Shurgan v. Tedesco

47 Citing cases

  1. Shea v. Icelandair

    925 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)   Cited 38 times
    Upholding award of $175,000.00 for emotional distress where plaintiff-employee was demoted and suffered both physically and emotionally, and this suffering was, in part, due to the defendant's discriminatory conduct

    Here, three out of four of the Appellate Division departments have held that the state trial courts are bound by the "deviates materially" standard. See Inya v. Ide Hyundai, Inc., 209 A.D.2d 1015, 1015, 619 N.Y.S.2d 440, 440 (4th Dep't 1994); Prunty v. YMCA of Lockport, Inc., 206 A.D.2d 911, 912, 616 N.Y.S.2d 117, 118 (4th Dep't 1994); Cochetti v. Gralow, 192 A.D.2d 974, 975, 597 N.Y.S.2d 234, 235 (3d Dep't 1993); Shurgan v. Tedesco, 179 A.D.2d 805, 806, 578 N.Y.S.2d 658, 659 (2d Dep't 1992). Furthermore, at least one federal district court has applied this test to a jury verdict under the Human Rights Law in an age discrimination case. Lightfoot v. Union Carbide Corp., 901 F. Supp. 166, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); see also Travelers Companies v. New York General Mechanical, Inc., No. 90-CV-0902E(M), 1994 WL 584926, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 1994) (applying § 5501(c) to damages in a diversity action); but see McIntosh v. Irving Trust Co., 887 F. Supp. 662, 664 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (applying "shocks the conscience" test to verdict under Human Rights Law without reference to N.Y.Civ.Prac.L. R. § 5501(c)).

  2. Lane v. Smith, JR

    84 A.D.3d 746 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011)

    Under the circumstances presented, the awards of $180,000 for past pain and suffering and $30,000 for future pain and suffering do not materially deviate from what would be reasonable compensation ( see CPLR 5501 [c]; Wilson v Livingston, 305 AD2d 585, 585-586; Shurgan v Tedesco, 179 AD2d 805, 806).

  3. Groell v. Groell

    61 A.D.3d 1357 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009)   Cited 1 times

    Plaintiff's son also chipped a tooth as a result of the attack, and he has become socially withdrawn as a result of his permanent scar. We conclude that the award of damages should be increased to $100,000 for past pain and suffering and that $50,000 should be awarded for future pain and suffering, and we therefore modify the judgment accordingly ( see Aversa v Bartlett, 11 AD3d 941; Olsen v City of Schenectady, 214 AD2d 869; Shurgan v Tedesco, 179 AD2d 805).

  4. Crawford v. New York City Housing Authority

    33 A.D.3d 956 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006)   Cited 9 times

    Based on the foregoing evidence, the jury's apportionment of fault of 40% to D'Antignac and 60% to the NYCHA was based on a fair interpretation of the evidence ( see Rhoden v Montalbo, supra; Nicastro v Park, supra). However, under the circumstances presented, we find that the awards of $350,000 for past pain and suffering and $350,000 for future pain and suffering materially deviated from what would be reasonable compensation to the extent indicated herein ( see CPLR 5501 [c]; Wilson v Livingston, 305 AD2d 585, 585-586 ; Shurgan v Tedesco, 179 AD2d 805, 806; see generally Harvey v Mazal Am. Partners, 79 NY2d 218, 225 [1992]; Bonilla v New York City Tr. Auth., 295 AD2d 297). The remaining contentions of the NYCHA do not require reversal.

  5. Ford v. Greater St. Johns Community Church

    2006 N.Y. Slip Op. 50250 (N.Y. App. Term 2006)

    However, it is well settled that a jury verdict should not be set aside as against the weight of the evidence unless the jury could not have reached the verdict by any fair interpretation of the evidence ( see Hospodar-Anikin v. City of New York, 12 AD3d 405; Nicastro v. Park, 113 AD2d 129). In the instant case, given the injuries claimed by plaintiff at trial as well as the conflicting testimony by the parties' medical witnesses, there was no basis to overturn the verdict since the record does not permit a determination that the amount awarded plaintiff deviated materially from what would be reasonable compensation ( see Shurgan v. Tedesco, 179 AD2d 805; Nicastro, 113 AD2d 129, supra). Pesce, P.J., Golia and Rios, JJ., concur.

