Opinion
5-22-0331
09-30-2022
In re ADOPTION OF HOLLIDAY W. v. Jonathan W., Respondent-Appellant. Kelli Shride and William Shride, Petitioners-Appellees,
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court Christian County. No. 17-AD-12 Honorable Bradley T. Paisley, Judge, presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE BOIE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Welch and Vaughan concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
BOIE PRESIDING JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed where the circuit court's finding that the respondent was an unfit person was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 2 The respondent, Jonathan W., is the biological father of the minor child, Holliday W., born on December 22, 2011. The minor child's biological mother, Jessica Tyson-Reagan, is deceased. The petitioners, Kelli Shride and William Shride, are the maternal grandmother and step-grandfather of the minor child. On December 6, 2017, the petitioners filed a petition for adoption of the minor child pursuant to the Adoption Act (Act) (750 ILCS 50/0.01 et seq. (West 2016)).
¶ 3 On August 15, 2019, the circuit court found the respondent to be an unfit person as defined in section 1(D)(i) of the Act (id. § 1(D)(i)), based upon depravity. The circuit court further determined that the termination of the respondent's parental rights was in the minor child's best interest. As such, on May 13, 2022, the circuit court granted the petition for adoption and entered a judgment of adoption. The respondent now appeals the circuit court's judgment arguing that the circuit court's finding that the respondent was an unfit person was against the manifest weight of the evidence. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 5 On December 6, 2017, the petitioners filed the petition for adoption of the minor child in the Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, Christian County, Illinois. The petition for adoption alleged that the respondent was an unfit person as follows:
"a. That he has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the child's welfare;
b. That he has repeatedly and continuously failed, although physically and financially able, to provide the child with adequate food, clothing, or shelter;
c. That he has deserted the child for more than three (3) months next preceding the commencement of the adoption proceeding;
d. That he has given evidence of the intent to forego his parental rights by his failure for a period of more than twelve (12) months to visit the child, to communicate with the child with no agency or court prohibition thereof, and to maintain contact with and plan for the future of the child although physically able to do so;
e. That he has been convicted of at least three (3) felonies under the laws of the State of Illinois, with one such conviction taking place within 5 years of the filing of this Petition and is depraved; and
f. That he is incarcerated as a result of [a] criminal conviction at the time this Petition was filed and prior to his incarceration, he had little or no contact with the child and provided little or no support for the child and his incarceration will prevent him from discharging his parental responsibilities for the child for a period in excess of 2 years after the filing of this Petition."
¶ 6 The respondent was incarcerated within the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) at the time the petition for adoption was filed and had been incarcerated within the IDOC since August 2, 2013. The respondent is serving a 15-year sentence imposed for an attempted first degree murder conviction in No. 13-CF-13 (Cir. Ct. Christian County, Aug. 1, 2013), and he is expected to be released in 2025. The minor child's biological mother, Jessica Tyson-Reagan, was killed in a motor vehicle accident on October 21, 2016. In response to the petition for adoption, the respondent filed, pro se, a response, a motion for the substitution of judge, and a motion for the appointment of counsel. On January 19, 2018, the respondent withdrew his motion for the substitution of judge, and the same day, the circuit court appointed counsel to represent the respondent.
¶ 7 On April 9, 2019, the circuit court conducted a fitness hearing. The respondent was present at the hearing with counsel, and three witnesses were called to testify. The first witness called to testify at the hearing was the petitioner, Kelli Shride. Kelli testified that the minor child was currently seven years old and had resided with her since the minor child was four years old. Kelli stated that she had obtained guardianship of the minor child after Jessica's death in 2016. Kelli testified that the respondent was incarcerated in the IDOC and had been incarcerated since 2013, when the minor child was 1½ years old. Kelli stated that she believed that the respondent would remain incarcerated until 2025, and that the minor child would be 13 years old at the time of his release.
¶ 8 Kelli testified that she had received two checks from the respondent since the minor child came to live with her. Kelli stated that one check was in the amount of $20 and the other check was in the amount of $15. Kelli testified that she had received both checks within the last year after the petition for adoption was filed. Kelli stated that she had known the respondent since approximately 2009, that he did not have a whole lot of involvement with the minor child prior to his current incarceration, and that he did not provide support for the minor child. According to Kelli's testimony, Jessica financially supported the respondent and the minor child.
¶ 9 Kelli went on to state that, after Jessica's death, the respondent wrote to the minor child frequently, but inappropriately. By "inappropriately," Kelli stated that, among other things, the respondent would tell the minor child about the women that he was talking to and that would write him, the drunk driver that caused Jessica's death, and that Kelli was keeping the minor child away from the respondent. Kelli stated that after the respondent was ordered to be careful of what he was saying in his letters, the letters came every few months. Kelli also testified that the respondent was not receiving any parenting time with the minor child, but admitted that he had filed numerous petitions in an attempt to have physical visitation.
¶ 10 Kelli further testified that the respondent had been verbally abusive to Jessica. Kelli stated that the respondent would belittle Jessica and call her a "[f]-ing cunt." Kelli stated that during the first year that Jessica was with the respondent, the respondent got upset with Jessica and "tore up" their apartment, resulting in the respondent going to jail for the first time. Kelli also stated that when Jessica and the respondent lived with her, there was numerous times that the respondent would call Jessica "every name you could possibly imagine in front of [the minor child]," and that the verbal abuse occurred daily. Kelli testified that the respondent physically "went after" her youngest daughter until her husband picked the respondent up, sat him on a counter, and told him "you do not ever touch a female, you do not put your hands on a female."
¶ 11 Kelli stated that there was also an incident which resulted in the breakup of the relationship between the respondent and Jessica. Kelli testified that the incident began when she had confronted the respondent about not providing anything for the minor child, and the respondent told her "to mind my F-ing business, that it was none of my concern as to what he spent money on." Kelli stated that she had the minor child in her arms and that the respondent picked up a metal burn barrel and threw it at her. Kelli stated that Jessica was present during the incident, that the respondent started grabbing at Jessica, then the respondent and Jessica were on the ground, and the respondent was pulling off Jessica's pants. Kelli stated that the respondent was telling Jessica "all kinds of bad stuff," so Kelli put the minor child down on the ground and ran to pull the respondent off of Jessica. Kelli stated that the neighbors heard the incident and stated that they were going to call the police, so the respondent left. Kelli testified that the incident was the last time she saw the respondent until he assaulted her husband with a vehicle.
¶ 12 Kelli also testified that the respondent had been abusive to Jessica at the hospital when the minor child was born. Kelli stated that the respondent refused to allow Jessica to hold the baby, and that when Jessica started to cry, the respondent yelled at Jessica, calling her stupid so loudly that he was disturbing several other patients and the respondent was "kicked out" of the room. Kelli stated that she was also crying "because he scared me," and that it took three nurses to get the respondent to return the baby to the crib.
¶ 13 Kelli further testified that the respondent had used drugs because he would sit in the driveway and smoke it or drive while the minor child was in the vehicle and "smoke the fake stuff which makes you crazy." Finally, Kelli stated that there was also an incident in which the respondent got into an argument with her other daughter, grabbed the minor child from Kelli's arms, put her in the car seat, and told Kelli that she was never going to see the minor child again.
¶ 14 After Kelli's testimony, the petitioners submitted exhibit A regarding the respondent's criminal history. Exhibit A evidenced the respondent's attempted first degree murder conviction and sentence, which was imposed on August 1, 2013, in No. 13-CF-13 (Cir. Ct. Christian County, Aug. 1, 2013); the respondent's conviction and sentence for criminal damage to property in excess of $300, a Class 4 felony, in No. 09-CF-1463 (Cir. Ct. Macon County, Mar. 27, 2014); and the respondent's conviction and sentence for residential burglary, a Class 2 felony, in No. 06-CF-546 (Cir. Ct. Macon County, May 31, 2006). The circuit court admitted exhibit A, without objection, and further confirmed that the parties agreed that the respondent had three felony convictions, and that at least one of those convictions took place within five years of the filing of the petition for adoption.
Exhibit A did not state the date of the respondent's conviction for attempted first degree murder, nor provide any details pertaining to the charge.
¶ 15 The respondent was then called to testify on his own behalf. The respondent stated that he was the father of the minor child and that he was currently incarcerated at the Centralia Correctional Center in Centralia, Illinois. The respondent testified that he had met the minor child's mother, Jessica, in approximately June 2009. In March 2011, the respondent stated that he and Jessica were living in St. Louis, Missouri, when he found out that she was pregnant. The respondent testified that he had attended all of Jessica's doctor visits and that he was present at the birth of the minor child. The respondent further stated that the petitioners were also at the hospital on the day that the minor child was born.
