These were the interests which in time Madison sought to liquidate. Fern v. Crandell, 79 Colo. 403, 246 P. 270, 271 (1926); Sagamore Corp. v. Willcutt, 120 Conn. 315, 180 A. 464, 465-466 (1935); Masser v. London Operating Co., 106 Fla. 474, 145 So. 72. 77 (1933); Shultz v. Ramey, 64 N.M. 366, 328 P.2d 937, 940 (1958). Jacobsen v. Sweeney, 92 U.S.App.D.C. 93, 202 F.2d 461 (1953); Isquith v. Athanas, 33 A.2d 733, 734 (D.C.Mun.App. 1943).
1. The courts of other jurisdictions have held or stated in dicta that when there is a sharecrop lease, the tenant impliedly promises to farm in a husbandlike manner. Shultz v. Ramey, 64 N.M. 366, 328 P.2d 937, 940 (1958); Cammack v. Rogers, 32 Tex Civ App 125, 74 S.W. 945, 948 (1903); Brown v. Owen, 94 Ind 31, 35 (1883). Almost 100 years ago in Patton v. Garrett, 37 Ark. 605, 610 (1881), the Arkansas court decided to the contrary.
The appellants Wright and Galvan argue that, although the parent-child relationship is per se confidential, such relationship is not sufficient to itself raise a presumption of undue influence. By way of dictum, this court in Shultz v. Ramey, 64 N.M. 366, 328 P.2d 937 (1958), stated the view thus expressed by these appellants. On the other hand, appellees Ira B. Miller and Iva Lucille Miller argue that in New Mexico the rule is that, where there is a fiduciary relationship between beneficiary and testator, a presumption of undue influence arises.
In my view, the burden was on the wife to plead and prove grounds for avoidance of the statute of limitations. She should establish facts out of which the duress arose, Shultz v. Ramey, 64 N.M. 366, 328 P.2d 937 (1964), and also that the duress continued to a time within the period of limitations. See Pacheco v. Fresquez, 49 N.M. 373, 380, 164 P.2d 579 (1946); Beck v. Searson, 29 S.C. Eq. (8 Rich.Eq.)
A court will not be reversed when it has arrived at the correct result for a wrong reason. Jones v. Harper, 75 N.M. 557, 408 P.2d 56 (1965); Southern California Petroleum Corporation v. Royal Indemnity Company, 70 N.M. 24, 369 P.2d 407 (1962); Schultz v. Ramey, 64 N.M. 366, 328 P.2d 937 (1958). Defendant's last point is directed at claimed error in the court's finding that defendant had taken possession of the salvage.
Donaldson v. Johnson, 235 Ark. 348, 359 S.W.2d 810; nor is the fact of such relationship in itself sufficient to raise a presumption of undue influence. Trujillo v. Trujillo, 75 N.M. 724, 410 P.2d 947; Shultz v. Ramey, 64 N.M. 366, 328 P.2d 937. Accordingly, a deed between relatives will not be held invalid for undue influence absent a strong showing of dominance.
Reynolds v. Earley, 241 N.C. 521, 85 S.E.2d 904; Tseka v. Scher, 135 Conn. 400, 65 A.2d 169; Shannon v. Jacobson, 262 Mass. 463, 160 N.E. 245; Gradle v. Warner, 140 Ill. 123, 29 N.E. 1118; 3 Thompson on Real Property, § 1111, p. 382; 32 Am.Jur., Landlord and Tenant, § 848, p. 720. Compare Shultz v. Ramey, 64 N.M. 366, 328 P.2d 937 and Darr v. Eldridge, 66 N.M. 260, 346 P.2d 1041, 77 A.L.R.2d 1052. No claim is made in this case that an election to terminate the lease was ever made. Even if we were to assume a breach of its covenants, the lease remained in full force and effect.
Appellant's argument that the parent-and-child relationship raises a presumption of undue influence is precluded by the trial court's findings of fact and reasonable inferences flowing therefrom. In addition, the fact of such relationship is not, in itself, sufficient to raise a presumption of undue influence, Shultz v. Ramey, 1958, 64 N.M. 366, 328 P.2d 937. The burden of proving the facts by which the presumption of undue influence arises was upon the appellant, and it is obvious that her proof did not satisfy the trial court. With this, we agree.
The function of a reviewing court is to correct an erroneous result, not to correct errors which could not change the result. Southern California Petroleum Corp. v. Royal Indem. Co., 70 N.M. 24, 369 P.2d 407; Shultz v. Ramey, 64 N.M. 366, 328 P.2d 937. Only ultimate facts required to support the judgment are necessary findings. Rule 52(B) (2) (§ 21-1-1(52) (B) (2), N.M.S.A. 1953).
* * *" 39 Am.Jur., Parent and Child, § 101, p. 748. Appellant says that Shultz v. Ramey, 64 N.M. 366, 328 P.2d 937, follows this rule. Even if we accept this as the rule and giving the stipulation the weight that it merits, we are of the opinion that the evidence is substantial to support the trial court's finding: