The record shows, however, that Appellants did not move for a continuance. Since Appellants did not specifically request a continuance, the trial court commits no error in failing to grant one. Burgess v. State (1984), Ind., 461 N.E.2d 1094, 1099, reh. denied (1984); see also Sidener v. State (1983), Ind., 446 N.E.2d 965, 968. Even had Appellants moved for a continuance, however, denial of their motion would not necessarily be error where an alternative remedy was given by the trial court, and more particularly, when the record does not show that Appellants suffered some prejudice from the denial.
Furthermore, the Record shows that Appellant's objection to Instruction No. 14 was made when it was tendered to counsel by the trial court prior to its being given to the jury and was only a general statement that did not in any way refer to the grounds Appellant now raises in this direct appeal. A statement of claimed errors must be specific or the issue will be considered waived. Spivey v. State (1971), 257 Ind. 257, 274 N.E.2d 227. Errors not properly preserved during trial and by the motion to correct errors are not available on appeal. Survance v. State (1984), Ind., 465 N.E.2d 1076, reh. denied; Sidener v. State (1983), Ind., 446 N.E.2d 965. Appellant has waived this issue. IV
When the sixth continuance was granted, the trial court informed the parties no further continuances would be granted. It is well settled that the denial of a motion for a continuance having no statutory basis will be reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion. Sidener v. State, (1983) Ind., 446 N.E.2d 965. Whether good cause for a continuance has been shown rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge, and in order to demonstrate an abuse of discretion the record must reveal that the appellant was prejudiced and not at fault. Id.; Johnson v. State, (1982) Ind., 432 N.E.2d 1358.
The granting of a continuance which has no statutory basis is within the discretion of the trial court. Sidener v. State, (1983) Ind., 446 N.E.2d 965. We find no abuse of that discretion in the case at bar.
Both the decision to declare a mistrial and the decision to grant a continuance are left to the discretion of the trial judge, reversible only upon a showing that the trial judge exceeded this discretion. Sidener v. State, (1983) Ind., 446 N.E.2d 965; Chambers v. State, (1981) Ind., 422 N.E.2d 1198. We totally agree with the state that the trial judge was in a better position than we to determine whether the juror's illness had any effect on the proceedings.
Moreover, even issues of a constitutional dimension are waived by failure to state them in one's motion to correct errors. Sidener v. State, (1983) Ind., 446 N.E.2d 965. This Court has held:
A litigant is not given special consideration by virtue of her pro se status.Sidener v. State, 446 N.E.2d 965, 966 (Ind. 1983).
A litigant is not given special consideration by virtue of his pro se status. Sidener v. State , 446 N.E.2d 965, 966 (Ind. 1983). Rather, ‘[i]t is well settled that pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys. This means that pro se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so.’
A litigant is not given special consideration by virtue of his pro se status. Sidener v. State , 446 N.E.2d 965, 966 (Ind. 1983). Rather, "[i]t is well settled that pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys.
[¶8] We note Gregory proceeds in this appeal pro se. A litigant is not given special consideration by virtue of his pro se status. Sidener v. State, 446 N.E.2d 965, 966 (Ind. 1983). Rather, "[i]t is well settled that pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys. This means that pro se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so."