Opinion
No. 28,940.
Filed January 11, 1954.
1. CRIMINAL LAW — Coram Nobis — Entry of Plea — Drug Addiction — Evidence. — Where appellant contended that at time of entry of plea, he was under influence of drugs, but evidence of several witnesses was to effect he appeared physically and mentally normal at time and conversed intelligently and he testified as to his previous convictions and of commission of crime of which he was charged, in minute detail, and the record demonstrated remarkable mental alertness and keen appreciation and understanding of proceedings, such assertions of lack of understanding at time are rank imposture. p. 50.
2. CRIMINAL LAW — Coram Nobis — Constitutional Rights Not Violated. — Where appellant was represented by counsel appointed by court and record shows that trial judge exercised meticulous care in safeguarding constitutional rights of appellant and caused to be made and preserved a thorough and complete record of proceedings, no reasonable man could doubt the correctness of decision of court on writ of error coram nobis hearing. p. 51.
3. CRIMINAL LAW — Coram Nobis — Influence of Drugs — Evidence. — Where appellant after entry of plea, took overdose of sleeping pills which necessitated hospitalization, and then returned to court for sentence, and evidence shows that when sentence was pronounced, he could make intelligent response to inquiries but was not then mentally alert, there was no violation of constitutional right in sentencing appellant under conditions he himself produced. p. 51.
From the Wabash Circuit Court, Byron C. Kennedy, Judge.
Robert Shuey filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis which was denied by the lower court. He appeals.
Affirmed.
James C. Cooper, Public Defender, and Richard M. Givan, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
Edwin K. Steers, Attorney General, and Frank E. Spencer, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.
This is an appeal from the denial of a writ of error coram nobis.
The record presents nothing but a disputed question of fact. The appellant, an admitted drug addict, testified that when he entered his plea of guilty he was so influenced by drugs, which he had taken while in the county jail, that he did not then comprehend and cannot now remember what transpired.
There is much oral and record evidence to the contrary. Several witnesses testified that he appeared to be physically and mentally normal at the time and that he conversed 1. intelligently and in a perfectly normal manner. At the instance of his attorney he testified concerning his previous record and his commission of the crime with which he stood charged, recounting it in minute detail. The record demonstrates a remarkable mental alertness on appellant's part, and a keen appreciation and perfect understanding of the proceedings. In fact, the oral testimony and the written record of the proceedings at the time the appellant entered his plea of guilty leads so irresistibly to the conclusion that the appellant's assertions of a lack of understanding are rank imposture, that we do not feel called upon to go into further detail concerning it.
The appellant was represented by counsel appointed by the court. The record shows that the trial judge exercised the most meticulous care in safeguarding the rights of the appellant 2. in all respects, and caused to be made and preserved a record so thorough and complete that no reasonable man could doubt the correctness of the decision in this case.
After the appellant entered his plea he was returned to the county jail, and he there took a large overdose of sleeping pills in what seems to have been an attempt at suicide, and as a 3. result he was rushed to the hospital where his stomach was pumped. There were no facilities for keeping him at the hospital for any considerable period, and three days later he was returned to court where sentence was imposed, and he was then taken to the reformatory. There is evidence that when he was sentenced he could make intelligent response to inquiries but he was not then mentally alert. We find no violation of any constitutional right of appellant in sentencing him under the conditions he himself produced.
Judgment affirmed.
NOTE. — Reported in 116 N.E.2d 298.