¶ 16 The respondent testified that he and Jessica remained in St. Louis, Missouri, after the minor child was born in December 2011, until roughly February 15, 2012. During that time, the respondent stated that both he and Jessica worked and that they alternated shifts so one of them could care for the minor child. In February 2012, the respondent stated that they moved in with the petitioners and then lived there intermittently until April 2012. In April 2012, the respondent stated that they moved to Decatur, Illinois, to live with his stepfather because he could "never find common ground" with the petitioner, Kelli. Between February and April 2012, the respondent stated that he worked and provided financial support for Jessica and the minor child. The respondent testified that they stayed with his stepfather until July 2012 and then moved back to the petitioners' residence.
¶ 17 On August 10, 2012, the respondent stated that he and Jessica "split up," and that he moved back to his stepfather's residence. The respondent stated that, after he moved, he saw the minor child "quite frequently" since Jessica would come to Decatur to see her best friend and that the respondent would provide "[a]nything that they needed." At the end of September 2012, the respondent testified that he got laid off from his employment and then took care of the minor child at least three times a week while Jessica was working. According to the respondent's testimony, he physically had the minor child at least three times a week and provided financial support for the minor child until he was arrested on January 28, 2013.
¶ 18 The respondent stated that he was sentenced on August 1, 2013, and that he had written letters and attempted to call Jessica, in order to have contact with the minor child. The respondent also testified that he wrote to the petitioner, Kelli, and that none of his attempts to see the minor child were successful. The respondent testified that he had filed petitions with the circuit court. The first petition that the respondent filed was a petition for visitation filed on December 2, 2013. The respondent stated that he filed the petition for visitation because he had not heard from Jessica since July 2013. According to the respondent's testimony, the circuit court conducted a hearing on the petition, at which he appeared via telephone, on August 14, 2014. The respondent stated that the circuit court "automatically denied visitation for no reason," but that the circuit court did order Jessica to keep the respondent informed of her current address so that the respondent could write to the minor child.
¶ 19 The respondent went on to testify that Jessica did not comply with the circuit court's order and that several of his letters were returned as undeliverable as addressed. As such, the respondent stated that he filed a motion to compel in December 2014. The respondent stated that no hearing was conducted, but that the circuit court did enter an order after which he received an address for the minor child in March 2015. The respondent stated that he next filed a motion to modify visitation on July 7, 2015, and a motion to compel on August 21, 2015, since his letters were being returned again. The circuit court conducted a hearing on the respondent's motion to modify visitation on April 28, 2016, and denied the respondent's request for parenting time due to the minor child's age. The respondent stated that the circuit court did, however, order Jessica to send the respondent pictures of the minor child, at least four times per year, and to read the respondent's cards and letters to the minor child. As such, the respondent testified that he wrote to the minor child on a daily basis and wrote to her as if she was "much older and could understand things as more of a mature person" because Jessica had informed the respondent that she was never going to read his letters to the minor child, but that she would save them and give them to her when the minor child got older.
¶ 20 The respondent testified that he filed another petition for visitation after Jessica's death and after he had consented to the petitioners' receiving guardianship of the minor child. The respondent stated that the circuit court never ruled on that petition. Since being incarcerated, the respondent stated that he has not had any type of income, but that he did attempt to have a third party send money to the petitioner, Kelli. The respondent also stated that he had "numerous people" reach out to Jessica, before her death, to assist her with anything that the minor child might need.
¶ 21 The respondent testified that he had done everything possible since being incarcerated to better himself so he could come home, take care of the minor child, and be a part of the minor child's life. The respondent stated that since being incarcerated, he had obtained his GED, received a certification in custodian maintenance, and completed other academic classes. The respondent stated that he took custodian maintenance because the woman he refers to as his mother, who is not his biological mother, owned a cleaning company and when the respondent was released, he would "run that business." The respondent testified that he had earned 47 college credits since being incarcerated.
¶ 22 The respondent further stated that he was aware that he had mental health issues and, as such, he had participated in mental health counseling and group therapy classes while incarcerated. The respondent stated that he was not eligible for the parenting class until he had less time left to serve since inmates with closer release dates took priority, but that he was on the wait list for the class. The respondent further testified that he was using his time while incarcerated to "do everything I possibly could to change and make a better me," so that he would not recidivate and go back to prison.
