the opposing party is the most important factor to consider in determining whether a party should be granted leave to amend. See Jackson v. Bank of Hawaii, 902 F.2d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 320, 330-31 (1971)). Prejudice may be found where additional discovery would be required because the new claims are based on different legal theories. See Jackson, 902 F.2d at 1387-88 (citing Priddy v. Edelman, 883 F.2d 438, 447 (6th Cir. 1989)).
While delay alone is insufficient to deny amendment, undue delay is a factor to be considered. See Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Rose, 893 F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 1990) (affirming district court's denial of motion for leave to amend to add new claims made two years into litigation). Pertinent to consideration of this factor is whether the moving party knew or should have known the facts and theories raised by the amendment in the original pleading. See Jackson, 902 F.2d at 1388 (citingE.E.O.C. v. Boeing Co., 843 F.2d 1213, 1222 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 889 (1988)).
III. ANALYSIS
The main focus of this case is whether the sheriff deputy defendants properly entered plaintiffs' house. Defendants' answer states they "deny that they did not have a proper exception to the warrant requirement and further deny they violated the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights." Answer, Dkt. No. 11 at 2. Moreover, the fifth affirmative defense alleges that defendants' "acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly perform any acts whatsoever which would constitute a violation of any rights possessed by plaintiffs." Id. at 7.
While the words "emergency doctrine" are not specifically provided in defendants' answer, it is clear that they have asserted their contention that there was a proper exception to the warrant requirement. Combining this statement with the fifth affirmative defense, one can reasonably conclude that the acts of good faith referred to a proper exception to the warrant requirement, such as the emergency doctrine.
In addition to the language of the answer, there is sufficient evidence that plaintiffs had notice that defendants were invoking the emergency doctrine exception to the warrant requirement. Each of the defendants testified as to their belief of an emergency exception to the search warrant requirement. While there appeared to be some effort to conflate the exigent circumstances and emergency doctrine by plaintiff's counsel during the depositions, defendants repeatedly stated they thought it was the emergency doctrine which justified their entry into plaintiff's house. For example, Autry testified, "I do not believe that this [situation] falls under an exigent circumstances [sic]. I feel this was an emergency situation that arose after we got on the scene." Decl. of Kathleen Williams in Supp. of Mot. to Amend, Ex. B (Autry Dep.).
In considering the four factors for a motion to amend, the degree of prejudice is the court's main concern. In this case, there is no prejudice to the non-moving party because plaintiffs had ample notice of defendants' belief that their actions were justified based on the emergency doctrine. This information can be inferred from the answer and was directly stated in all sheriff deputy defendants' testimony. Because plaintiffs had notice of this alleged justification, there is no burden on them in terms of conducting supplemental discovery.
The court finds that amendment of the sheriff deputy defendants' complaint is not necessary to assert a defense of the emergency exception to the warrant requirement. This is especially so given the advance notice plaintiffs have had of the defense. According, the sheriff deputy defendants' motion is denied. Nonetheless, these defendants may bring a defense of the application of the emergency exception to the warrant requirement.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court orders that the sheriff deputy defendant's motion to modify the scheduling order to amend their answer, Dkt. No. 54, is DENIED, because an amendment is not required for defendants' to argue that the emergency exception to the warrant requirement applies.
IT IS SO ORDERED.