Shoyer v. Wright-Ginsberg Co.

4 Citing cases

  1. Irving Trust Co. v. Lindner Bro., Inc.

    190 N.E. 332 (N.Y. 1934)   Cited 7 times

    "The lien of a factor at common law," within the meaning of the last clause of the amendment, whether emphasis be placed on the word "lien" or on the word "factor," and without regard to the definition of the word "factor" as including a pledgee who advances money on goods pledged though not employed to sell them, when reasonably interpreted, can only be understood to mean a lien which did not come into existence through statutory enactment, the lien not of a factor who becomes such by legislative nomenclature and definition but of the "ordinary factor" as known to the common law. "The standard, presumptive meaning of the word `factor' does include and denote a selling agent." ( Shoyer v. Wright-Ginsberg Co., 240 N.Y. 223, 230, 232; Duguid v. Edwards, 50 Barb. 288, 295; Howland v. Woodruff, 60 N.Y. 73, 80.) As suggested in Shoyer v. Wright-Ginsberg Co. ( supra), under a particular contract, the definition of factor may have to yield to "commercial and trade usages and understanding at least in the locality" where the contract was made, and in accordance with such usages the word "factor" may no longer, under the circumstances involved in a particular litigation, indicate "a person enjoying the powers and bearing the responsibilities of a selling agent.

  2. D. S. Pate Lumber Co. v. Weathers

    167 Miss. 228 (Miss. 1933)   Cited 23 times

    Appellant should have absorbed whatever commission he would have had to pay the broker. Shoyer et al. v. Edmund Wright-Ginsberg Co., 240 N.Y. 223, 148 N.E. 328, 330. Appellant has no right to charge the fifty-cent brokerage.

  3. Lucisano v. Paratore

    195 Misc. 45 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1949)   Cited 1 times

    Pursuant to this principle, parol evidence of a trade usage or custom is admissible, not to contradict the express terms, but to show the special meaning of words. Thus parol evidence was received to explain "on approval" in the diamond trade; "order" in a sale of books; "for the season" in a contract of employment; "factor" in a contract for the disposition of goods. ( Smith v. Clews, 114 N.Y. 190; Newhall v. Appleton, 114 N.Y. 140; Shoyer v. Wright-Ginsberg Co., 240 N.Y. 223.) Likewise in a contract for the sale of paper of a certain quality, parol evidence was admissible to show a trade usage as to variation in grade and thickness of the paper.

  4. Lemnos Broad Silk Works, Inc., v. Spiegelberg

    127 Misc. 855 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1926)   Cited 8 times

    The defendants in the contract see fit to style themselves "factors and commission merchants." In the juridical sense they were not factors, no more than Edmund Wright-Ginsberg Company were factors in the recently decided case of Shoyer v. Wright-Ginsberg Co. ( 240 N.Y. 223), referred to by both counsel in their briefs with incorrect citation. (See 240 N.Y. 226, opinion of HISCOCK, Ch. J., at 232.)