¶ 23 The respondent went on to state that the minor child was currently with the petitioners and that he was glad that the petitioner, Kelli, was there after Jessica's death. The respondent stated that Kelli had "stepped up and she took [the minor child] without a question, without a blink of the eye and came pretty much to the rescue." The respondent stated that he knew that the minor child was safe with Kelli and that Kelli always tried to do the best she could, especially when it came to her children. The respondent also stated that he was "110 percent" appreciative of what Kelli had done for the minor child and further stated that Kelli had done things that she did not have to do for the minor child. The respondent further stated that he wished "nothing but the best" for the petitioner, Patrick, and that Patrick was a good person, and a loyal individual.
The petitioner's full name is William Patrick Shride, and it appears that he goes by his middle name of Patrick since he is consistently referred to as "Patrick" within the record of proceedings. For consistency, and to avoid any potential confusion, we will also refer to the petitioner by his middle name of Patrick.
¶ 24 The respondent acknowledged that the petitioner, Patrick, was the victim in the case that resulted in the respondent's current incarceration. The respondent stated that he was sorry for hurting Patrick, and testified that he had hit Patrick with a vehicle because he was "frustrated at that situation that we were in at that point in time." The respondent stated that Kelli and Jessica were outside and present at the time of the incident, but that the minor child was inside of the residence. The respondent stated that there was no history of domestic violence between himself and Jessica, and that Jessica had visited him one time in prison in 2013, but that she did not bring the minor child with her. The respondent testified that the earliest he would be eligible for release would be October 30, 2025, and that the last time he had seen the minor child was January 28, 2013.
¶ 25 The last witness to testify at the circuit court's fitness hearing was Dawn McElroy. Dawn stated that she had known the respondent since he was a teenager and that she was a mother figure to the respondent. Dawn testified that the respondent's early family life "wasn't good" and that he did not have "a support system, love, roots." Dawn stated that she had maintained her relationship with the respondent while he has been incarcerated, had spoken to him at least weekly, and visited the respondent as often as possible.
¶ 26 Dawn testified that, although she had not observed the respondent around the minor child very much, the respondent spoke of the minor child a great deal. Dawn further stated that, since being incarcerated, the respondent had matured in his way of thinking, his actions, and "definitely in his future desires." Dawn testified that when the respondent spoke to her about his future, it was always the minor child and how the respondent wanted to be better for her.
¶ 27 Dawn testified that the respondent would work for her upon his release and that he had a good work ethic, so she would have no issue with hiring him. Dawn also testified that she would support the respondent upon his release with housing and "to the best of my ability help him financially and keep loving him." Dawn stated that the respondent had asked her to provide money or gifts for the minor child and that she had attempted to do so by bringing gifts to the courthouse in 2018.
¶ 28 At the close of the hearing, the circuit court granted the parties 14 days to submit written closing arguments, after which the circuit court took the matter under advisement. On August 15, 2019, the circuit court entered a nine-page written memorandum order on stage one hearing on the petition for adoption (memorandum order). The memorandum order acknowledged that the evidence demonstrated that the respondent had taken advantage of the programming while incarcerated in an attempt to rehabilitate himself. The memorandum order also stated that the respondent had demonstrated his willingness to maintain a presence in the minor child's life despite his circumstances that severely limited his ability to maintain and foster a relationship with her. The memorandum order noted, however, that:
"On January 28, 2013, [the respondent] intentionally struck petitioner, William Shride, with his automobile. On May 29, 2013, a jury found [the respondent] guilty of attempted first-degree murder. On August 1, 2013, the Court sentenced [the respondent] to 15 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections. [The respondent] is still serving that sentence and is still litigating post-conviction matters arising from that conviction."
¶ 29 The memorandum order went on to state that because the respondent had been convicted of attempted first degree murder, there was a statutory presumption of depravity that could only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence. The memorandum order stated that, while the respondent's accomplishments were commendable, they were insufficient to overcome the presumption of depravity by clear and convincing evidence. In support of its findings, the memorandum order cited precedent that the completion of classes while in prison does not demonstrate rehabilitation and that rehabilitation could" 'only be shown by a parent who leaves prison and maintains a lifestyle suitable for parenting children safely'" (quoting In re Shanna W., 343 Ill.App.3d 1155, 1167 (2003)).
