Thus, each was a de facto officer, and `as such his acts are as binding as though he was an officer de jure.' Shriber v. Culberson, 31 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1930, no writ). De jure is defined in Black's Law Dictionary 382 (5th ed. 1979) as:
Here, as in Vick v. City of Waco, the challenged officers were acting under color of authority. Thus, each was a de facto officer, and `as such his acts are as binding as though he was an officer de jure.' Shriber v. Culberson, 31 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1930, no writ). Your fourth and fifth questions relate to the procedure for removal of the officers in question.
' In Shriber v. Culberson, 31 S.W.2d 659 (Tex.Civ.App., 1930, no writ hist.), the court, recognizing that the purpose of taxation is to raise required revenue, held there was nothing either illegal or wrong in the board of equalization fixing the value of property at an amount sufficient to raise the required revenue, provided said valuation does not exceed the actual cash market value of the property. There is no contention by plaintiffs that the valuation fixed exceeded the actual cash market value of their property.
And the Board of Equalization violated no law when they went about their assessing and equalizing processes in such manner as to raise said amount. Jopling v. City of La Grange, Tex.Civ.App., 256 S.W.2d 901; Shriber v. Culberson, Tex.Civ.App., 31 S.W.2d 659; McPhail v. Tax Collector, Tex.Civ.App., 280 S.W. 260; Druesdow v. Baker, Tex.Com.App., 229 S.W. 493. The record before us discloses, as we have already pointed out, that the final, complete list of assessment valuations was presented by the Tax Assessor to the Board of Equalization in August 1955.
We overrule appellants' fifth point. Blewett v. Richardson Ind. School Dist., Tex.Com.App., 240 S.W. 529; Shriber v. Culberson, Tex.Civ.App., 31 S.W.2d 659; McPhail v. Tax Collector of Van Zandt County, Tex.Civ.App., 280 S.W. 260. Having disposed of all of appellants' points and concluding that none of them discloses a reversible error, an affirmance of the judgment of the district court is accordingly ordered.
It is a generally recognized rule that where one under color of right enters into the possession of an office and exercises the functions thereof, he is a de facto officer and the acts performed by him as such are valid so far as the public or third parties are concerned, notwithstanding he is not actually authorized to fill such office. Blewett v. Richardson Ind. School District (Tex.Com.App.) 240 S.W. 529; Martin v. Grandview Ind. School District (Tex.Civ.App.) 266 S.W. 607; Shriber v. Culberson (Tex.Civ.App.) 31 S.W.2d 659; Germany v. State, 109 Tex.Cr.R. 180, 3 S.W.2d 798; Broach v. Garth (Tex.Civ.App.) 50 S.W. 594; 46 C.J. 1060; 22 R.C.L. 601. Bonds given as security for the discharge of the duties of an office are good although the principals thereon are officers de facto only since neither the principal nor the sureties may be heard to impeach the official title of the principal.