  6. Cooper v. Apple Radio Car Service

    261 A.D.2d 500 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)   Cited 2 times

    In the case at bar, it was reasonable, based upon the evidence presented, for the jury to determine that the appellant failed to stop his vehicle at a red traffic light, and therefore, that he was the sole cause of the accident in which the plaintiff, a passenger in the car struck by the appellant, was injured. The damages awarded for past pain and suffering were excessive to the extent indicated because they deviated materially from what would be reasonable compensation under the circumstances of this case ( see, CPLR 5501 [c]; O'Brien v. Covert, 187 A.D.2d 419; Artis v. City of New York, 183 A.D.2d 685; Shurgan v. Tedesco, 179 A.D.2d 805). The parties' remaining contentions are without merit.

  7. DePasquale v. Klenetsky

    255 A.D.2d 546 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)   Cited 3 times
    In DePasquale, the plaintiff suffered constant pain in his neck and back as a result of an accident for a four-year period prior to verdict, and the jury determined he would suffer the same or similar pain for one year following the verdict (DePasquale, 255 AD2d at 546).

    Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs. Although as a general rule courts should exercise their discretionary power over damage awards sparingly ( see, Cochetti v. Gralow, 192 A.D.2d 974, 975; Shurgan v. Tedesco, 179 A.D.2d 805, 806), they are accorded considerable latitude in this regard ( see, Prunty v. YMCA of Lockport, 206 A.D.2d 911, 912). In the present case, the evidence established that the plaintiff Roy DePasquale has suffered serious and constant pain in his neck and back for the four-year period prior to the verdict, and the jury determined he would suffer the same or similar pain for a period of one year following the verdict.

  8. Plotkin v. New York City Health and Hospitals

    221 A.D.2d 425 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995)   Cited 22 times

    In a wrongful death action, an award of damages is limited to the fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injuries resulting from the decedent's death to the persons for whose benefit the action is brought (see, EPTL 5-4.3). The standard of review of an award is whether it deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation (see, CPLR 5501 [c]; Marigliano v City of New York, 196 A.D.2d 533, 536; Shurgan v Tedesco, 179 A.D.2d 805, 806). We agree with the trial court that the jury award of $41,000,000 for economic loss deviated materially from what was reasonable under the circumstances.

  9. Ashton v. Bobruitsky

    214 A.D.2d 630 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995)   Cited 34 times

    Prior to the entry of the judgment, the trial court, among other things, increased the award for past pain and suffering from $6,500 to $75,000. The trial court had the power, on motion of the parties or on its own motion, to review the question of whether the jury's verdict on the issue of damages was against the weight of the evidence (see, CPLR 4404 [a]) and to set it aside if it found that the verdict deviated materially from what would be reasonable compensation (see, Shurgan v Tedesco, 179 A.D.2d 805, 806). However, the trial court lacked the power to substitute its determination as to what was an appropriate award for that of the jury (see, Kupitz v Elliott, 42 A.D.2d 898; see also, Anderson v Stephen M. Donis, D.P.M., P.C., 150 A.D.2d 414, 416).

  10. Inya v. Ide Hyundai, Inc.

    209 A.D.2d 1015 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994)   Cited 38 times

    Order and judgment unanimously modified on the law and as modified affirmed without costs and new trial granted on damages for past and future pain and suffering only unless defendants, within 20 days of service of a copy of the order of this Court with notice of entry, stipulate to increase the verdict to $80,000 for past pain and suffering and $150,000 for future pain and suffering, in which event the order and judgment is modified accordingly and as modified affirmed without costs. Memorandum: Supreme Court may set aside a jury's award of damages if it materially deviates from what would be reasonable compensation (see, Prunty v. YMCA of Lockport, 206 A.D.2d 911; Cochetti v Gralow, 192 A.D.2d 974, 975; Shurgan v. Tedesco, 179 A.D.2d 805). The court erred in applying the "shocks the conscience" test to plaintiffs' motion to set aside the verdict on the ground that it was inadequate.