¶ 30 The memorandum order went on to state that, "[e]ven if the Court analyzed the 'depravity' issue based on the presumption arising from three felony convictions, the Court would still conclude petitioners have met their burden of proof." The memorandum order stated that:
"A jury convicted [the respondent] of attempted first degree murder after he drove a vehicle at a high rate of speed down the block and into Petitioners' yard, striking William Shride and causing serious injury before driving off at great speed. This occurred immediately after [the respondent] confronted [petitioner, William Shride] in the yard and immediately after he had returned Holliday to Jessica and Holliday was in the house at the time. Independent witnesses observed the incident and testified against [the respondent] at trial. The Court finds the evidence in the case, coupled with his other criminal convictions and his treatment of Jessica and the [petitioners], demonstrated [the respondent's] conduct resulting in his convictions was extremely serious and indicative of an inherent deficiency of moral sense and rectitude. As stated above, [the respondent's] efforts at rehabilitation are not sufficient to avoid a finding of depravity."
¶ 31 Finally, the memorandum order stated as follows:
"Here, the evidence at trial very specifically demonstrated the facts of the attempt first degree murder case as stated above, as well as [the respondent's] prior criminal history and history of verbal and physical abuse of Jessica and her mother. The Court concludes all of the evidence in the record was sufficient to prove [the respondent's] depravity by clear and convincing evidence and that his rehabilitation efforts are insufficient, for the reasons state[d] above, to avoid said finding.
In summary, the Court finds that the Petitioners have proven [the respondent] to be 'unfit' because of his 'depravity.' "
¶ 32 On May 10 and 11, 2021, the circuit court held a hearing on the best interest of the minor child. The circuit court found that the termination of the respondent's parental rights was in the best interest of the minor child, and the respondent does not challenge that finding on appeal. Therefore, in the interest of brevity, we will not summarize the evidence presented at the circuit court's best interest hearing, any reports filed with the circuit court regarding the best interest of the minor child, or any specific findings of the circuit court related to the best interest of the minor child.
¶ 33 On May 13, 2022, the circuit court entered a judgment of adoption (judgment). The judgment stated that on April 9, 2019, the circuit court heard evidence at the fitness stage of the proceedings, and that on August 15, 2019, the circuit court found, by clear and convincing evidence, the respondent unfit based upon depravity. The judgment then set forth the best interest factors outlined in section 1-3(4.05) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2020)), and its findings regarding each factor. Based on weighing the best interest factors, the judgment stated that the circuit court had determined that it was in the minor child's best interest that a judgment of adoption be granted. Therefore, the circuit court's judgment ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the petition for adoption was granted, and that the respondent's parental rights regarding the minor child were terminated. The respondent now appeals the circuit court's judgment of adoption arguing that the circuit court's finding that the respondent was unfit was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 34 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 35 On appeal, the respondent urges this court to reverse the circuit court's finding that he is an unfit person as set forth in section 1(D)(i) of the Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(i) (West 2018)), arguing that the circuit court's finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence. A finding of parental unfitness will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re C.N., 196 Ill.2d 181, 208 (2001). A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent or the determination is arbitrary, unreasonable, and not based on the evidence. In re G.W., 357 Ill.App.3d 1058, 1059 (2005). The circuit court's finding of unfitness is given great deference because it has the best opportunity to view and evaluate the parties and their testimony. In re Daphnie E., 368 Ill.App.3d 1052, 1064 (2006). This court, therefore, does not reweigh the evidence or reassess the credibility of the witnesses. In re M.A., 325 Ill.App.3d 387, 391 (2001). Each case concerning parental fitness is unique and must be decided on the particular facts and circumstances presented. In re Gwynne P., 215 Ill.2d 340, 354 (2005).
¶ 36 To terminate a parent's parental rights in a proceeding commenced under the Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2018)), the circuit court must first find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent is unfit. In re M.M., 156 Ill.2d 53, 61 (1993). Section 1(D)(i) of the Act provides, inter alia, that a parent is unfit based upon depravity and sets forth a rebuttable presumption that a parent is depraved if the parent has been criminally convicted of at least three felonies under federal law, or the laws of any state, and at least one of the felony convictions occurred within five years prior to the filing of the petition for adoption. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(i) (West 2018). Because the presumption is rebuttable, a parent may still present evidence showing that, despite the convictions, the parent is not depraved. In re J.A., 316 Ill.App.3d 553, 562 (2000). Section 1(D)(i)(3) of the Act further provides a higher standard for the rebuttal of the presumption of depravity for an individual convicted of "(3) attempt or conspiracy to commit first degree murder or second degree murder of any child in violation of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012." 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(i)(3) (West 2018). The presumption of depravity provided for in section 1(D)(i)(3) of the Act may only be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. Id.
¶ 37 In this matter, the respondent first argues that the circuit court applied the incorrect standard to the initial part of its ruling by stating that the respondent was required to rebut the presumption of depravity by clear and convincing evidence because of his conviction for attempted first degree murder. Whether the trial court applied the correct legal standard is a question of law that we review de novo. NC Illinois Trust Co. v. Madigan, 351 Ill.App.3d 311, 314 (2004).
¶ 38 In its memorandum order, the circuit court stated that:
"[O]ne is presumed depraved if he is convicted of attempt first degree murder, and that presumption can only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(i).
Since [the respondent] was convicted of attempt, first degree murder, he is presumed depraved and can only overcome the presumption by clear and convincing evidence that he is not depraved."
¶ 39 We agree with the respondent's argument that the circuit court erred in applying a clear and convincing evidence standard for the rebuttal of the presumption to the initial part of its ruling.
As noted above, section 1(D)(i) of the Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(i)) provides a higher rebuttal standard for an individual convicted of "(3) attempt or conspiracy to commit first degree murder or second degree murder of any child in violation of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012." (Emphasis added.) Id. § 1(D)(i)(3). The victim of the respondent's attempted first degree murder conviction was the petitioner, Patrick Shride, who was not a child at the time of the incident. As such, section 1(D)(i)(3) of the Act (id.) was not applicable to the respondent and the respondent was not required to rebut the presumption by clear and convincing evidence. Rather, the respondent only had to provide evidence opposing the presumption. In re P.J., 2018 IL App (3d) 170539, ¶ 14.
¶ 40 Normally, the application of the incorrect standard regarding the presumption of depravity would require this court to reverse the circuit court's judgment. See id. ¶ 16 (findings based on wrong standard foreclosed any additional argument regarding respondent's alleged depravity and required remand). In this case, however, the circuit court did not apply the higher standard at the hearing, but instead, applied the higher standard to the initial portion of its analysis and then went on to conduct an analysis of the evidence under the lower standard regarding the presumption arising from three felony convictions. Therefore, this court will disregard the circuit court's findings under the higher standard and focus our analysis on the circuit court's findings under the presumption arising from three felony convictions.
¶ 41 In Illinois, the term "depravity" means "an inherent deficiency of moral sense and rectitude." Stalder v. Stone, 412 Ill. 488, 498 (1952). The State must demonstrate depravity by establishing that the respondent has a" 'deficiency' in moral sense and either an inability or an unwillingness to conform to accepted morality," at the time that the petition for adoption was filed. In re J.A., 316 Ill.App.3d at 561. In order to rebut the presumption of depravity, a parent must show that despite his convictions, he is not depraved. Id. at 562. There is no fixed rule as to how much evidence is required to rebut the presumption, but the stronger the presumption, the greater the amount of evidence is required to rebut it. In re A.M., 358 Ill.App.3d 247, 253 (2005). If a parent presents evidence contradicting the presumption, the presumption is removed, and the issue is determined based on the evidence presented. In re J.A., 316 Ill.App.3d at 562.
¶ 42 Here, the circuit court found that the respondent had produced evidence to rebut the presumption arising from three felony convictions and decided the issue based on all of the evidence adduced, as if the presumption never arose. The circuit court stated that:
"[T]he evidence at trial very specifically demonstrated the facts of the attempt first degree murder case as stated above, as well as his prior criminal history and history of verbal and physical abuse of Jessica and her mother. The Court concludes all of the evidence in the record was sufficient to prove [the respondent's] depravity by clear and convincing evidence and that his rehabilitation efforts are insufficient, for the reasons state[d] above, to avoid said finding."
¶ 43 The respondent argues that the circuit court relied upon on its own private investigation or personal knowledge and considered evidence not presented in the evidentiary hearing to reach the above finding. The respondent states that the memorandum order discussed facts regarding the respondent's conviction for attempted first degree murder that were never presented at the hearing. Specifically, the respondent argues that there was no evidence presented of the following facts that are explicitly mentioned in the memorandum order: (1) that the respondent was convicted by a jury; (2) that the respondent was driving at great speed towards the petitioner from a block away; (3) that the petitioner suffered serious injury; (4) that the respondent drove off at a great speed; and (5) that independent witnesses observed the event and testified against the respondent at trial.
