The Beechers thereafter filed a petition in the United States Tax Court challenging this determination. The court rendered judgment for the Commissioner, basing its decision on its own precedent, as well as that of the Seventh, First, and Fifth Circuits, citing Krukowski v. Commissioner, 279 F.3d 547 (7th Cir.2002), Sidell v. Commissioner, 225 F.3d 103 (1st Cir.2000), and Fransen v. United States, 191 F.3d 599 (5th Cir.1999). II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We find this argument to be unpersuasive, as have the First and Fifth Circuits. See Sidell v. Commissioner, 225 F.3d 103, 107 (1st Cir. 2000); Fransen v. United States, 191 F.3d 599, 601 (5th Cir. 1999). Section 496( l) authorizes the Secretary to "prescribe such regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out provisions of [Section 469], including regulations which specify what constitutes an activity, material participation, or active participation" and regulations "requiring net income or gain from a limited partnership or other passive activity to be treated as not from a passive activity."
This regulation hardly could be clearer and, under familiar principles, ordinarily would be entitled to great weight. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984); Sidell v. Commissioner, 225 F.3d 103, 109 (1st Cir. 2000). Here, however, the petitioner scoffs at the suggestion that deference is due.
Furthermore, because the Commissioner speaks only through formal policy pronouncements, informal statements of his employees do not bind him and are not properly treated as his statements as a party to a case before the Tax Court. See Sidell v. Commissioner, 225 F.3d 103, 111 (1st Cir. 2000); see also Murphy v. Commissioner, No. 22-9001, 2022 WL 3910506, at *2 n.2 (10th Cir. Aug. 31, 2022) (citing Sidell v. Commissioner, 225 F.3d at 111), cert. denied, 143 S.Ct. 1096 (2023). We will therefore treat petitioner's Motion as seeking to compel nonparty depositions under Rule 74(c)(2), as indicated in the notices of deposition, and we will recharacterize it accordingly.
The Commissioner "speaks" only through formal statements of policy, such as regulations and revenue rulings. Sidell v. Commissioner, 225 F.3d 103, 111 (1st Cir. 2000). The informal statements of individual IRS employees-even those who occupy senior positions-do not bind the Commissioner.
We have previously held that section 1.469–2(f)(6), Income Tax Regs., is not arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to section 469(1)(2). Krukowski v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 366, 2000 WL 656711 (2000), affd. 279 F.3d 547 (7th Cir.2002); Shaw v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.2002–35; Sidell v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.1999–301, affd. 225 F.3d 103 (1st Cir.2000). The Courts of Appeals for the First, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits have also upheld the validity of section 1.469–2(f)(6), Income Tax Regs.
In any event, Murphy would be mistaken in giving legal weight to these discussions because "statements by individual IRS employees cannot bind the Secretary." Sidell v. Comm'r, 225 F.3d 103, 111 (1st Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). Entered for the Court
We simply concluded from this that the agency's interpretation of its regulations was "entitled to great deference." Id. (quoting Sidell v. Comm'r., 225 F.3d 103, 109 (1st Cir. 2000) ). Notably, we clarified in a footnote that we did not decide the question of whether a two-step process could satisfy the time and date requirements of the statute at issue in Pereira.
As this interpretation is neither "obviously erroneous or inconsistent with the language of the regulation," we see no reason to depart from the general rule that "an agency's interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to great deference." Sidell v. Comm'r, 225 F.3d 103, 109 (1st Cir. 2000). It follows that because the petitioner's NTA complied with the regulations as reasonably interpreted by the BIA, it was effective to confer jurisdiction upon the immigration court.III. CONCLUSION
According to MMC, the words “as defined in subsection (c)(3)” have the effect of adding the qualifier “C” to every instance of the word “corporation” in the overpayment provisions. The term “C corporation” refers to corporations that are taxed under subchapter C of the income tax provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. Cf. Sidell v. Comm'r, 225 F.3d 103, 105 (1st Cir.2000) (equating a “so-called C corporation” with “a regular business corporation”). Section 1361(a)(2) of the Code, however, provides that “the term ‘C corporation’ means ... a corporation which is not an S corporation.” Relying on that provision, the government argues that, because MMC is not an S corporation, it must in fact be a C corporation, and should receive the lower corporate interest rate regardless of the construction given to § 6621(a)(1).