Opinion
NNHCV156052205
04-05-2017
Isiah Shuler v. James Margolies et al
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Jon M. Alander, Judge of the Superior Court.
The plaintiff has filed the subject action against the defendants James Margolies and Robert Margolies for personal injuries resulting from a motor vehicle accident. The plaintiff alleges that, on May 16, 2014, he was operating a motor vehicle on Ella Grasso Boulevard in New Haven when a vehicle operated by an unidentified driver disobeyed a traffic signal and collided with the plaintiff's vehicle resulting in injuries to the plaintiff. The plaintiff further alleges that the unidentified driver was operating a motor vehicle owned by Robert Margolies with the permission of James Margolies, who was a passenger in the vehicle. The defendant James Margolies has moved for summary judgment contending that the plaintiff asserts a vicarious liability claim against him solely on the basis that he allegedly gave permission to the unidentified driver to operate the vehicle and that such a claim is not a viable cause of action.
" Summary judgment is a method of resolving litigation when pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law . . . Scrapchansky v. Plainfield, 226 Conn. 446, 450, 627 A.2d 1329 (1993). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court's function is not to decide issues of material fact, but rather, to determine whether any such issues exist. Cortes v. Cotton, 31 Conn.App. 569, 575, 626 A.2d 1306 (1993). [I]n deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party . . . Johnson v. Meehan, 225 Conn. 528, 535, 626 A.2d 244 (1993). Once the moving party has presented evidence in support of the motion for summary judgment, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue . . . Hammer v. Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Co., 214 Conn. 573, 578, 573 A.2d 699 (1990)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Warner v. Lancia, 46 Conn.App. 150, 158, 698 A.2d 938 (1997).
" It is not enough for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue. The existence of the genuine issue of material fact must be demonstrated by counter affidavits and concrete evidence. If the affidavits and the other supporting documents are inadequate, then the court is justified in granting the summary judgment, assuming that the movant has met his burden of proof." (Internal quotation marks and citations omitted.) Mozeleski v. Thomas, 76 Conn.App. 287, 290, 818 A.2d 893 (2003). The test is whether a party would be entitled to a directed verdict on the same facts. Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., 229 Conn. 99, 105-06, 639 A.2d 507 (1994).
As noted previously, James Margolies asserts judgment should enter in his favor on the complaint because the complaint fails to assert a recognizable cause of action against him. Specifically, James Margolies contends that the complaint solely asserts a claim of vicarious liability based on his giving permission to the unidentified driver to operate the vehicle. Since it is not alleged that he was the owner of the vehicle, James Margolies argues that a claim of vicarious liability does not lie. In his objection to the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff does not dispute that he seeks to impute the negligence of the unidentified operator to James Margolies. He contends that the negligence of a non-relative operator is considered the negligence of the passenger under the family car doctrine when the passenger has given the operator permission to drive the vehicle.
No authority exists for imposing vicarious liability on a non-owner of a motor vehicle merely because that individual gave permission to another to operate the vehicle and the operator did so negligently. " [T]here are no statutory or common-law causes of action that impose liability on an individual solely because he or she granted a third party permission to use his or her vehicle. See Pettway v. Johnson, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. CV 92 296135 (April 26, 1993, Fuller, J.) (9 Conn.L.Rptr. 33, 34, Id. ) ('there is no cause of action at common law or by statute against a defendant who neither owned nor operated the vehicle involved in the accident and where the claim only is based upon the giving of permission to drive the vehicle'); Knapp v. Chamberlain, 5 Conn.Supp. 97, 98 (1937) ('[t]hat portion of [the] allegation which asserts that the defendant . . . was driving [the co-defendant's] car with the latter's permission at the time of the collision is . . . alone . . . not sufficient to impose liability on [the co-defendant] for [the defendant's] negligence')." Luby v. Moore, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 126028720S, (June 7, 2013, Wilson, J.). The recognized causes of action covering such situations are limited to agency, negligent entrustment and the family car doctrine. Id. It is the family car doctrine, established by General Statutes § 52-182, upon which the plaintiff seeks to base his claim against James Margolies in this case.
It should be noted that the plaintiff failed to comply with the provision of the Practice Book which requires the plaintiff to expressly identify the statute upon which a claim is made. See Practice Book § 10-3(a). (" When any claim made in a complaint . . . is grounded on a statute, the statute shall be specifically identified by its number.")
It is undisputed that James Margolies is the son of Robert Margolies, the owner of the motor vehicle in question. The family car doctrine as embodied in General Statutes § 52-182 provides in pertinent part that " [p]roof that the operator of a motor vehicle . . . was the husband, wife, father, mother, son or daughter of the owner shall raise a presumption that such motor vehicle . . . was being operated as a family car . . . within the scope of a general authority from the owner, and shall impose upon the defendant the burden of rebutting such presumption." The statute places liability on the owner of the motor vehicle in situations where a family member is operating a family car. Case law has extended the owner's liability under the doctrine to include situations where a third party operates the vehicle with the permission of a family member authorized to use the vehicle. See, e.g., Cima v. Sciaretta, 140 Conn.App. 167, 176, 58 A.3d 345 (2013) (a plaintiff may successfully impute liability to the defendant owner under the family car doctrine where the defendant had granted general authority to his son to use the defendant's vehicle for the son's own pleasure and convenience, and, in furtherance of that grant of authority, the son authorized a third party to operate the vehicle at the time of the accident) and Chen v. Bernadel, 101 Conn.App. 658, 669, 922 A.2d 1142 (2007) (the defendant father may be subjected to liability for the friend's negligence because the defendant's son had general authority to use the car for his own pleasure and convenience). Here the plaintiff seeks to use the family law doctrine to impose liability on the son of the owner. The statute and case law do not support that claim.
In light of the above, the defendant James Margolies has shown that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the defendant James Margolies' motion for summary judgment is hereby granted.