¶ 44 We agree with the respondent's argument that the circuit court improperly considered facts not in evidence at the time the determination of unfitness was rendered. This court, however, may affirm the circuit court's decision on any basis supported by the record, regardless of the reasoning employed by the circuit court. In re Marriage of Morreale, 351 Ill.App.3d 238, 241 (2004); Scassifero v. Glaser, 333 Ill.App.3d 846, 860 (2002). As such, this court will disregard that portion of the circuit court's reasoning based upon facts not in evidence and base our analysis solely on the record on appeal.
¶ 45 Based on our review of the common law record and the record of proceedings for the fitness hearing, we find that the State presented clear and convincing evidence sufficient to prove the respondent unfit based upon depravity. Without consideration of the facts improperly noted by the circuit court, the record clearly reflects that the respondent was convicted of attempted first degree murder. The very nature of attempted first degree murder evidences a complete disregard, not only of the effect it would have on the minor child, but also of the human life jeopardized. Further, the respondent was on probation for another offense and still proceeded to commit another crime, thereby demonstrating a complete disregard for any consequences. If the respondent believed there were mitigating circumstances that would reduce or eliminate the nature of his convictions, he was free to present those circumstances to the circuit court. Instead, the respondent testified that he had "hit [the petitioner, Patrick] with a vehicle" because he "was frustrated at that situation that we were in at that point in time." As such, there was sufficient evidence to indicate the seriousness of the respondent's attempted first degree murder conviction and the respondent's deficiency in a moral sense.
¶ 46 The circuit court's finding of unfitness was also based on the respondent's other criminal convictions and his treatment of Jessica and the petitioners. The respondent argues that little information was presented regarding the facts and circumstances of the prior convictions. We disagree. The State admitted, without objection, the charging information for both of the respondent's previous felony convictions. The charging information provided the dates and locations and outlined the crimes committed. The respondent was aware that his prior convictions were the basis for the State's allegation of unfitness and, as stated above, he was free to offer any evidence regarding his previous convictions for the circuit court's consideration and declined to do so.
¶ 47 The respondent also argues that he had disputed the testimony regarding any physical violence and that the testimony of the petitioner, Kelli, was self-serving and unsupported by any other form of evidence. This court does not reweigh the evidence or reassess the credibility of the witnesses. In re M.A., 325 Ill.App.3d at 391. Instead, this court gives great deference to the circuit court's findings on credibility because it has the best opportunity to view and evaluate the parties and their testimony. In re Daphnie E., 368 Ill.App.3d at 1064. As such, it was completely within the discretion of the circuit court to find the testimony of the petitioner, Kelli, more credible than the testimony of the respondent, and to consider that testimony in determining whether the respondent had exhibited either an inability or an unwillingness to conform to accepted morality.
¶ 48 Finally, the respondent argues that the State failed to prove he was depraved at the time the petition for adoption was filed. According to the respondent's argument, the incident that led to the respondent's incarceration occurred almost four years prior to the petition for adoption being filed, and the vast majority of evidence presented by the petitioners took place four or more years prior to the filing of the petition. The respondent further argues that the only evidence presented by the petitioners concerning depravity at the time that the petition for adoption was filed was the content of his letters, but that the letters alone do not demonstrate a total depravity. According to the respondent's argument, he had presented evidence that he was able to conform to accepted morality and had shown a willingness to do so, not only by competing classes, but by showing a strong moral compass despite his convictions. As such, the respondent argues that he was never depraved at all, not that he is no longer depraved.
¶ 49 We find this argument unpersuasive. During the four years or so prior to the filing of the petition for adoption, the respondent was incarcerated and in a controlled environment where there was no opportunity for him to commit any further offenses. The behavior of the respondent while in prison does not show that the respondent is willing to conform to accepted morality outside the structure of prison life, but simply shows, at best, an intent to conform to accepted morality. See In re A.M., 358 Ill.App.3d at 254. Thus, even disregarding the improper facts considered by the circuit court, there was sufficient evidence within the record for the circuit court to have found that the respondent's conduct resulting in his convictions was indicative of an inherent deficiency in moral sense and rectitude.
¶ 50 Therefore, based on the above, we find that the circuit court's finding that the respondent was an unfit person pursuant to section 1(D)(i) of the Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(i) (West 2018)), based upon depravity, was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 51 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 52 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Christian County.
¶ 53 Affirmed.